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ABSTRACT
Following the British occupation of Egypt, the 
political influence and the economic position of the 
Egyptian large landowners was greatly enhanced. In 
1907, a group of provincial notables and intellectuals 
encouraged by Lord Cromer, published the daily ;1-Jaridah 
and formed the 1Ummah Party. The policies and ideas of 
the new movement were largely governed by the financial 
and political interests of the wealthy families in the 
countryside, and by their efforts to check the growing 
influence of the Egyptian sovereign and the increasing 
popularity of the radical demand of the Patriotic Party 
for complete independence. In the years which elapsed 
before the outbreak of the First World War, the 'Ummah 
Party not only consolidated its relative control over 
the provinci"^ a.l nat?. c: ax representative institutions, 
but also acquired a greater measure of political influence 
throughout the country as the numerical strength and the 
functions of these institutions were increased.
However, at the beginning of the War, the British 
authorities declared Egypt a Protectorate, placed the 
country under martial law, and eventually dissolved the 
newly-formed Assembly, Consequently, these measures
greatly undermined the political 'position of the 1 Ummah 
Party and impelled its leading members to co-operate 
first v/ith Sultan Husain and later Fu'ad In an effort to 
induce the Brinish government to restore the earlier 
system cf self-government,
A similar attempt was made at the end of the War, 
when a group of Egyptian notables and former members of 
bbe 'Ummah Party, under the leadership of Sa°d Zagnlul 
formed the Wafd to advocate Egyptian autonomy. As the 
movement, however, rapidly gained the support of the 
middle and lower classes, its demand for self-govern­
ment was superseded by that of complete independence,. . 
Consequently, the majority of its founding members, who 
were keenly interested in preserving their relationship 
v/ith Britain, left the Wefd and formed the Liberal 
Constitutionalists Party,
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INTRODUCTION
This study endeavours to explain the role played 
by a group of Egyptian intellectuals and local notables 
in the political life of Egypt, during the period 
1907 - 1921. More specifically, it is an attempt to 
discover some of the main underlying factors which 
determined the ideological orientation and the political 
behaviour of the rising native political elite, at a 
time when the country witnessed the ;/olution of political 
parties and the emergence of the national movement for 
independence. This process is examined in the light of 
the political and some aspects of the social conditions 
which prevailed in Egypt after the British occupation, 
and more particularly in relation to the way in which 
this new political elite utilised the new provincial 
and national 4 ..r^ i tut ions in its searcu for political 
dominance.
The method of study involves a discussion of the
relationship which existed between the emerging elite
and ohe occupation authorities, as well as the relation­
al
ship wirh the indigenous class of provincial notables.
1, It is essential to bear in mind that the reference to 
the "class of provincial notables" is made in terms
/Continued overleaf
While recognising the informative value of approaching 
the development of the political outlook of the new elite 
in terms of the impact of European political ideas, it is, 
however, more important for purposes of analysis to view 
the question in the context of the specific relation­
ships which this group of Egyptian political notables 
established with the occupying Power and with toeir com­
patriots. Equally important in this connection is to 
stress the point that the ideas, aspirations and policies 
of the group were to a large extent snaped by their deep 
interest in promoting their political influence in the 
administration through the conclusion of a new political 
arrangement with the British authorities.
Therefore, though the first chapter focusses on the 
consequences of Cromer*s policy of financial and adminis-
Footnote 1 continued from previous page
of ] andownt .'snip, and in terms of positions'of social 
and political influence in the administration, the 
press, the free professions and the local represen­
tative institutions. Furthermore, it is important 
to note that in an era characterised by the rapid 
gi*>wthof the political and economic dominance of 
Western Europe over a number of developing countries, 
including Egypt, the political role of the rural 
upper classes in these areas as well as the problems 
which they faced greatly differed from those of the 
European class of sanded gentry.
9trative reforms in Egypt, it is not the intention of 
this research to present a socio-economic analysis of 
Egyptian society during the period under discussion, 
but merely to define m  general terms the economic, 
social and political bases for the emergence of the 
new e1ite. In this context, the first chapter tries 
to show that the new system of Government which Britain 
introduced and the relative economic stability which 
Egypt enjoyed under Cromer, not only consolidated 
the financial position of the class of provincial 
notables but also introduced a large number of its mem­
bers into the local and central administration.
The second chapter examines the wider political 
implications of these favourable conditions under which 
the new group of political notables evolved* It first 
deals with the question of how in the course of pur­
suing their own interests they came to form an alliance 
v/ith the British authorities to curb the influence of 
the Panislamic and Patriotic movement sponsored by the 
Khedive; and secondly how this political stand was 
expressed in the writings of their principal spokes­
men in al-Jarideh and other sources, and in the policies 
pursued by the 1Ummah Party.
Chapter three discusses the changes in the structure
10.
and functions of the Provincial Councils, the Shiakhat 
Commissions, the umda institution and the national 
representative bodies, which enabled the 'Ummsh Party to 
exercise its political influence on a local and national 
level, in the period between 1907 and 1914. At the 
same time, it is shown that by the beginning of the 
First World War, a great number of middle landowners 
had also gained a certain measure of control over the 
provincial administration, mainly through their re^uit- 
ment to the Cantonal Courts and the post of umdas, or 
by their election to the membership of the Provincial 
Councils.
The fourth chapter inquires.into the sudden decline 
in the political power of the 1Ummah Party following the 
declaration of the British Protectorate over Egypt, and 
the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly. The emphasis, 
however, is laid on the growing disenchantment of the 
members of the Paity and the Egyptian sovereign with the 
occupying Pow^r. and the successive proposals which they 
jointly made throughout the period of the War to restore 
their pravious political and economic privileges.
Chapter five is devoted to an analysis of the 
political tendencies which existed in the V/afd since its 
inception in November 1913, and the consequent events
which culminated in the withdrawal of the compromising 
faction, traditionally committed to the principles of 
the ^mmah Party from the movement,, It further inquires 
into the social and political causes of the 1919 
unrising, and examines the role played by the peasants, 
the middle classes, and the large proprietors during 
and after the rebellion.
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CHAPTER I
THE IMPACT OF THE BRITISH OCCUPATION ON THE ECONOMIC 
BASIS PQR THE EVOLUTION OF AN EGYPTIAN POLITICAL ELITE
The British occupation of Egypt in 1882 ushered a 
nev; er' in the political ^nd social development of the 
country, Britain1s reluctance to remain in Egvpt during 
the early years of 4"he occupation soon gave way by the end 
of the 1880s to a change of attitude which came "to regard
A
Egypt in the light of a colony". ' T>-is was generally a 
result of the growing competition among the European 
Powers to expend their possessions in Africa during the 
second half of the 19th century, but more specifically 
it was a consequence of the mounting Anglo-German rivalry 
which "was influencing British strategic thinking about 
Egypt". But aside from the international rivalries 
and complications which accompanied Britain’s increasing 
involvement in Egypt, the local scene was largely governed 
by the policies of the British Consul-General in Egypt.
The chief task of the Consul-General was to achieve
1. A.L, Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer, London, 1968, p. 81. 
See R.L. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial 
Rule m  Egypt 1882-191A~^^inceton, 1966 / for an 
informative study on the reasons for the British occu­
pation of Egypt.
2. P.J, Vetikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt, London-
-)69, pp. 240-241.
15 c
financial solvency and to reform the administration of 
the country following a period of economic disruption 
and political instability.
Cromer believed that sound finance was the foun­
dation stone on which the prosperity of all states 
rest 1. He recalled that on his arrival in Egypt 
he realised that the removal of the "shadow of bank­
ruptcy" was to uek precedence over everything else.^
But the fulfilment of such an objective largely relied 
on his policy for the reorganisation of the machinery 
of the state and the proper allocation of Government 
expenditure uo produce a favourable environment in 
Egypt for the encouragement of the foreign investors 
and local farmers.
Bor some years before the occupation the Egyptian 
economy had been largely dependent on the expansion and 
export of the ^otton crop to Europe, n^bably Britain.
The Bhedive 1IsmaCil encouraged the influx of a con­
siderable number of Europeans to finance and technically 
direct the process of cotton production and export, and 
to ^ d e m i s e  the administration and the system of edu-
IL
cation. Bearing in mind the priority of financial
3. B.O. 800/46, Cromer to Gray, 8 March 1907•
4. Vatikiotis, pp. 86-87*
recovery and aware of the financial restrictions which 
the Powers imposed on Egypt's spendings, Lord Cromer 
continued to rely on the European investors and the 
Egyptian landowners. Politically, however, this policy 
led, in the first instance, to the installation of an 
increasing number of British officials in the Egyptian 
administration, and to the consolidation and promotion 
of the economic interests and political position ^  
the class of Egyptian large landowners. Simultaneously, 
the legislative powers of the Khedive and his control 
over the agricultural fortunes of the country through 
taxation were curbed, and his authority was confined to 
the administration of Muslim institutions. On the 
other hand, Cromer's policy towards the European resi­
dents in Egypt was determined by two conflicting con­
siderations: the desire to rid the Egyptian adminis­
trator from c e snackle^, of the Capitulations, ana at 
the same time Ghe determination to avoid incurring the 
hostility and suspicion of the European business com­
munity. In the last resort the latter consideration 
seemed to dominate the attitude of the Consul-General.
During the first twenty-five years of the occupation, 
Egypt witnessed the gradual establishmenc of British 
cortrol over the administration, the consolidation of
15.
the independent economic position of the class of 
provincial notables vis-a-vis the Khedive, and last 
but not least the decline of the political and economic 
influence of the traditional sovereign. The purpose 
of this section of oui study is to outline the general 
development ot these tendencies in the light of the 
predominant economic considerations, which to a great 
extent guided the local policies of the Consul-General.
In addition to his f .i rm belief in the principle 
of the white man's burden, end apart from being a des­
cendant of a well-known banking family, Cromer already 
had an intimate knowledge of the administration and 
finances of Egypt and India, which made his appoint­
ment to the post of Consul-General more than reasonable. 
First on his agenda was the urgency of the financial 
situation. Towards the end of 1882, Britain abolished 
the system ci v/o-urolle- 3 and substituted it by the 
post of Britis.i Financial Adviser. In doing so she 
practically established her exclusive control over the 
administration of Egyptian finance, a move to which 
France strongly objected out without avail. In 1884, 
Egyptian Departments were advised to pay the balance of 
their receipts direct to the Treasury, instead of to 
the Caisse de la Dette-Publique. The Powers represented
16
on the Caisse protested against whet they considered 
to be an illegal step taken by Britain, but after 
strenuous pressure they finally endorsed Britain’s 
action by signing the London Convention in 1885.
The Powers in London also consented to Egypt’s request 
to negotiate a loan of L.E. 9 million to offset her 
deficit, and allowed the Egyptian Government tc have 
some freedom in the allotment and expenditure of her
5
revenues. The agreement also entitled the Egyptian
Government to call upon the Caisse for funds to finance
any kind of expenditure which fell into a newly-defined
category, but the Caisse retained the right to authorise
this new category. As a result,
"The Caisse became a barometer of 
the international situation, and 
the degree of co-operation between 
the various Powers and England 
was measured by whether they helped 
or killed a reform that called for 
mo‘_ , ." 6
However, ultimobely a satisfactory settlement with Prance 
was reached in 1904, when the Anglo-Brench Entente removed 
ail restrictions on the use of revenues and led to the 
release of a large amount of the reserve funds. The
5. A.E. Crouchley, Investment of Foreign Capital in 
Egyptian Companies and Public Debt, Cairo, 1950, 
p. 23.
6, /i.l'-Sayyid, E^ypt and Cromer, p. 44.
agreement was later recognised by the other Powers 
represented on the Caisse.
Despite these successful moves towards the exclu­
sive independence of the British Administrator in the 
management of the financial affairs of the Egyptian 
Government, the influence of the Powers still made 
itsel’f felt through the Capitulations. The privileges 
conferred upon the European residents in Egypt, s-.xtce 
the 16th century, gave them a decisive sezr in judicial 
and financial matters. The Egyptian Government was 
unable to impose on them, without their consent, new 
taxes. This proved to be a handicap to several attempts 
which were made to increase the revenues of the country. 
Lord Milner, in retrospect, regretted that Britain did 
not declare Egypt a protectorate or even a temporary 
protectorate. He believed that this would have led 
to the suspension of the Capitulations or indeed their
n
abandonment altogether.' Cromer was aware of the 
obstacles which the Capitulations placed before the 
financial administration of the country, but at the same 
time he regarded their modification before the final 
agreement wrth France in 1904-, a measure outside the
7. A. Milner, England in Egypt. 9th ed., London, 1902.
Q
realm of practical politics. He fully appreciated the 
vital importance of the European residents to the 
Egyptian economy, and was averse to any change which 
would provoke rheir opposition. However* after 1904, 
in an attempt to procure the confidence of the business 
community, Cromer urged the Foreign Secretary on several 
occasions to extract from the British Cabinet a dec­
laration to uhe effect that the British occupatior would 
c
be permanent.' He was at that time proposing a plan 
for the modification of the Capitulations. He recom­
mended that
.......... "The British Government should request
the Poweis of Europe to vest in them 
the legislative power which each now 
exercises separately. Simultaneously 
with this request, a legislative 
Chamber should be crea bed in Egypt 
for enacting laws to which Europeans 
will be amenable." 10
The realisation of such a scheme would have undoubtedly
given the British Government a fresh source of influence
as the common capitulatory authority ever foreigners in
EgyP'C' Moreover, Britain would have acquired a potent
vc'OC5 in Egyptian legislation and indirectly in Egyptian
administration, as only very few legislative measures
could have been effected in the country unless they
were applicable to foreigners.
8. ‘/romer, Political and Literary Essays. Vol.I, London, 
1915, p. 162.*
9. P.O. 800/46, Cromer to Grey, 12 and 16 January 1907*
10. Cromer, Political and Literary Essays, Vol. I, p. 167.
The atbempt of Cromer to persuade the European
residents to surrender their privileges to Britain
failed. His efforts early in 1907 to achieve the
agreement of the European Chambers of Commerce for his
scheme were unsuccessful. The Italian Chamber opposed
his plan, and finally the International Chamber of
Commerce in Cairo came out publicly against it ^
The matter was of such personal importance to Cromer
that, less than a month before, he had privately informed
the Foreign Secretary of his intention to resign his
post in Egypt; he wrote to him that despite his old
age and failing health he remained in Egypt to carry
through the reform of the Capitulations and in order
not to give the appearance of being driven out by the
12"Moustapha Kameis". After his departure in May 
1907 the political and economic situation in Egypt 
underwent a .f c. ge anr1 Vic scheme for uhe modification 
of the Capitulations was for the time oeing shelved.
The British authorities were also unable to effect 
any substantial change in the functions of the Mixed 
Oour'cs, which were established in 1876 "both to mitigate
11. F.O. 8C0/46 Cromer*s correspondence with Grey during 
January 1907.
12. Ibid., Cromer to Grey, 3 March 1907o
20.
the effects on Egypt of the privileged status of
Europeans under the Capitulations and to curb the power
13of the Khedive; ...!l. There was a desire to modify
che working of the Courts to render Europeans liable 
to payment of certain taxes, but not co the extent 
of 9-.itagonising the foreign communities. In 1889, 
the Powers consented to the proposal that the Egyptian 
Government had the right to make bye-laws applicable to 
foreigners provided that the general assembly of the 
MtLxed Courts decreed they were legal ^  In effect 
this meant that legislation for the European residents 
remained a prerogative of the Mixed Courts.
Cromer was less unsuccessful 'when dealing with 
the purely Egyptian part of the administration. The 
defect of cUrabi and tne political events which led to 
the British occupation of Egypt had already undermined 
the position of the Khedive and his lo^al adminis­
tration. It was thought that a return to the absolute 
rule of the Khedive would immediately involve the intro­
duction of autocracy and intrigue, while a policy of 
self-ruie would bring about anarchy. Lord Dufferin 
was entrusted with the task of devising a scheme for
13. Vatikiotis, pp. 167-168.
14. Al-Seyyid, op.cit. , p-‘85.
the reorganisation of the administration. Apsrt from 
spelling out the current ideas or subject races and the 
inability of the 1 childish” Egyptians to rule themselves, 
his report in 1883 conferred upon the executive all 
powers of legislation and assigned to the decisions of 
the Legislative Council and General Assembly an advisory 
role. It was thus left for the Consul-General in 
matters pertaining to the native population, unimpeded 
by the capitulations, to utilise the wide powers of the 
executive for the realisation of the tasks of the British 
occupation. Tranquility and public order was a vital 
issue on which the efforts of the Consul-General were 
concentrated. The protection of the property and 
lives of foreigners was, after all, one of the pretexts 
for the occupation of Egypt. The police force in the 
provinces was unaer the authority of the mudirs (governors 
of provinces') who were in charge of z Vblic order in 
their provinces. Gradually the force came under the 
control of British officers in the police department of 
the Ministry of Interior. Brirish inspectors and sub- 
iuspa^tors of Interior were despatched to the provinces 
to report on the conditions prevailing in the remotest 
districts. In 1891, 9 British adviser to the Interior 
was appointed. The principal departments of the 
Ministry, the police, prisons and sanitation were already
under the control of a British director-general. By
1895, the Ministry of Interior, for all practical intents
and purposes, was under the paramount influence of the
British Adviser snd British personnel. Cromer observed
that ^his tended to weaken the authority of the mudirs,
but he obviously did not contemplate in the least
remedying the situation. He was more inclined to
believe that
"the total withdrawl of thr Inspectors
from the provinces would be attended
with a serious risk that many of the
abuses of the past would reappear and,
generally, that great administrative
confusion would arise." 15...................
Another area in which Cromer sought to consolidate 
British influence was the Ministry of Justice. Here, 
however, he faced the difficulty cf recruiting enough 
Englishmen who were familiar with the French penal 
code to be e .o, ,d in t .e Ministry. A change, cn the 
other hand, in the whole judicial system itself would 
have inconvenienced most, if not all, of the native and 
foreign judges and lawyers. The appointment of two 
successive British Judicial Advisers in the early years 
of the occupation proved urusuccessful. A Belgian was
15. Cromer, Modern Egypt, vol. II, London, 1908, 
p . 489 -
appointed in 1887 Procureur-Generel, and in co-operation 
with Kitchener, he produced in the course of 1888 an 
elaborate report on the irregularities of Commissions 
of Brigandage. These commissions were established 
earl"1 3r to deal with crime in the provinces; but 
according to the report they proved to be incompetent, 
and therefore were suppressed. Cromer thus suggested 
strenghening the native courts by the appointment of 
European judges. In 1889 two addit-' onal Englishmen 
were appointed to the Native Court of Appeal, making in 
ell three Belgians and three Englishmen. The appoint­
ment of Belgian judges served the double purpose of 
enxisting the services of qualified persons and at the 
same time forestalled French interference in the native 
courts. Finally in 1890, a British judge from the 
Indian service was appointed Judicial Adviser.
The development of Egypt's agricultural potential 
depended largely on the efficient administration of the 
Ministry of Public vforks. The British occupation, 
cware of the vital importance of this department to 
the whole population and economy of the country, moved 
rapidly to bring it under its direct influence. A 
British Adviser was appointed in 1883, Qnd by 1890 a 
nei of British inspectors had covered the country to
perform the function of supervising the distribution
of water* The inspectors also settled disputes over
the distribution of waters and came into direct
contact with the provincial officials and the village
head .on. Tignor descrioed their influence in the
following words:
"When it is kept in mind that 
irrigation was the lifeblood of 
Bgypt and that those unable to 
procure water could not raise their 
crops, it is possible to it .derstand 
the vast powers exercised by these -.g 
officials /Inspectors of Irrigation/."
The systematic transfer of the different sections 
of the administiation into the hands of British officials 
led to a situation where British influence was not con­
fined to the central departments in Cairo, but pene­
trated into the provinces and villages through the 
persons of the British inspectors of Interior, inspectors 
of irrigation and the British Consuls in provincial 
toms. Under Khedive Tawfiq, the British authorities 
had little difficulty in dealing with the occasional 
cbjmotions of the native ministers to the incieasing 
British interference in their departments. Cromer, 
nevertheless, was anxious to undermine the position of 
the Ministers and the Khedive. In 1883 Sharif Pasha
16. Tignor, p. 115-
insisted on the reconquest of the Sudan, but Cromer
objected on financial grounds and took the opportunity
to request the Foreign Secretary to send the Khedive a
message categorically emphasising that Egyptian ministers
and governors of provinces should adopt the policy
recommended by Britain.’*-'7 The Foreign Secretary
approved Cromer's lequest and Sharif Pasha resigned.
The wider impact of the incident was very significant,
it established the principle that in its general policy
the Egyptian Government should be guided by the decision
of the British Government. In another instance, Nub£r
Pasha was forced to relinquish his office as Prime
Minister, as he objected to placing the police force
under the command of British officers. Riad Pasha
*
resigned the premiership when he refused to yield on 
the question x dissolv^^g the Commissions of Brigandage.
Until the accession of cAbbas Hilmi to the Khedivate, 
the choice of Ministers did not seem to pose any difficult 
problem for Cromer. But when cAbbas on January 15,
1895 dismissed Mustafa Fahmi and appointed Fakhrl Pasha, 
without prior consultation with the Consul-General, 
the latter thought it advisable to teach the young
IQ
Khedive a lesson. The very next day he presented
17. Cd. no. 38^4 (1884).
18. Cromer, Abbas II. London, 1915, p. 24.
the Khedive with a note from the Foreign Secretary
strongly asserting the right of the British Government
to be consulted in such matters. The Khedive was
prevented from appointing his own prime minister, and
at a xater date, Cromer won over the issue and appointe 1
Mustsf5 Fahml. From that time on Cromer often referred •.
to the Ministers as "dummies'* or "cyphers" thus 
reflecting on their absolute subservience to the wishes 
of the Consul-General. Furthermore, the British 
Advisers now sat in Cabinet meetings without formal 
invitation.
It is very significant at this point to note 
that the establishment of British political and adminis­
trative paramountey in Egypt basically served the 
purpose of developing the agricultural potential of 
the country reorganising its financial system. 
Cromer, deterred by the lack of funds to spend on 
schemes for the extension of irrigation and the develop­
ment of the cotton crop, and by the obstructive tactics 
of the Powers, urged his Government at home to negotiate 
the London Convention. The measure of control which he 
had already acquired over the Ministry of Finance 
enabled him to divert part of the loan, sanctioned by 
the Powers to make good Egypt's deficit, to the use 
of the Ministry of Public Works. This portion of the
27.
loan "was without doubt, ... destined for the recon-
19struction of the Delta Barrage", J under the super­
vision of the British Adviser, Scott-Moncrieff. The 
Barrage which was put into operation in the summer of 
1891, provided a large amount of extra summer water in 
the Delta and increased the cultivated area in Beheira 
and C-harbia Provinces.
The Aswan Dam was completed in 1902; it increased 
the supply of water for summer use in the Delta and 
extended cultivation to a great area of land along the 
fringes of the Delta* The construction of the Dam was 
at first hampered by the restrictions on the reserve 
fund, but in 1893 the Government was able to avoid this 
obstacle by signing a contract with a British firm.
The contractors accepted payment by instalments and 
the effect c f *-be agreement was similtr to a 30 years 
loan of £2 million at about 6# interest. In the same 
year a Barrage at Assiut was also finished and it allowed 
the conversion of extensive areas from basin to perennial 
irrigation in Middle Egypt. The Daira Saniya Company 
took over from the Government in 1893 and by 1907 the 
Daira had actually reclaimed and sold some 300,000 feddans.
19« Croucnley, The Investment of Foreign Capital .... 
p. 23.
Between 1897 and 1906, the Domain land under the direct
control of the Government and a British Director-General
was able to sell some 85,000 feddans. Foreign land
companies were encouraged to invest in reclamation and
drainage schemes. The first Financial Adviser to
Egypt estimated thac between 1884 and 1908 more than
20£11 million was sunk in irrigation projects. Tcrd
Milner, in describing the weakest point of tho severe
British financiers who controlled the destinies of
Egypt, wrote: "The Finance Ministry, while turning a
deaf ear to.other claims, showed from the first a . .
certain leniency to the demands which were made upon it
P~
in the name of irrigation." x
Following the extension of the cultivated area 
and the development of the irrigation sysrem, heavy 
expenditure w s incurred in other departments of the 
administration for the import of supplies and material 
to cope with tne expansion of cotton production and the 
increase in trade. In 1883 office under British 
direction was established in London for the inspection 
of railway materials oought in Britain and the Continent
20. A. Colvin, The Making of Modern Egypt, London,
1906, p. 292.
21. Milner, p. 87.
for the use of the Egyptian State Railways Department. 
After 1896 the office was charged with works for other 
Government departments of both Egypt and the Sudan. 
However, because of the lack of funds, the Government 
encouraged railway companies to buy concessions.
This led to the extension of the Government line of 
railways from Qena to Aswan by the Qena-Aswan Railway 
Company formed in 1895* Another line was built between 
Ismailie and Port-Said and was run by the Suez Canal 
Company. In both cases, aware of the importance of 
controlling communications and revenues from these 
enterprises, the Government re-purchased the conces­
sions. Similar concessions were given to the Egyptian 
Delta Light Railways Company for introducing agri­
cultural railway lines in the Delta. The set of 
standard gaug railways in 1877 comprised of 1519 
kilometers, and increased by 1913 to 2593* In 1902, 
there were already over 1000 kilometers of light agri­
cultural railways chiefly in the Delta and Payyoum, and 
by 19JA they had increased to some 1400 kilometers.
In 1913, relative to its population and inhabited area, 
Egypt was well provided and better off than most 
countries in the world with its net of extensive railway
2 2communications.
The management of the increasing export of the 
cotton crop initiated the improvement of transport by 
the means of building agricultural roads. These were 
financed by local taxation in the Sharqia and Daqahlir 
provinces, and late^* were extended to Beheira and the 
rest of lower Egypt. Between 1890 and 1899 over 2000 
kilometers of such roads were built.
The period following the signature of the Anglo- 
Prench Entente up to 1907, was one of heavy expenditure 
by the Government especially on drainage and irrigation, 
railways and telegraphs, but mostly on railways. ^
Other measures were taken by the Egyptian Government to 
provide for the protection and increase of the cotton 
crop. Between 1885 end 1889 the corvee (forced labour 
for public \o was abolished. Previously the burden 
of this tax fell wholly on the agricultural workers and 
small pe&sents, but its abolition was chiefly inspii’ed by
22. 0. Issawi, ’’Asymmetrical Development and Transport 
In Egypt, 1800-1914”, (ed.) W.R. Polk and R.L. 
Chambers, Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle 
East, London, 1968, pp. 383-400.
23. See the annual reports of the British Consul*
General for the years 1905-08.
the desire to release a greater number for agricultural
labour. Crouchley stated:
"the abolition of the corvee for 
clearing out the canals, which had 
previously occupied a large part of 
agricultural labour of the country, 
had resulted in very large increase 
in the crops of the country; ..." 2;’
Furthermore, the provincial administration and village 
headmen were charged with the task of combating the 
cotton-worm, and Inspectors of Irrig* tion and Interior 
were despatched to all parts of che country to supervise 
the implementation of the directions of their respective 
departments. Penalties were imposed on native 
officials and Umdas who did not comply with the direc­
tions of the authorities. In 1905 ©11 cultivators were 
compelled by a Khedival decree to report the appearance 
of the cotton-vorm and then to take pr liminary stens 
to combat it. In 1906 special British inspectors were 
sent to the provinces to ensure that the orders of the 
Government were carried out.^ In 1898 the Khedival 
Agricultural Society was formed for the purpose of 
selection and distribution of seeds to the growers,
24. Crouchley, The Investment of Foreign Capital .... 
pp. 50-51.
25. E.R. Owt.n, Cotton and the Egyptian Economy. 1820- 
1914. London, 1969, p. 216.
while the Government subsidised the initial purchases 
of the Society.
During the period 1832 to 1907, the functions of 
the Egyptian Administration were mainly determined by 
the need co develop the cotton sector of the economy.
The attention paid by the British authorities to Govern­
ment Departments, tne money allocated for the use ^f each 
of these Departments, and the degree of British control 
over them, depended largely on the part which each per­
formed in the effort to meet this economic priority.
While the British Financial Adviser was generous with 
the Ministry of Public Works, he refused adamantly to 
respond to the demand for the increase of the expen­
diture on public education. Moreover, while Cromer 
was in no mood to delay the appointment of British 
Advisers in j t e ji^nistr^ ol Finance and Public Works 
and to effect radical changes in the budgetary system 
despite the objections of the Powers, he was in no 
such hu^ry to impose too promptly his control on the 
other Departments.
The production of cotton in Egypt was greatly 
dependent on two factors: the Egyptian landowner end
peasant, and the European entrepreneur and European 
capital. The Egyptians provided the land and the labour
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force, while the Europeans advanced money to the growers 
and the Alexandria merchants handled the yield for 
export. This was the general framework of the process 
of agricultural production in Egypt. A vital task of 
the nritish-controlled siate apparatus was to act through 
Government expenditure as a catalyst to encourage the 
inflow of foreign capital to be invested in enterprises 
directly and indirectly related to the process of cotton 
production. The bulk of these investments went into 
the undertakings of mortgage banks, which accounted in 
1902 and 1907 for 42$ and 46$ respectively of the total 
paid-up capital and debentures of companies operating 
in Egypt. The remaining part of the money was placed 
in transport companies, commercial firms, end a few 
industrial enterprises. The pattern of movement of 
foreign capiJ_ 1 rres closoly related to che increasing 
spendings of Government on irrigation schemes, railways 
and agricultural roads. It was further encouraged by 
the growth of the cotton harvest in the lC90s to double 
the size of the 1880s, and by the tremendous increase of 
the value of the cotton crop between 1898 and 1913* 
Consequently there was a steady increase in the rent 
and value of rural and urban land and a sharp rise in 
the cost of living.
Another task of the Colonial Administration was 
to preserve harmony between the two major forces of 
production, namely, the Egyptian and European elements, 
both of which were indispensable in their own right to 
the process of cotton production. This was implemented 
by various methods, ranging from direct interv ;ntion 
by legislation uoral persuasion, the underlying 
principle being the preservation of the division of 
labour between the Egyptian producei and the Eurupean 
financier. Cromer frequently intervened to redress this 
balance wnenever one of the elements seemed to trans­
gress over the assigned part of the other. He also 
kept a watchful eye on changes in land ownership.
He was strongly averse to the danger of replacement 
of native landowners by Europeans. He wrote in the 
annual report tor 1904:
"The policy of the Egyptian Government 
has been to erdeavour to maintain the 
small proprietors, and whilst affording 
all reasonable facilities for the 
employment of European Capital in land 
development, to do nothing which would 
tend towards ousting native proprietors 
and substituting Europeans in their 
place." 26
Furthermore, a decree was issued enabling the growers 
to sell their cotton crop by contract. The purpose of
26. Egypt no. 1, (1905), Cd. 2409
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the measure was to prevent the European merchants from 
manipulating the purchase prices to the detriment of 
the interests of the Egyptian landowners. Likewise, 
Cromer rejected Egyptian demands for the extension of 
the powers of the Legislative Council, and strongly 
opposed any modification which would allow local or 
national native representative institutions to legis­
late for foreigners. He envisaged the future of Egypt 
to lie not in the "narrow nationalism" cf the native 
Egyptians, but rarher in that of an enlarged "cosmo­
politanism" which would tend to amalgamate all the 
inhabitants of the Nile Valley.^ But until that 
could be achieved it was necessary to maintain the 
Judicial and legislative independence of the European 
from the native Egyptian.
The stro g ^esire o^ perpetuate the situation was 
often reflected in some of the basic views which Cromer 
repeatedly voiced on the nature of Egyptians. Although 
admitting the numerical inferiority of European resi­
dents, he, nevertheless, denied the existence of an 
Egyptian nation. He claimed that the Europeans held 
a large portion of the wealth, and, therefore, Egypt
27. Cromer, Political and Literary Ecsays. p. 171.
belonged to them as much as it belonged to the millions
of natives. He advised Kitchener in 1912, that if a
scheme of representation for the Egyptian people was
ever to be implemented, it should equally include the
two communities. He told him:
"National representation in Egypt in 
the sense in which the term is generally 
used is a sheer absurdity, for the very 
natural and sufficient reason that the 
Egyptians are not a nation, and, so 
far as can now be foreseen are not 
likely to be a nation, at all events
during the lifetime of any person now
living." 28
Cromer*s attitude towards what he called the "Egyptian
reformer" was again governed by the cautious policy
of granting the reformer a certain measure of support,
yet withholding it whenever these reforms were pushed
29"so far as to shake the whole political fabric
Equally . up.rtsnt : i zhe process of cotton production, 
apart from capital, was the part played by the Egyptian
fellah and landowner. In terms of the functions they
performed, thev formed a dependent and integral part of 
the economy. On the other hand, they seemed to enjoy a
28. P.R.O. 30/57/no.42, Cromer to Kitchener, 25 July 
1912.
29* Cromer, Modern Egypt. Vol. II, p. 324.
certain measure of independence determined by their 
relationship to the land. To illustrate this pointy 
it would be convenient to trace briefly the transfor­
mation of land from being state property into full 
private ownership.
Under Muhammad AIT, land belonged to the Pasha, 
and uhe peasant was a mere agricultural worker defending
for his means of subsistence on what the state left
-z,
him after the collection of taxes. Muhammad CE1I«
had full control over the fortunes of Egypt. and conse­
quently over her people. However, in 184-0, the
31failure of the Government machine to collect the taxes,
and the decline of cotton prices in Europe induced him
to introduce the °uhda system, and to entrust the large
32estates to high officials and members cf his family* 
Similar meaji were I during the 1840s and large 
estates were offered to the ruling family and high 
ranking officials. But Muhammad CA1I and his successors
30. G. Baer, Population and Society in the Arab East. 
London, 1964, p.~139.
31. Owen, Cotton . ... p. 58.
32. Baer, 'The -Dissolution of the Egyptian Villgge 
Community1, Die Welt des Islams. N,S„ Vol. VI,
NR. 1-2, Leiden, 1959, pp. 56-70.
retained their influence over the new class of land­
owners through taxation, family allegiance, and irrigation 
schemes. The ruler also kept his firm grip on them by 
not granting them the full rights of ownership and the 
priv-.xeges attached to i: such as: inheritance, sale
or transfer. Baer states that some two-third.' to three- 
quarters of the °uhda were assumed by cAbb5s I ana 
incorporated in his own estate. The position of the 
landlords remained largely dependent on the Khedive.
They acted as intermediaries for the central adminis­
tration in the collection of taxes and the organi­
sation of the provinces. Under Khedive SacId steps 
were taken in the direction of introducing some aspects 
of private property. In 1855 & law was enacted "accor­
ding to which male descendents of a fallgh (and, 
under certain ^cumstancos, also female descendents) 
acquired the legal right to inherit his lands". But, 
a more decisive step was taken in 1858, by which "a 
person who had held a certain plot of Kharadjlya land 
lor fxve consecutive years, tilled it and paid its 
taxes, acquired irrevocable ownership of i t " I n
33. Baer, A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt, 
1800-1950. London, 1962, p. 14.
3^* Baer, 'The Dissolution of the Egyptian Village 
Community'. p . 66.
return for the security which SacId granted to the 
landholders, he imposed a system of individual 
taxation instead of the collective responsibility of 
the village for payment; of taxes. In 1854 SacId 
also imposed the _cushr t^x and in return full owner­
ship was escablished on the large estates. Receipts 
from land-tax increased from roughly £1,700,000 in 
1853 to £2,500,000 in 1858. Prom then 011 landowners 
bogsn to acquire an independent status from the ruler. 
The state thus gradually lost its political and economic 
control over the landowners as the principle of private 
ownership was increasingly established. The Khedive 
therefore began to rely on the manipulation of taxes 
and the allocation of money for public works. In 1866, 
'Isma Tl, unable t;o raise new loans, proposed in 
February to 1 v/ an a^ck*t?onal tax of o piastres per 
feddan. In April the figure in question rose to 10 
piastres, and in July the proposed increase was 20 
piastres. ^ He instituted a Legislative Assembly to 
vote in the new tax. This measure was taken partly 
to impress the Powers, but it was at the same time a 
clear indication of the growing influence of the new
35 D.S. Landes, Bankers and Pashas, New York, 1969,
pp. 259-260.
class of landowners. Though the majority of the members 
of the Assembly at that time were the yes-men of the 
Government, a few years later, as the number of dis­
satisfied landowners increased and the influence of 
army officers began to appear, the Assembly came to 
assert itself in a more independent manner from the 
Government?. dndei 'Ismacil the system of taxari^n 
was greatly tightened up as the Khedive's financial 
difficulties accumulated. The MuqSbala lav; of 1871 
enabled the owners of kharg ,iiya land to be freed from 
half their tax liability for life on payment of six 
years' tax in advance, and gave them further rights 
in the direction of full ownership.^ However, under 
the pressure of heavy taxation the condition of a large 
number of small peasants became untenable. Owen 
estimated the w e  land lost by the fallahin to the 
larger estates "during Ismacil's reign may have been 
considerably in excess of 300,000 feddans".^ The 
wealthy landowners were continuously alienated from 
the Khedive by the policy of heavy taxation and auto­
cratic rule which he and bis successors adopted at a 
time when, in their own right, the landowners had
36, Baer, Population and Society ... , p. 139#
37# Owen, Cotton ... , p. 148.
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attained relatively independent social and economic 
status.
During the period of cUrabi' s advent to power, 
their representatives in coalition with the officers 
and Jlama class headed by such men as Sultan Pasha, 
cUmar Lutfi and ’Isma0!! Ragheb, formed one of the 
leading political ^orces, which displayed great political 
influence in the struggle against the authority of the 
Khedive, and the events leading to tue British occu­
pation.^
It would appear that as Egypt from 1837 moved 
rapidly towards its almost total integrabion as an 
agricultural unit in the European commercial system, 
the rulerfs autnority over the country gradually dec­
lined. The more rIsmacIl borrowed from abroad the 
more bis cor-1— i over hi s subjects wee dened. At
first, when he was the sole landowner, his power in 
the country was almost absolute, but when under the 
increasing pressure of his debts he was gradually forced 
to ±eiax his hold on the land, and increasingly depended 
on the new emerging class of landowners, his influence 
decreased. He became more dependent on the land-tax 
for the payment of his European creditors, and the
38. Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer% p. 6.
civil and military administration, and for expenditure 
on irrigation schemes. Consequently, the land was 
transformed from being the monopoly of the state, 
passing through several intermediary stages, and ending 
as tne private property )f landholders. At the same 
time, this new class was increasingly asserting its 
independence from the Khedive. A final break occurred 
when the Khedive unwisely persisted in the use of his 
somewhat worn-out policy of heavy taxation.
Under the British occupation the authority of the
Khedive to impose taxes was withdrawn and the colonial
administration took matters into its own hands.
Cromer fully realised the importance of safeguarding
the interests of the landholders against the Khedive's
mismanagement of the finances of the country. Measures
to increase V „ 1and-t^x. ~f taken, would have provoked
the discontent of the Egyptian element in the process
of production, and would have consequently undermined
the economic system. Low taxation, therefore, became
one of the cornerstones of Cromer's policy in Egypt
and the Sudan. He wrote that:
"in the absence of ties, such *s 
community of race, language, religion 
and social customs, the only link 
between the governors and the governed 
is to be found in material interests, 
and amongst those interests by far the
4-3.
most important is the imposition 
of light fiscal burthens. X 
hold, therefore, that the political 
conditions with which we have to 
deal are such that all other con­
siderations must yield to the 
necessity of keeping taxation low*11^-'
As a matter of fact, throughout the years of Cromer*s 
stay in Egypt, the land-tax remained almost static..
The revenue of the Government from the land-tax in 1881 
was something like L.E. 4-; 881.,000 and in 1907 it did 
not exceed L.E. A,916,000. The benefits accruing
from the determined effort of Croner to increase the 
cotton production were not only confined to the foreign 
investors, but were also enjoyed by the Egyptian land­
owners. As already mentioned, the gradual abolition 
of the corvee released a large number of peasants to be 
employed on the land. The irrigation and drainage 
schemes and w e 2 mpro\ c?r 3ixl: of communications in the 
provinces, all contributed to the increase in the area 
under cultivation and to the development of the system 
of irrigation. Furthermore, during the 1890s the
position of the landowners was consolidated when all
cdifferences between the kharajiya and ’ushria land were 
finally abolished, and ,fThus the twentieth century 
found the agricultural land of Egypt held with full
4*0ownership rights (mulk), and no miri 2.and remains".
39. Cromer, Abbas II, from preface p.xxii.
4*0. Baer, Population and Society ... , p. 14-0.
However, these developments appeared to benefit 
some more than others. Changes in landholdings and 
the increase of the cultivated area during the years 
1893 to 1907 tended to favour the wealthier category 
of native landowners of 1*0 feddans or over. There 
was an increase in native holdings of roughly 304,000 
feddans, while some 128,000 feddans were lost by the 
mediun-size properties of 5 to 30 feddans to the small 
landowners of up to 5 feddans and to the large estates. 
Thirty-seven per cent of the area involved in these 
changes and others such as the sale of 400,000 feddans 
between 1897 3^ -d 1906 by the Daira Saniya and State 
Domains to the wealthier proprietors and the ordinary 
transactions involving the purchase, sale, or inheri­
tance of land, was acquired by the class of large 
landholders. Tvo remaning proportion mainly through 
inheritance became divided among the increasing number 
of small proprietors. However^ though the greater 
portion reverted to this latter class, the benefits were 
apparent rather than real, In 1898 the small proprietors 
appeared to be better off than in 19075 since the 
average holding per native landowner decreased from 
over 1.5 feddan to less than 1.2 feddan. On the other 
hand, despite the law of inheritance, uhe average holding
45.
o f the larger proprietor increased from 160 feddans to 
over 164 feddans. During the same period, the average 
holding of the middle class fallah slightly decreased, 
but oore important was the tendency of the medium- 
size estates to break up into smaller and smaller 
properties, because of the law of inheritance and to 
a lesser extent because of purchases by the richer 
landowners. Landholdings of up to  ^feddans of the 
total area owned by the native Fgyptisns increased 
from 23.4$ in 1898 to 27*6$ in 1907, those of 50 feddans 
or over from 37*1$ to 38.1$, while holdings between 5 
and 50 feddans decreased from 39*4$ to 34.2$. In 
the Gharbia province where the greatest increase of 
cultivated land was registered more than 54$ of the 
increase went to the upper class, 6$ to the middle class 
and 40$ to tho poorer peasants. In the Fayyoum 80$ 
of the absolute increase in cultivated area and changes 
in landholdings reverted to the rich peasants, and the 
remaining 20$ to the small Fa11abin, while the total 
area of the mediam-size estates decreased. Daqanlia, 
Iiinia and most of the other provinces showed the same 
patterns of change in the distribution of cultivated 
lari among the three categories of landowners. In 1907*
large estates formed 40$ of the privately owned land 
in lower Egypt belonging to the natives while the 
medium and small properties formed 32$ and 28$ respec­
tively. In Upper Egypt estates of 5-50 feddans formed 
40$ of the area owned by the natives, the remaining 
60$ was equally divided between the other two classes 
of landowners. 'The distribution of landownershin 
between various sizes, thus showed that there was 
greater concentration of large estates in Lower Egypt 
and especially in the cotton-growing provinces, while 
in Upper Egypt the dominant category was that of the 
middle landowners, with the exception of Minis and 
Feyyoum. The lot of the large proprietors was further 
enhanced by the facilities afforded to them by foreign 
investors. They became almost the exclusive clients of 
mortgage conv 3 ani v *nks. In his annual repcxt for 
1894, Cromer seated that over 70$ of the borrowings
from mortgage oanks were secured on properties of fifty
41feddais or over. The minimum loan of the Credit
Foncier was fixed at L.E. 200 and the advances on 
securities by the National Bank of Egypt increased from 
L.E. 1 million in 1901 to L.E. 3,500,000 in 1906.42
41. Egypt, No. 1 (1895), Cd. 7308.
42. National Bank of Egypt. 1898-1948. p. 34
4-7*
Again, as for the National Bank, "like all other com­
mercial banks, its business consisted mainly in financing 
the cotton crop by advancing to large growers, mer- 
chants, and exporters", ^ The greater part of these 
loans was used for additional purchases of land.
Bet ween 1900 and 1904- the total increase of the area 
of cultivable land amounted to 160,139 feddans. Appar­
ently 104,474- feddans of this increase were bought by 
the bigger landowners.^ It was around this time, in 
April 1903) that Bacd Zaghlul bought some 168 feddans 
in the Beheira province at L.E. 55 a feddan. _  While
Ahmad Lutfi al-oayyid's father could afford in 1906
4-6to buy his son 4-50 feddans. Names of prominent and 
wealthy landowners such as cAli Pasha Shacrawi, Iiassan 
Pasha cAsem, Hassan cAbdel RS'ziq and Mahmud eAbdel 
GhaffSr, appe ^ r^u in ±9-6 on the lists of administra­
tive councils of several land companies which they 
jointly ran with Europeans. Being the primary bene-
4-3. 0. Issawi, Egypt : An Economic and Social Analysis,
London, 194-7, p. 31.
4-4-. Egypt No. 1 (1905) Cd. 24-09,
4*5. Zaghlulfs Memoirs, 10 April 1903. ^This infor­
mation was found on a loose paper in notebook 27.)
46 A.A. Pahml, Hadhihi Haygtl. Cairo, 1963, p. 51.
ficiaries of the commercial and agricultural expansion 
which Egypt witnessed under Cromer, many of them were 
consequently able to move from the provinces to live in 
Cairo and Alexandria, leaving behind either a Nazir or 
a member of their family to supervise the work on thei^ 
estates.
The fortunes of the other classes of landowners, 
on the other hand, were declining. Apart from the 
decrease in the average holding of the small fellah. a 
large number of the members of this class were dropping 
out to become agricultural labourers. In 1907> the 
number of men engaged in agricultural works in Egypt 
was 2,258,000. The bulk of this rural population was 
either engaged in the cultivation of land taken on lease, 
or was employed as agricultural workers, farm servants,
Ll H
etc. 1 Crr u j. repeatedly drew atten: ion to the 
gra^e economic end political consequences of the 
situation. In 1906, he warned that, as the rapid 
increase in rural population was not matched by a similar 
rate of increase in the cultivated area, there was a 
risk of class conflict between landlords and tenants 
similar to that of India and Ireland. He proposed that,
4-7- Ministry of Finance, The Census of Egypt taken in 
1917. Cairo, 1921, p. 580.
"The best way to postpone this 
strife, as also to mitigate its 
intensity, should it eventually 
prove to be inevitable, will be 
to avoid the adoption of measures 
which will tend towards the dis- 
appearance of the small proprietor."
Cromer was strongly averse to the displacement of small 
proprietors by large landowners, more so if the latter 
were of European nationality. One of his main con­
cerns was to preserve a sizeable area of land for the 
mass of small peasants in order to avoid* rightly or 
wrongly, having on his hands a peasant uprising. He 
undoubtedly realjsed that such an eventuality would 
disrupt the whole economic system. He took special 
interest in the creation and development of the Agri­
cultural Bank of Egypt, founded in 1902 with the 
object of advancing money to small cultivators. The 
greater part ± 'he advances were secured by mortgage 
on land. In 1907, 22,594 loans amounting to a total 
of L.E. 217*153 were secured against promissory notes 
signed by the small fa11ah. at the same time the sum of 
L.E. 1,509,127 was put out to 24,487 borrowers against 
mortgage. The former loans ranged from L.E. 0*5 to 
L.E. 20, and the latter from L.E. 10 to L.E. 500 with
49an average of L.E. 9.5 and L.E. 55,4 as loan respectively.
48. Egypt no. 1 (1907) Od. 5394.
49. E.O. 568/284, Gorst to Grey, 20 March 1909, Enclosing
a note prepared by the Financial Adviser entitled:
* Memorandum regarding the Agricultural Bank of Egypt*.
50.
Assuming that the loan required by a small farmer often 
fell between L.E. 10 to L.E. 20, it was therefore very 
probable that the greater part of the money was received 
by farmers of medium and large-size properties. The 
small proprietor, thus, remained the victim of the 
moneylender and the exorbitant rate of interest which 
he charged. On the basis of the information con:r-led 
by a Commission appointed by Kitchener in 1912 to investi­
gate the debts of this category of small peasants, it
was found that the weight of approximately L.E. 16
million had been borne by the poorest class in Egypt.^ 
Despite the heavy borrowing of the Egyptian fallah from 
the usurer, the decline in his average landholding, and 
the increasing number cf landless peasants, the number 
of owners with 5 feddans or less still continued to 
increase. T is was mainly a result of the fragmen­
tation via inheritance cf some of the medium and sma11-
size holdings, the purchase of small parcels of land
51with the money borrowed, and the sequestration of
50. Egypt no. 1 (1914) Cd. 7358.
51. E.O. 568/284. The Financial Adviser wrote: "The
Agricultural Bank has furnished statistics as to the 
purpose for which loans were asked during three months 
of 1908; 2C# is said to be for the purchase of land,
44# for payment of debts, probably incurred in great 
part for the same purpose. It is in fact admitted 
that a large proportion of the bank's output has
been devoted to the purchase of land."
51.
land in lieu 6 f  e debt by the moneylender only as a 
last resort. In addition to this, the expansion of 
the cultivable ares and the heavy expenditure on irri­
gation schemes tended bo absorb the increase in rural 
population aij.d afford a large number of them oppor­
tunities of work ir the provinces. During the period 
1897 to 1907, the movement of population from the 
countryside to the towns slowed down. Baer observes 
that, with the exception of a few agricultural centres 
favoured by agricultural growth during that decade and 
the influx of Ottoman subjects, Greeks and Italians into
Cairo, all other towns, "declined either relatively or
52even in absolute numbers of inhabitants". Evidently 
the system of agricultural production fostered by 
Cromer showed great capacity to incorporate into its 
own confines so^e of I1 s negative aspects of the agrarian 
question. It provided the necessary conditions for 
its own self-perpetuation as well as the environment to 
resolve peacefully the internal social and economic 
contradictions which arose.
However, bhe drawbacks to this economic system, and,
52. Baer, 'Urbanization in Egypt, 1820-1907*, (ed.)
Polk and Chambers, Beginnings of Modernization ....
p. 168.
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therefore to the economic and political position of the 
landowners lay in external factors. Fluctuations in 
the price of cotton in most cases followed the American 
cotton crop, and the country had little control over the 
changes in the value of its major source of income.
What is more, the increase in foreign capital invested 
in Egypt only added to the country’s indebtedness to 
foreign creditors. The favourable balance of trade was 
insufficient, with the exception of the war years, 
1915-1919, to pay the interests cn loans and the Public 
Debt. The deficit was only made goo3 by further 
borrowing from abroad.^ Thus, the country’s economic 
fortunes became more and more vulnerable to changes 
lying outside her immediate control. In this respect 
the economic crisis of 1907 was a case in point.
To conci .cn then, J Lo urgency of the financial 
situation prompted the Consul-General on his arrival 
in Egypt to seek through the establishment of British 
predominant influence over the administraoion, the 
achievement of political and economic stability in the 
country. Gradually, key Government Departments rele­
vant uo the development of the agricultural potential
55 Crouchley, The Investment of Foreign Capital ... ,
P. 195.
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of Egypt came under the control of British adminis­
trators and the greater portion of Government expendi­
ture was allocated to drainage and irrigation schemes. 
This led to the encouragement of the inflow of foreign 
capital which financed the process of cotton production 
and export, while the native Egyptian provided the land 
and the labour. The large landowners were cbe m In 
beneficiaries from the policy of agricultural growth; 
they were not only able to increase their land holdings, 
but also to secure the full righto of private ownership 
over their estates and so end the traditional inter­
ference of the Khediv? in taxation, The class of pro­
vincial notables which owed its newly- acquired position 
to the occupation, authorities, became the natui'&i ally 
of the British Consul-General and the principal supporter 
of the Jaride  ^ 1 ;nmah gioup. Furthermore, it formed the 
economic bast for the emergence of a new Egyptian 
political elite, which acquired some of the powers 
previ'.n; -ly held by the Khedive, and exercised for a 
number of decades & profound, influence on the develop­
ment of Egyptian pol'tical thought. On the other hand, 
the political authority of the Khedive gradually declined 
as his influence over the administration was systemati­
cally taken over by the British authoiities.
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CHAPTER II
THE POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND FOR 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE 1UMMAH PARTY
Cromer recognised the limitations which the Capi­
tulations, the Muslim institutions, and the judicial 
system imposed upon his powers in Egypt. Up to 1904-, 
Prance exploited its capitulatory privileges to protect 
the interests of its nationals in Egypt, but more often 
to cause political embarrassment to Britain in the 
wider context of the clash of interests between the two 
countries in Africa. Seeking to undermine the British 
position in Egypt, Prance gave Khedive °Abb£s and the 
1Patriotic Movement1 a great deal of encouragement.
However, despite the implicit acceptance of the British 
occupation 1” _,°04-, Prance retained he. rights to inter­
fere in Egypt1s legislative measures which involved 
Prench nationals. Thus, in 1908, the Prench opposed 
proposals for the increase of the house-tax in Cairo 
and rejected the scheme for the reform of the system of 
land registration. Gorst urged the Poreign Secretary 
to make representations to the Prench Ambassador in 
London, and added, "I should be quite satisfied if the
A
Pr nch gave us the support which we get from the Germans”.
1. r.O. 800/4-7, Gorst to Grey, 17 May 1908.
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But by then, the European diplomatic situation was 
changing rapidly. New difficulties superseded the 
old ones which the agreement with France had removed.
The possibility of war with Germany and Turkey came to 
be regarded as a cortingency which must be consideredc 
In October 1906, the War Office instructed the Commanding 
Officer in Cairo to prepare a plan for the utilisation 
of the forces under his command in case of an external
p
aggression against Egypt, Germany now began to culti­
vate its relations with the Khedive and the Egyptian 
nationalists. Cromer noted the considerable anti- 
British activities which the Oriental Secretary at the 
German Agency was promoting in concert with Mustafa 
Kamil, J The Deutsche Orient Bank in Egypt, founded 
in December 1905, granted loans to the Kbedive, and to 
some of the . asjxng njJ members of the Egyptian
- 4 AGovernment, on exceptionally generous terms. Among 
those to whom loans were made were Sacd Zaghlul, at that 
time Minister of Public Instruction, and his brother
2. F.O, 14-1/396/no. 294-, W.O. to Officer Commanding,
19 October 1906,
3. F,0, 371/59, Cromer to Grey, 28 February 3-906.
4. F,0, 368/1508, McMahon to Grey, 10 November 1916, 
transmits note by a former manager of the Deutsche 
Orient Banx.
Fathi, the Undersecretary of Justice.
However a relatively more disconcerting and per­
sistent external threat to Britain1s position in Egypt 
came from Turkey, whose Sultan was not only the nominal 
suzerain of Egypt, but what was more important the 
religious head of all Muslims. At the instigation of 
the Ottoman High Commissioner in Egypt Muslim sentiment, 
was stirred. Cromer reported:
"The day before yesterday several 
mullahs of influence preached 
sermons in the mosques calculated 
to inflame Moslem sentiment, and
then proceeded to visit Moukhiar ..............
Pasha and reported what they had 
done."
Cromer added that only the Khe&i'/e could put an end to 
such proceedings as two of the most violent sheikhs were 
connected with the religious institutions which the 
latter directi ■ centroil^d.
In their opposition to Britain in Egypt, the 
Foreign Powers largely relied on the local support of 
the Khedive and the nationalists, whose joint political 
and social influence had greatly suffered since the 
British occupation. In 1882, Britain had claimed that 
her intention in Egypt was to restore the authority of
5. F ,0. 37l/^59 Cromer to Urey, 22 April 1906
the Khedive and to establish public security and order, 
later developments indicated, however, that in effect, 
the policy of the Consul-General tended to replace the 
influence cf the Khedive by that of the British Occu­
pation. Nevertheless, the authority of the occupation 
for practical and political reasons could not be extended 
to the administration of religious establishments ^nd 
Weqfs. Cromer refrained from overtly attempting to
introduce a radical change in the administration of Muslim 
institutions. He believed that the consequences of 
such a measure
nwould be extremely impolitic, and, 
moreover would probably result in 
failure. The British reformer, 
therefore, being partly convinced, 
of the uselessness of attack and 
partly impelled by political neces­
sity, turned aside from Mohammedan 
laTT reform." 6
The Khedive thus retained his direct control over
religious institutions. Buring the first decade of the
British occupation, Cromer did not encounter any serious
aiffioulties from these institutions, because Khedive
Tawfiq realised that he owed his position to Britain
and, therefore, proved to be very amenable to the advice
of the Consul-General. But with the accession of joung
6. Cromer, Modern Egypt« Volume II, p. 515*
58.
GAbbas to the Khedivete, Cromer's troubles began.
The political influence of 0Abbas was predominant 
in matters related to the Waqfs and the Azhar. The 
private and public Waqfs included a large area of culti­
vated land administered by a Director-General "who in 
practice takes his orders from the K h e d i v e " T h e  
Khedive endorsed the appointment of the overseers 
(nazirs) to these estates and at the same time mani-1 > ■ 19 1 ■ 1
pulated a large amount of the revenues derived from them. 
Cromer remarked tnat, when cAbbSs first became Khedive, 
the letter's attitude towards the. culama and religion 
was one of indifference. Daring 1894-1895* however, 
encouraged by the emergence of the Patriotic Party and 
the support of the Colonial Party in Paris, his atti­
tude underwent a change. cAbbas "began to show him­
self in the lj-ght of a Moslem ruler", and, with funds 
from bhe public Waqfs, he effected repairs of mosques, 
founded schools and increased charitable endowments.
At the same time he freely spent from private Waqfs and 
applied for his own purposes tne influence he gained over 
judges of the Sharfco Courts.^ Until 1906 a great 
number of the Kuttabs (village schools attached to mosques)
?• Tbid.„ p. 270.
8. P.O. 371/87, Cromer to Grey, 13 June 1906.
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9in the villages were financed from the Waqfs1 funds.
The Azhar, on the other hand, was the oldest
institution of religious learning in Egypt. Between
1882 and 1906, the number of the Azhar students ranged
between 8,000 and 10,000.^ The main functions of the
institution during that period was to provide teachers
of Arabic language, Shari0a judges, and instruccc.- 3 in
Islamic theology. Financially, the Azhar relied on
donations from rich individuals, notably members of the
Khedival family, and on a constant income from the Waqfs.
By tradition, since the time of Muhammad All, the
appointment of the Rector of the Azhar was a prerogative
of the Khedive.^ The sovereign, therefore, by virtue
of his almost absolute control over the revenues of the
Waqfs and the administration of the Azhar, exercised a
great deal of ini luence over the class of Gulamai in
Egypt. The independent influence of this class had
howr-ver declined since the advent of Muhammad CA1I to
«
9. H. Ammsr, Growing Up in an Egyptian Village. London, 
1954-, P. 207.
10. M.A. El-Eycun, Al-Azbar. Ceiro, 1949, table on 
page 85.
11. P.A. Al-Zawahiri, Al-SiySsah wa Al-Ashar. Cairo,
1945, pp. 29-28.
power, when the culamaflost their role as the inter-
12mediaries between the ruler and the people. This
was accompanied by a decline in their economic
position. According to Beer:
"previous to modern development 
many religious functionaries amassed 
capital as multazims. However, 
after fax-farming had been abolished 
few religious functionaries con­
tinued to be large landowners." 15
The ulama1 became increasingly dependent for their well­
being on the revenues from the Vaqfs and consequently 
on the discretion of the Khedive. However, under the 
patronage of the Khedive they continued to fulfil 
their educational and judicial functions* In 1907*
the number of those involved in works related to Muslim
14-institutions was approximately 105*000, while the
total number of the members of the public administration
ISand the army and police did not exceed 86,000. J The
12. A.L. Al-Sayyid, *The Role of the/UlamS* in Egypt 
Buring the Early 19th century1, (ed.) P.M. Holt, 
Political and Social Changes in Modem Egypt.
Lonuon, 1967, p. 279.
15. Baer, Population and Society .... p. 216.
14-. Ministry of Pi nance, Census of Egypt Taken in 1917. 
Cairo, 1921, p. 4-00.
15. Ibid., p. 3Q8.
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young Khedive did not refrain from utilising the men 
and funds at his disposal to assert his authority vis- 
a-vis that of the Consul-General.
Another political movement which emerged during, 
the 1890s to antagonise uhe British occupation was the 
Patriotic Party, under the leadership of a young 
Egyptian lawyer, Mustaf^ Kamil. In the early ye • ?s of 
the occupation, the British authorities were involved 
in the task of reforming the administration. The 
Ministry of Justice was the main branch of the adminis­
tration which was capable of absorbing the growing number 
of educated Egyptians. The unfamiliarity of the 
British authorities with the French Penal Code and the 
desire to avoid incurring the hostility of the native 
and European members of the legal profession, led it to 
satisfy itsel with the services of a large number of 
Egyptian lawyers. A further opportunity of employment 
in the administration was offered to them by the creation 
of the Native Courts in 1884. By the end of the 1880s 
"a stream of graduates of schools of law began to flood 
the judicial and law professions".^ The majority of 
them were graduates of the Khedival School of Law and the 
French School oi Law founded in 1891, while others
16. Fahmi, p. 54.
studied in Europe. Their influence "was by no means
confined to the law, but permeated the whole structure
of society. In particular, it was from this group
that an enormously high proportion of the politicians 
17
was drawn1
l/ith the growth of a large group of professional 
lawyers a feeling of national independence and a mood 
of resentment against the British occupation began to 
manifest itself among a new generation of young intel­
lectuals. A combination of factors contributed to the 
gradual emergence of. this, attitude. Amongst them was 
the indignation at the appearance of the pro-British
-jo
newspaper al-Muqattam. the resentment of British inter­
ference in the administration and notably the appoint­
ment of a Judicial Adviser in 1890,^ and last but not
20
least uhe ministerial crisis of 1893. The combined 
effect of these factors led by the beginning of the 1890s 
to the independent appearance of a group of young lawyers
I?. I.N.D. Anderson, 'Law Reform in Egypt, 1850-1950*, 
(ed.) Holt, Political and Social ...» p. 216.
18. A.R. Kelidar, Sheykh CA1I Yusuf. Unpublished Ph.D. 
Thesis, London University, p. Al.
19. Miner, pp. 151-152.
20« A.R. Al-Rgfi0!, Mustafg Kamil., A ed. Cairo, 1962, 
p. 56. See also (56apter I , pp. 25-26.
to act as the spearhead of the new Patriotic movement.
Earlier, however, in 1889, Sheikh eAlI Yusuf, an
Azharite who at the time "was a man of no particular
means or social standing” published a daily al-Mu1ayyad.
Upon its inception it was patronised by the Prime
Minister, Biadh Pasha, As the Premier;s relations with
the Eritish authorities ran into difficulties ai-Mj^ayyad
moved from a position of moderation to vigorous attack
against the British. Finally, in 1892, the newspaper
became the mouthpiece of the Khedive, and remained so
until the death cf its editor in 19i?«...................
Al-Mu"^yyad1 s appeal centred on some of the ideas
of Pan-islamism disseminated a decade earlier by
Afghani and cAbduh. The reformers of the 1870s we re
seeking to combat the tyranny of the ruler and the
external cult .re.:, and m lrfcary threat from Europe,
They set themselves to the task of restating in modern
European terms the traditional concepts of Islamic
though^, Hourani observes:
”In this line of thought maslaha 
gradually turns into utility, shura 
into parliamentary democracy, ijmac 
into public opinion; Islam itself 
becomes identical with civilization 
and activity 21
21* A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age. 
1798-1959. London, 1962, p. 144,
To repel the imminent European threat, they advocated
the solidarity of the Muslim community and the co-oper-
22ation of its members. The political significance
of this doctrine was that, "The tendency to support 
and defend the Ottoman Empire ... became a basic element;
07
in the thinking of the Egyptian pan-Islamists".
Driven by his hostility towards the British . ^cu-
pation, Sheikh cAli Yusuf continued in the tradition
of the earlier reformers to assert the authority of the
Ottoman Sultan, but in contrast to Afghani and cAbduh,
he tended to defend what he regarded as the constitutional
24 arights of the Khedive , At the hands of the editor
of al-Mu1 ayyad Panislamism lost the inspiring force 
which lay behind the works of Afghani and cAbduh.
The principle of the regeneration of the Muslim com­
munity gave we / r>o the uassertion of the traditional 
rights of the Egyptian sovereign. The demand for 
independence appeared not to be made with the intention 
of saving the rights of the Egyptian nation from falling 
into 'che hands of the British, but for the purpose of 
reinvesting political power in the person of the Khedive.
22. Ibid.. p. 118.
23. Kelidar, p. 83.
24. Ibid.. p. 160.
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Al-Mu1 ayyad expressed the ambitions of the Khedive in 
Panislamic terms* In that form they were more appealing 
to Muslim sentiment in Egypt, and secured the support 
of the Ottoman Sultan* Moreover, it was highly unlikely 
for the Khedive to make nis appeal in terms alien and 
contradictory to the religious nature of the insti­
tutions which formed the bases of his authority i the 
country.
The Khedive received further support from MustafS 
Kamil and his associates* In 1893, Letlf Salim Pasha 
had formed e secret society, but he was superseded by 
Mustafa' Kamil as its leader. This society had among 
its members, cAbdel Latif SufSnf, Mahmud Anls, Hassan7 ♦ • 1 • * i
CKsim, Muhammad Khulusi, Hassan 0Abdel Hazrq, and 
Muhammad Earid.^ The majority of its members v/ere in 
their early + tfer.ties ar.a, with the exception of SufSni 
and Khulusi, they were all lawyers. The membership of 
the group was not stable and changed constantly, and 
Kffmil ‘n 1897 reorganised the group.
In the early 1890s the Khedive realised the impact
25. A # Goldschmidt Jr., "The Egyptian Nationalist Party: 
1392-1919", (ed.) Holt, Political and Social ..*« 
p* 311.
26 J.M. Landau, Parliaments and Parties in Egypt* 
Tel-Aviv, 1955", pp. 108-109.
of Kamil*s movement on the rising generation of Egyptian
intellectuals and, more particularly, the students in
Cairo, In 1895 be sent Kamil to France to agitate
against the British occupation, and to rally European
27public opinion against Britain, ' However, despite 
the close relation betv/een the Khedive and KSmil, the 
latter in many instances exercised a certain mees.re 
of independence from the policies of the Khedive,
This was perhaps governed by Kamil's genuine attach­
ment to the principle of complete independence. When 
the Khedive appeared to succumb to Cromer's pressure
...................   p Q ......................
after the Fashada incident, K^mil showed a greater 
tendency to lean on the support of the Sultan, In 
1899 be was awarded the grade of Mutamayiz in Constan­
tinople and a few years later the Sultan p.ade him a 
Pasha
At the same time, Sheikh CA1I Yusuf began to res­
trict Kamil's access to al-Mu'ayyad, which led the 
latter to publish his own newspaper, al-Liwg1, The
27« M. Anls, Safahat Matwiyya min Tarlkh al-ZacIm 
Mustafa KSmill Cairo, 1962,
28, Goldschmidt Jr., p, 518,
29* N.H. Haykal laranim Misriyya wa Gharbiyya, Cairo, 
1929, p * 152. 1
Anglo-French Entente in 1904-, further widened the gulf
between the Khedive and K£mil, and the Khedive's part
in marrying the Naqib al-Ashrgf's daughter to cAli
Yusuf put an end to the relation between the two.
The Anglo-French agreement also strengthened Kamil's
belief in the necessity of self-reliance and the
advisability of supporting the Ottoman Empiie in ^bs
struggle against the European powers. Thus in 1906,
K5mil supported the claims of Turkey during the Aqaba
Affair, while the Dinshwai Incident resulted in a
51reconciliation between the Khedive and KSmil,
The Patriotic movement led by Kgmil and the Pan- 
islamic trend represented by al -Mu'ayyad, formed tne 
two wings of the nationalist movement during the first 
twenty-five years of the British occupation. The 
former, though in many instances subsidised by the 
Khedive, retained a measure of independence which 
enabled Kamil to assert his leadership. Unlike the 
AzhariJes and the editor of al-Mu'ayyad, Kamil's move­
ment in the final analysis was neither an integral 
part of the religiou° institutions nor a palace creation. 
The Khedive later stressed the fact that "KSmil only
50 Farid's Memoirs, Notebook no, 1, p, 1, 
51, Ibid,
32belonged to himself".
The call for evacuation and complete independence 
captured the imagination of the students# Kamil’s 
message was simple and straight-forward. He did not
appeal to the intellect, but to the conscience of the 
youth and the sentiment of the idealists# He advo­
cated the achievement of independence by the spree'a of 
national education, unity of social classes and the 
co-operation of Muslims and Copts#^ He did not,
however, evince a particular interest in Egypt1s social 
34-problems. Drawing the attention of Egyptians to 
social differences would have undermined one of the 
corner-stones of his policy - national unity. More­
over, the rapid development of agricultural production 
during the years 1882-1907* and the apparent advantages 
which the country seemed to enjoy from it, tended to 
conceal the misfortunes of the lower classes#
More significant, however, was the fact that the 
major.it/ of Kamil’s followers, including K£mil himself 
and Muhammad Farid who succeeded him in the leadership 
of the Patriotic Party were members of well-to-do urban
32. Khedive’s Memoirs. Aj-Misri. 18 May 1951.
33. Al-Rafici, Mustafg Kgmil# pp. 265-266.
34-. Landau, p. 119.
69.
families. Their connections with the countryside where 
the magnitude of Egypt’s social problems were most 
glaring, were indeed very slight.
Out of thirty members of the first National Council 
of the Patriotic Party only four were provincial notables. 
The rest were ex-Government officials, Cairo notables, 
lawyers and members of the liberal professions.’
The majority of them lived in towns and particularly 
Cairo. In the final analysis, regardless of the social 
origin of its leading members, the Party attracted a 
number of educated Egyptians and enjoyed the support of 
the student population. However, its misfortune, 
especially after Kamil’s death in 1908, was its 
inability to utilise effectively this support in the 
form of a massive political organisation. The new 
Consul-General did not fail to note that, on the day of 
Kamil's funeral, students in Cairo abandoned their 
schools ”en masse”, and a great crowd of people of the 
lower e *ddle-class, minor Government employees, and 
small shop-keepers joined the procession. With some 
satisfaction, he reported:
35* A. Sfer, Essai sur les Origines et le Development 
du Na t i ona1j sm Egyptien. unpublished manus cript in 
Wingate1s Papers, box no. 107.
"It is worthy of notice that almost 
everyone taking part in the procession 
wore a tarbush, the turban being rarely 
noticed, which shows that, although 
Mustafa Pasha exercised extensive 
influence among the Effendi classes, 
his propaganda had so far produced no 
perceptible effect on the agricultural 
class of which the majority of the 
population is composed." 36
The movement was only able to exert some influence on 
the course of events however when it joined nands with 
the Khedive. This was clearly indicated during the 
Aqaba and Dinshwai Incidents. But when the Khedive 
either bowed to British pressure or willingly co­
operated with Cromer's successor, the movement lost 
much of its impetus.
In the early 1890s the political allegiance of the 
generation of Egyptians seemed to be undetermined.
Men like Lutfi al-Sayyid who later became the managing 
editor of al-Jarldah was, in 1897i closely associated 
with Kamil and the Khedive. Hassan cAbdel Raziq, the 
eldest son of the deputy-Chairman of the 'Ummah Party 
was, in 1893> 8 membei of Kamil's secret society.
Hassan ^sem, another member of the society, shared the
37 cpolitical views of al-Jaridah group. ( Even Sa d
Zaghlul, who owed his prominence largely to Cromer's
36. P.Or 371/449, Gorst to Grey, 16 February 1908.
37* A.L. Al-Sayyid, Qissat Hayati. Cairo, 1962, p. 96.
support came twice to the rescue of the conservative 
Muslim newspaper al-Mu1ayyad. However, towards the
end of that decade the majority of Egyptian intellectuals 
appeared to identify themselves with one political move­
ment or the ocher. The influence of °A1I Yusuf among 
the conservative majority of Azharites was predominant, 
while Kamil attracted a large section of the aria..
intelligentsia. On the other hand, the greater number 
c •of Abdula1 s followers were drawn from the provinces 
where they had spent their childhood and part of their 
youth and where their families at the beginning of the 
20th century still resided. They included among them, 
Eathi and Sacd Zaghlul, Lutfi a?-Sayyid, °Abdel ^Aziz 
Eahmf, and Husain Haykal. cAbduhfs influence was 
greater among the higher ranks of the legal profession, 
teachers in the higher Government schools and heads of 
Government dapartments.^
The revolutionary zeal of °Abduh to combat the 
military and political influence of Europeans seemed to 
give way, after the defeat of cUrabI's movement, to a 
more conciliatory attitude towards the British occupation* 
On the other hand, he and his followers firmly opposed
38. Kelidar, p. 4-9•
39. C.C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt* London,
1933, pp. 206-207.
any measure whj ch might extend the Khedive!s authority.
Abduh's Islamic teachings lent themselves to two dia­
metrically opposed trends of thought* His emphasis on 
the purity of the Hedith and Qur15n led some of his 
disciples to more conservative conclusions, while his 
stress on reason and the necessity of modern change 
led others to adopt some of the basic tenets of secular 
liberalism. But perhaps the greatest influence
which ultimately determined the political outlook of the 
pan-Islamists, the liberal secularists, and the patriots, 
and inspired their policies was the impact of the social 
and political changes which resulted from the British 
occupation of Egypt.
cAbduh returned from exile in 1 8 8 3 when Khedive 
Tawfitq "acting under British pressure, pardoned him, and 
made him a judge He was resolved to achieve
gradually religious reform with the help of the Consul- 
General He centred his efforts on the reorganisation 
of the Azhar and the 3har ia Courts. Consequently he.
40. Bor an excellent study of cAbduh*s political thought 
and the different schools of thought which were in­
spired by 'AbduhJs teachings, see: M.H. Kerr,
Islamic Reform; and Vatikiotis, Chapters 9 ©nd 10.
41. Cromer, Modern Egypt, Vol. II, p. 179*
proposed the adoption of a more liberal method of 
teaching in place of the obsolete practices of the con­
servative culama1. and advocated the reorganisation of
42 -rthe administration and finances of the Azhar. In 
1895* He and Sheikh cAbdel Karim Salman were appointed 
Government representatives on the Administrative Com­
mittee of the Azhar. The conservative majority , - the 
0ulama1 class and the opposition of the Khedive proved, 
however, to be unsurmountable obstacles to his attempts 
at reform. cAfgf Lutfi al-Sayyid has observed that 
"Only the material reforms were successful, for the 
ulama were more interested in their material welfare, 
than in the spiritual fare they served."^ In 1899, 
cAbdul became the Mufti of Egypt and automatically 
appointed a member of the Superior Council of Waqfs.
Mufti, he proposed an elaborate report for the reform
c 44 cof the frhari a Courts. He advised the Shari a Judges
not to restrict themselves to the imitation of rigid
and bl:nd forms of traditional Islamic teachings, but
to seek the understanding of the essence of Muslim 1aw.
He urged the Ministry of Justice to exercise closer
42. J.M. Ahmed, The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian 
Nationalism - London, I960, pp. 36-57•
43. Al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer, p* 110.
44. M. Abduh, The Keform of the Sharica Courts .> (ed.) 
M.R. Rida, Cairo, 1900.
supervision over the workings of the Shari0a Courts„
Undoubtedly cAbduh,s proposals were basically dic­
tated by his genuine conviction that the remedy against 
Egypt*s decline was through the revival of Islam which 
motivated the majority of its population. However, 
the political implications of his recommendations not 
only aimed at altering the status of the Muslim Insti­
tutions and ^ulamg1 class, but also implicitly threatened 
to undermine the authority of the Khedive. The 
suggestion to place the Azhar under the administration 
of the Public Instruction Department, and the proposal 
to bring the Sharica Courts under the closer control of
the Ministry of Justice could only provoke the Khedivels
cenmity towards 'Abduh. This feeling was reciprocated 
by Abduh1s opposition, while on the Council of the Waqfs, 
to the policies of the Khedive in the use of the waqfs: 
funds. ^ Cromer on his part, being unable to bring 
into line the functioning of the Muslim Institutions 
with ot^er Government Departments, sought to exert 
his influence through the mediation of cAbduh and his 
followers. And as the Khedive persisted in the use 
of these institutions in a manner detrimental to British 
interests, Cromer became increasingly more dependent on
45. Al-Sayyid, op.cit., p. 150.
GAbduhfs group. But it was obvious that in such an 
alliance, the dominant partner would naturally be the 
British. From a British point of view, the ultimate 
political significance of the group was to check the 
growing influence of the Khedive and to provide for the 
growth of an indigenous political force which would 
counter politically and ideologically the Pa nisi ,.iic 
and anti-British sentiment. This did not prevent 
the members of the group from levelling a number of 
criticisms against Cromer’s restrictive educational 
policy. But these mild manifestations of dissatis­
faction with the occupation did not threaten the 
foundations of the British presence in Egypt. In 
avoiding raising some such critical issues as complete 
independence and evacuation in the name of political 
realism, they were in fact playing into the hands of 
the occupation. Cromer described them as "the natural 
allies of the European reformer".^ Some of their 
prominent leaders went so far as to condone the British 
occupation of Egypt .
Before the publication of al-Jarldah, Eathf 
Zaghlul was perhaps the most important policital theorist 
of the group. He was b o m  in *Ibianah, a village in
46. Cromer, op.cit.. p. 180.
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Gharbia province and belonged to a rural family with a 
tradition of local leadership. He received his early 
religious instruction at the village kuttab and moved 
lafec to Rashid and then to Cairo for his higher edu­
cation in Government schools. In 1884, he was sent 
on a Government educational mission to France where he 
studied law and returned in 1887 to enter Gcverumj.it 
service in the Ministry of Justice. He owed his pro­
motion to higher positions in the Ministry to the influence 
of the British authorities. His merit lay in the fact 
that he introduced to the Egyptian reader translations 
of major European works in the fields of law, philosophy, 
education and politics. The translation of Rousseau*s 
Social Contract and Bentham's Principles of Legislation 
was intended to guide the mind of the educated Egyptian
to a definition of the relationship of the individual
47to differert social groups and to the state. ( On the 
other hand, his choice to translate Demolin's A Quoi 
tient ?a Superiorite des Anglo-Saxons and le Bon1s Spirit 
of Society and Secret of the Evolution of Nations was 
intended to draw the attention of his compatriots to 
the basic weaknesses of Egyptian society* Fathl*s
47 Vatikiotis, p. 222
77*
belief in bis educational message and his sincere desire 
for reform were the chief considerations which inspired 
his works.
However, in the light of the close relation which
existed between °Abduhfs followers and Cromer and the
political role entrusted to them, the works of f'athf
gained another dimension directly related to the ^liticel
situation. In the introduction to the translation of
Demolin’s book, Zaghlul stated that his purpose was to
draw the attention of the Egyptians to the causes of the
zj_8
decline and retrogression of Egypt. He wrote that 
the Egyptian society suffered from a weakness in all 
the fundamental elements which contributed to the progress 
of a nation. This weakness led its inhabitants to almost 
absolute reliance on the Government for their material 
and social well-being. In doing so, he claimed, the 
Government was overburdened by tasks which lay outside 
its competence. He argued that the functions of the 
Government should be confined to the following: "The
maintenance of public order, the implementation of 
justice, and the encouragement of agricultural develop­
ment, free trade and industry." Zaghlul then asserted
48. A.F. Zaghlul, Sjrr Teqaddum el-Ingliz al-Saxoniyyiii. 
Cairo (undated), /Introduction written in 1892/.
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that the failures of the Egyptians led to their sub­
jugation to the interests of the British* But this 
was not the fault of the British, he wrote: "It is
God*s law in his creation that knowledge dominates 
ignorance and strength overcomes weakness *.." Ke 
urged his readers ^o compare the superiority of the 
British with the inferiority of the Egyptians. ihe 
political significance of Bathi's views in the context 
of the conflict between the Patriotic and Panislamist 
movement on one side and the British on the other, was 
indicative of the pro-British position of cAbduhfs group.
In describing at length the weaknesses of the 
Egyptian society, Zaghlul was in effect endorsing 
Cromerfs rejection of the concept of Egyptian nation.
At the same time, his conservative inteipretation of 
the basic functions of the state was an attempt to 
defend the administration from the attacks against it 
by al-Mu1ayyad and the nationalist press. But perhaps 
most interesting and significant was his direct ref­
erence to the British occupation. Here, the occupation 
of Egypt, and indeed the phenomenon of colonialism, 
was not only regarded as an inevitable relationship 
between the knowledgeable and the ignorant, the strong 
and the weak, but also a legitimate condition sanctioned
79,
by God's divine lews*
The translation of Demolins inspired another
Government official and a junior member of cAbduh's
group to publish in 1902 a book entitled: The Present
State of the Egyptians or the Cause of Their Retro- 
4.Q _
gression. y Fathi Zaghlul introduced the book and
endorsed without reservations its conclusions anc
contents. The author, Muhammad cUmar of the Post1 .
Office Department, dealt basically with the same themes
which Zaghlul had raised. He exposed the moral and
material decline of the three major social classes of
the Egyptian Society, namely, the poor, the rich, and
the middle class. The regeneration of the Egyptian
nation, he claimed, lay in the revival of uhe solidarity
of the rich class, which began in the family unit and
then spread to the neighbours. This solidarity then
extended through education to all members of the social
group (al-Jamciyah), and finally through the religious
50bond t the whole nation *
Considered in the context of the then existing
political situation, the book had great political
significance. It was dedicated to the Prime Minister,
and any reference to the Egyptian Government was made
4-9. M. c Umar, Hadir al-Misriyyfn fAw Sirr Ta1akhkhurihum, 
Cairo, 19057s "
5°» IkicU. pp. 9-11.
only in apologetic and complimentary terms. The 
British occupation was rarely mentioned, and even in the 
exceptionally few cases when it was, the author came to 
its defence. Even the wudely accepted criticism of 
Cromer's educational policy in Egypt was blamed, not 
on the British, but on the wealthy Muslims, who, unlike 
the Copts and Europeans, did not take enough interest 
in the promotion of education.-^ He believed that the 
nationalists who were advocating the evacuation of 
Egypt if they would only read the works of the well- 
known Egyptian historian, al-Jabarti on 18th and 19th 
century Egypt "they would realise their mistake and 
praise God for their present f o r t u n e s L i k e  FathI 
ZaghlHl, he did not favour Government interference in 
trade, industry, or agriculturer He argued that, 
precisely because the Government before the occupation 
took upon itself the task of industrialisation that the 
present indifference of Egyptians to industry existed*^ 
While lefraining from blaming the Government for the 
defects of the civj.1 administration, he did not exercise 
such self-restraint \hen discussing the Azher, the Wsqfs
51* Ibid.. pp. 115-116. 
52 Ibid.. p. 16?.
53. Ibid.. p. 150.
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or the Sherlca Courts. Indeed, he poured his criticisms 
on ell grades of the culama1 class, the waqfs1 adminis- 
stration, and attacked the Panislamic and Patriotic 
press. He averred that religion was a matter for 
individual conscience, a relation between man and God, 
which should be separated from social relationships 
which are a function of civil societv.^
Another member of c Abdula's group whose worlds pro­
voked tremendous political controversy, was Qasim Amin. 
His book The Emancipation of Women, published in 1899 
"provoked about thirty books and pamphlets written in 
opposition", and led the Khedive, the ‘nilema1 and Mustfa 
Kamil to combat his ideas.^ The following year, Amin 
published his second book, The New Woman, in reply to 
his critics. The starting point of Amin was the same
p *
as that of 'Abdula, Zaghlul and cUmar, that society was 
in decline and its regeneration lay in strengthening 
the moral ties of the family. However, Amin emphasised 
that in this process the role of the woman was funda­
mental oecause she was involved in both the relation 
between wife and husband, and mother and child. A. 
Hourani noted that in his second book Amin shifted his 
appeal from the Qur'an and Hadith to the "social thought
54 Ibid.. p. 186 
55- Ahmad, p. 47-
of the modern west, . ..". In other words, Amin, like
c cUmar, "dissolved the relationship established by Abduh
between Islam and civilization, and created in its
56place a de facto division of spheres of influence".
The views of cAbduh and his disciples, in part, 
reflected the political alliance which existed between 
them and the Occupation. On the other hand, by virtue 
of their social background and their close association 
with the rising rural class of notables, the group 
increasingly came to represent in a relatively articulate 
form the political and economic interests of this class. 
The gradual development of this tendency became more 
obvious after the publication of al-Jarldah, but the early 
seeds were being sown with the increasing success of 
Cromer's agricultural policy. During the 1890s the 
large landowners fully realised the benefits accruing 
to taem from British rule. As far as they were con­
cerned, the achievements of Cromer were not confined to 
agricultural development, but extended to administrative 
and political revival. Cromer increasingly drew upon 
the members of this class to fill the higher posts in 
Government Departments, schools, and the legal profession. 
With the decline in the powers of the Khedive and the
56, Hourani, pp. 167-169*
growing influence of the class of provincial notables, 
local political power began to shift "away from the 
older Turco-Egyptian aristocracy, notables and religious 
leaders to the new groups of professionals, rich cul­
tivators and administrators, .. . cAbduh's group
reflected in th^ r political end social works some 
aspecus of this change. Despite the inconsistencies 
end the contradictions which their works contained, a 
tendency nonetheless in the direction of expressing the 
growing influence of the emerging native class was not­
iceable by the end of the 3 9th century.
While in exile, Abduh argued that religious
solidarity wes the element which strengthened the bond
58between all members of the community. In describing
the process of the regeneration of society he did not
assign any special importance to the role of social or
professional groups, but merely emphasised that the
individual's performance contributed to his own personal
59good anl to the interest of the society as a whole.
A few years later, while in Beirut, he drafted a note
57. Vatikiotis, p. 2G9.
58. M.R, Rida, larikh a1-Sheikh Muhammed cAbdutu Vol. 2, 
2nd Ed.* Cairo, 1951, PP. 24-9-558•
59. Ibid. , p. 269.
on the reform of religious education. Influenced by 
Plato's Republic, he proposed three programmes of reli­
gious education to coincide with the professional and 
social division of the society into the class of 
commoners (Tabaqat al-°Knah), the politicians (includixxg 
army officers, judges and administrators), and the 
culemgr 1 class to which he assigned the task of racial 
guidance and religious i n s t r u c t i o n . ^  Finally, in 
1900, while advocating the reform of the Shari°a Courts, 
he accorded the family ties and the family unit a 
function which he seemed earlier to have assigned to 
religious solidarity and to the individual. He wrote:
"A people /al-Shacb7 are constituted of families. The
basis of every nation /TUmmeh7 rests upon its families,
6"1because the whole does not stand without its parts. '  ^
These rare and dispersed remarks which cAbduh made 
in a way mirrored his growing awareness of the part which 
some influential families in the provinces were playing 
in the social and public life of the country. In 1899? 
cAbduh had become a member of the Legislative Council. 
Undoubtedly, his association with the heads of prominent 
families such as: Suleiman, Shacr?wl, 0Abdel Rc?ziq and
60* Ibid., p. 5±1.
61. cAbduh, The Reform of the Shari'a Courts, p. 5*
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others, and his realisation of the immense local
influence they possessed could not fail to impress him.
It was this particular emphasis on the family as the
basic unit of national regeneration which inspired
Amin*s and Umar's works. Fathi Zaghlul was even more
explicit in defining the crucial importance of the upper
classes to the whole nation. He wrote:
"The passing away of the upper classes
is like the perishing of the soul from
the body. They are the defenders of
ethics and tradition and the personi­
fication of the life and feelings of
the nation." 62
Zaghlul pointed out that the existing material and moral
decline of the rich was transmitted to the middle and
lower classes, and consequently to the v/hoie nation.
He claimed, that only the efforts of the wealthy
65■Egyptians were capable of achieving national revival. ^
q
With Umar the tendency was more articulate and consistent. 
He approached the question of Egypt's decline on the 
lines of the socio-economic division of society, and 
mdnosined that the regeneration of the nation emanated 
from the solidarity of the rich. He also defined the 
middle class as being the real working element of the body
62. Zaghlul, Sirr Taqaddum .... p. 38. 
0
63. Umar, pp. 5-8.
of the nation and the link between the upper and lower 
classes without which no progress could be achieved.
The impact of the growing political and social 
influence which the wealthy Egyptian families acquired 
under the British occupation, led Abduh and his 
associates to shift their emphasis away from the indi- 
vidua1 to the family and ultimately to the 1 a yan (notables), 
or as Lutfl al-Sayyid frequently described them in al- 
Jarldah "The representatives of those who have a real 
interest in the country".
Unlike the Patriotic Party, Qkbduh end his group 
advocated the gradual introduction of the Egyptian 
nation to Independence rather than revolutionary change. 
Furthermore, as Mustafa Kamil increasingly displayed his 
pro-Turkish sentiment after the Fashoda Incident and the 
Anglo-French Entente in 1904, members of Abduh's school 
of thought tended to shift their appeal from religion 
to secular notions of solidarity and utility. This 
particular change of attitude at the beginning of the 20th 
century did not, however, alienate the leading old 
generation of provincial notables who were very much 
entrenched in the Islamic tradition of their environment.
They continued uo lend their support to a secular move­
ment not because a radical change in “heir thinking
habits had occurred, but because that movement pro­
vided the ideological weapon which undermined the pro- 
Khedival Panislamic movement.
It would appear that towards the end of the 19th 
centux’y an alliance between the large landowning class 
and the British authorities was established. Cromer 
found in this class the natural supporter of his policy 
of agricultural expansion and administratative reform.
He installed a number of its members in Government depart­
ments and representative institutions (Provincial 
Councils, Legislative Council, General Assembly, etc.), 
to act as intermediaries for the occupation whenever 
for political or practical reasons it was thought 
inadvisable to appoint British administrators.^*
Members of cAbduh's school of thought reflected the 
interests of this alliance in ideological and political 
terms. They emphasised the weakness of the Egyptian 
nation while pointing out the great achievements of the 
occupying Power; they endorsed Cromer's economic 
policy and refrained from criticising the Egyptian 
Government or the occupation. On the other hand, they 
demanded the reorganisation of the religious institutions
64. See Chapter III, on the development of local insti­
tutions under the British occupation.
which formed the basis of the appeal and powers of the 
Khedive. To counter the Panislamic and independence 
movement which threatened to undermine the political 
and social foundations of the society, they tended to 
establish their political doctrine on secular rather 
than religious notions and introduced the concept of 
evolutionary change as opposed to revolutionary methods 
of achieving independence. Fowever, after the depar­
ture of Cromer, this alliance was partially disrupted, 
and the disciples of GAbduh became the spokesmen of the 
1 Uraniah Party, or better known among its adversaries "Hizb 
al-1A fygn", (The Party of Notables).
Up to this point the purpose was to sketch a general 
outline of the political and social forces which operated 
in Egypt during the first twenty-five years of the British 
occupation. The intention now is to discuss the 
impact of the events which led in 1907 to the transfor­
mation of these local forces into political parties, 
with special emphasis on al-Jaridah group.
Uuring the early months of 1906, Turkish troops 
occupied Taba, situated a few miles west of Aqaba.
The British protested to the Porte and demanded the with­
drawal of chc troops claiming that they violated Egyptian 
territorial sovereignty. The Incident immediately became
89.
an issue of political conflict between Cromer and his 
local allies on one side, and the Khedive and his sup­
porters on the other* Kamil, perhaps at the insti­
gation of the Sultan, drew closer to the Khedive so that 
al-Mu*ayyad and al-Liwe joined hands in asserting the 
sovereign rights of the Sultan over Egypt. On the 
other hand, the followers of cAbduh pledged their full 
support to the Consul-General and identified themselves 
openly with the British position* A serious crisis, 
however, was ultimately averted and, as a result of 
British diplomatic pressure, Tabs was evacuated on 13 May 
1906.
This Incident did not pass without some serious
repercussions. Firstly, it prepared the ground for the
re-establishment of the relations between the Khedive
and Kamil, which since 1904 had been severed. Secondly
it brought to Cromer*s notice the grave magnitude which
the Panislamic movement might take on similar critical
occasions. On the termination of the Incident he wrote
to the Foreign Secretary:
"an amount of Moslem feeling has been 
evoked such as I have never known 
before during my lengthy Egyptian 
experience. Although the intelli­
gent classes have been on our side, 
and although probably very few 
Egyptians, if any, wanted the Turks
back again in Egypt, at the same 
time, as regards the mass of the 
population, the feeling of the 
Moslem for his co-religionist 
swamped, ..." 65
Finally, the Incident impressed upon Cromer the
invaluable support which his moderate allies would
render him in his conflict with the Khedive.
No sooner had the agitation subsided than another 
event occurred which had a far-reaching impact on the 
political situation. On 13 June 1906 a group of British 
officers who were on a pigeon-shooting trip near 
Dinsliwai in Menufia, accidentally shot; and wounded an 
Egyptian woman. At the same time fire broke out in 
the threshing-floor of one of the villagers. A scuffle 
ensued between the officers and the villagers as a result 
of which a wounded British officer died while on his way 
to summon military help from a nearby camp. Later in 
the day British troops arrived on the scene and shot 
dead one of the villagers and arrested fifty-three sus­
pects. A special court which specifically dealt with 
attacks against the army of occupation met two weeks 
later and passed sentences on the accused. The next day 
four Egyptians were executed while the rest received 
sentences ranging from imprisonment to public flogging,
65. F.O. 800/46, Cromer to Grey, 16 May 1906
The brutality and severity of the punishment provoked 
the feelings of all sections of the population, regard­
less of their political affiliations. At a later date 
Cromer described the sentences as being "somewhat 
unduly severe", while the new Consul-General in 1907 
wrote that Binshwai was "our most mismanaged piece of 
work since the beginning of the occupation".
K£mil and the Khedive realised at this juncture 
the necessity of co-ordinating their anti-British cam­
paign. §gdiq Ramadan, the private physician of the
Khedive arranged a meeting between them which was attended
(in addition to Ramadan) by Muhammad Farid and Latlf 
66Salim. They agreed at that meeting to prepare for
the formation of the Patriotic Party and for the estab­
lishment of a company to finance the publication of an 
English and French version of a l - L i w a namely: the
Standard and 1 fEtandard. The Khedive consequently 
urged some of his rich followers, like the Toussons and 
Yegens. co make financial contributions to the newly- 
formed company.^ According to Cromer, the Khedive made 
a contribution of some L.E. 4000.^
66. Farid's Memoirs. Notebook no. 1, p. 1; A. Shafiq,
Mudhakkar.a11 fT~Nisf Qarn. Vol. II, Cairo, 1936, p. 103-
67. Ibid.. Notebook No. 1, p. 2.
68. Ibid.
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Abduh*s group, on the other hand, were caught 
unprepared by the consequences of the Binshwai Incident. 
Cromer, at the time, was in England and the promptness 
with which the British authorities on the spot dealt 
with the situation left chem little time to consider a 
plan of action. Some of their prominent members 
notably Fathx Zaghlul and Ibrahim el Hilbawl were dis­
credited for taking a direct part in the conviction 
of the accused, while Lutfi al-Sayyid came into the
limelight for defending in court the villagers impli-
£
cated in the Incident. However, as Abduh*s dis­
ciples realised the political capital which Kamil 
and the Khedive were extracting from the event, they 
immediately set themselves to the task of countering 
the sudden rise in the popularity of the anti-British 
movement.
On 23 June 1906 a group of notables including
several members of the General Assembly and Legislative
Council met in Mahmud Suleiman*s house in Cairo and
decid-ed to form a company for the publication of al- 
~ 70Jarxdah. ( Convinced that the Binshwai Incident was 
being adroitly exploited by the Khedive, they were 
resolved to combat the intrigues of the Palace and to
70. Al-Jeridah, 13 June 1911.
express in the press their own views on political and 
social issues. The British Consul in Alexandria, 
commending the step, reported that a new departure in 
Egyptian journalism was being contemplated, that a 
company cf sixty "gentlemen of high, social and 
official standing ...” was formed with a capital of 
L.E. 20,000 of which L.E. 16,000 were already pa.-.c.#
The policy of the newspaper, he added, would be 
governed by the following principles: the acceptance
of the existing system of Government, the exclusion of 
issues which ferment religious prejudice and discussion, 
the creation of a healthy public opinion, and the
encouragement of discussion on matters of public
71interest.' Cromer who was on leave in England at 
that time, submitted a memorandum to the Cabinet in 
.which he made several proposals intended to reduce the
growing influence of the Khedive and the Panislamic
72movement. He informed the British Cabinet that, 
short . f the only really effective remedy of naming him 
Viceroy of Egypt or President of the Council of Ministers, 
he proposed on his return to Cairo to bring about more 
cohesion and co-operation among the different parts of
71 P.O. 371/67 M.De C. Findley to Grey, 5 August 1906. 
72. P.O. 371/68 Memorandum, 8 September 1906.
the Egyptian administration by bringing the various
heads of Departments into contact with each other and
with himself. He also expressed his intention to
deprive the Khedive of his powers over the Waqfs*
administration by placing it "under a responsible
Minister, aided by a carefully selected Board composed,
of course, almost entirely of Mohammedans".
Finally he proposed to rally cAbduh*s group to his side
in order to check the disrupting influence of Panislamism.
"I have encouraged them ^£budh!s 
group7 by all possible means, 
short of granting pecuniary aid, to 
do so ... I am much inclined to take 
an early opportunity of bringing some 
more adherents of this school of 
Moslem thought into the Egyptian 
Cabinet, but I should like to wait a 
little before pronouncing a definite 
opinion on this point. This new 
departure would probably be unpopular 
amongst some of the British officials 
in Egypt, nevertheless, I am inclined 
to try the experiment."
On his return to Cairo, Cromer did not waste much
time in pursuing his new policy. Within a few weeks
on 2o October 1906, he had an audience with the Khedive
and to the dismay of the latter, he demanded the
appointment of Sacd Zaghlul as Minister of Public 
74-Instruction. One of the first acts of the new
73 A. Shaflq, vol. 2, p. 102.
74. P.O. 371/68, Cromer to Grey, 2? October 1906
95.
Minister was to establish the School of ffiadis, and to 
entrust its administration to his nephew, c£tif Barak^t, 
a junior member of cAbduh's group. This move under­
mined one of the chief functions of the Azhar and 
consequently curbed the Khedive's interference in 
the administration of the Sharl°a Courts. Subse­
quently, in March 1907, the Egyptian Government formed 
a committee, which included among its members Fathi 
Zaghlul, to report on the budget of the £>harica Courts
75and to review the system of salaries and expenditures. ^ 
Towards. the end of 1906 the Khedive, without consulting 
the Consul-General, had appointed a new Rector for the 
Azhar, Cromer took the opportunity to express his 
strong objection to this step and was able to extract 
from the Khedive a promise to remove the new Rector 
within three months*^ Cromer also moved to prevent 
the Khedive from manipulating for his own interest the 
distribution of honours and decorations to Government 
of’f.i cials,^
On the 9th March 1907, the first issue of al-Jaridah 
75* Ibid,. 10 March 1907*
76, F.O. 800/4-6 Cromer to Grey, 2 November 1906.
77. F.O. 371/2^4- Cromer to Grey, 29 December 1906.
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finally appeared, and a month later a Ministerial 
decree awarded some of the shareholders of al-Jaridah 
company official honours and decorations. In an 
interview with the Egyptian Gazette Lutfi al-Sayyid 
revealed that before its publication, some of the 
prominent members of the Company, namely, Mahmud Suleiman, 
Hassan cAbdel Raziq, Ibrahim Sacid and Mahmud °Abdel 
Ghaff£r communicated to the Prime Minister their inten­
tions. They then, at the invitation of Cromer, were 
received at the Agency where the Consul-General expres­
sed, to them, his warm sympathies for the project.^ .
By the beginning of 19C7, therefore, the Consul-
General had achieved a certain measure of success in
checking the anti-British feeling which the Taba and
Dinshwai Incidents had provoked. He was confident
that lie could cope with his local difficulties, but
recognised that his real troubles entirely arose from
the sympathetic response which the Egyptian Patriotic
-« 79Party were receiving in England* ' '
As early as 1904, the Khedive had established 
contact with Robertson, a Liberal M.P, who formed a 
committee for the defence of Egyptian demands for self-
76. Al-Jaridah. 19 September 1911*
79* E.O. 800/46, Cromer to Grey, 3 March 1907*
80government, Early in 1906, the Liberals won an 
overwhelming majority in the general elections, and with 
them in power the Egyptian question was given more
attention in Parliamentary debates, the more so after
the Teba and finshwai Incidents® Embarrassing questions 
in connection with Dinshwai were asked in the Commons, 
and demanas for the early release of the prisoners 
involved in the Incident were made, Cromer complained 
that,
"If I am only left alone, I can 
deal witn the local situation, although 
it is rather a ticklish business, . But 
if the agitators here are to get into 
their heads that by continual worrying
and misrepresenting things to members
of Parliament at home they can have 
their own way, the whole machine of 
Government here will really become 
almost unworkable, I do most earnestly 
urge that when a good opportunity occurs, 
a very firm stand should be made against 
them. *.. So long as Mr Pobertson and 
his friends merely ask questions about 
drink, Nile mud, etc., they will do no 
real harm ... But if they raise the 
whole Denshwai case again, and insist 
upon the immediate pardon of the 
prisoners, the case will be much more 
serious." 31.
Soon other points were raised against Cromer*s 
policy in Egypt. The Parliamentary Egyptian Committee
80. Abba s1s Memoirs. al-Misrl, 9 July 1951•
81. P.O. 800/46, Cromer to Grey, 22 November 1906.
accused Cromer of attempting to displace Arabic by 
English as the language of instruction in Egyptian 
schools. Simultaneously the same accusation was made 
by the editor of al-Mu'ayyad during the debates of the 
Egyptian General Assembly. Furthermore, the Foreign 
Secretary, pressed by Robertson and vis colleagues, 
asked Cromer whether it was possible to remit the
o p
Dinshwai sentences. Cromer explained that Arabic 
was a poor language for teaching s c i e n c e s a n d  whilst 
appreciating the difficulties of the Foreign Secretary, 
he deprecated a change for the time being in the Dinshwai
84
sentences.
For seme time now, Cromer's health deteriorated 
under the strain of work. He stated in the course of 
proposing his resignation that his health really began 
to give way in 1898 and had never been the same since 
then. He confessed that it was becoming more and more 
difficult for him to cope with the situation in Egypt 
and the Sudan in spite of his attempts to decentralise.®^ 
Gorst reported that according to the doctors, "there was
82. F.O. 800/46, Grey to Cromer, 2 March 1907*
85* Ibid., Cromer to Grey, 3 March 1907*
84* Ibid.. Cromer to Grey, 7 March 1907#
85. Ibid., Cromer to Grey, 28 March 1907.
nothing organically wrong with him, but his nervous 
system has had too much strain and has reacted upon
oc-
his digestion". It is probable that his great
irritation at the growing criticism of his policy in 
the Commons, and the increasing difficulty of managing 
the local situation produced a seric is mental and 
physical strain which finally led him to submit his 
resignation.
Despite the fact that in October 1906, the Khedive 
and Kamil had decided to form a political party, the 
project did not materialise. The Khedive- from the 
beginning seemed to be reluctant to associate himself 
openly with Kamil. ^  He was aware of Kamil's political 
independence and would have had a good reason to suspect 
that once the party was formed, the growing popularity 
which the latter won after Dinshwai, especially among 
the students, would enable him to assume almost full 
control over its policies. GAli Yusuf., cut of 
hostility towards Kamil attempted to undermine the 
project. Furthermore, Cromer's fresh offensive against 
the Khedive, appeared, to dishearten the latter and led 
him to approach the Consul-General "in a roundabout way"
86 Ibid.. Gorst to Grey, 20 April 1907.
87. The Khedive suggested in his first meeting with 
KSmil in 1906 to form a secret party. Farid1s 
Memoirs, notebook no. 1, p. 1.
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disclaiming bis demand for an Egyptian Parliament,
But what ultimately determined the Khedive's attitude 
towards Kamil and the idea of forming a political party 
was the nev; policy introduced by Cromer's successor.
On the recommendation of Crcmer, Gorst was 
appointed to the post of British Consul-General in 
Bgypt, He arrived in Cairo on 16 April 1907? ^nd met 
the Khedive three days later. He described the meeting 
as "cordial”, but hastened to add that before con­
veying his final impression to the Foreign Secretary he 
intended.to ."keep a careful watch for the next months 
or so".8?
No sooner had Cromer left early in May 1907? than 
al-Jaridah suggested in its editorial on May 18, that 
neither a policy of co-operation nor of hostility between 
the Khedive and the British would contribute to the
90achievement of real independent life for the nation.
In the same article, al-Jaridah impressed upon its
necessity of the formation of a political 
party to represent national public opinion. The
88. F.O. 800/4-6, Cromer to Grey, 50 March 1907.
89. Ibid., Gorst to Grey, 20 April 1907.
90. Al-Jaridah. 18 May 1907.
reference to co-operation between the two authorities 
in the country indicated the beginning of a change of 
policy introduced by Gorst. However, during the 
summer of 1907 the new Consul-General went on leave to 
England and the Khedive went to Constantinople, but 
shortly after their return, it oecame evident that the 
two men had made their peace. Gorst felt that Cromer's 
hand towards the end of his term of office had weakened, 
and, therefore, he began to rely more and more on the 
British Advisers. Gorst also noticed that the growth 
of the nationalist spirit caused Cromer to antagonise 
the Egyptian Muslims and forced him to seek the support 
of the European communities and native Christians. The 
situation had been rendered more acute by nis hostility 
towards the Khedive, and by the greatly surenghened 
influence of the nationalists over a considerable 
section of the educated Egyptian Muslims. On the basis 
of this assessment of the situation, Gorst proposed to 
maintain friendly relations with the Khedive, solve the 
financial crisis, refrain from indulging in polemical 
issues which would l^ad to embarrassing questions in the 
Commons, show greater sympathy towards the Muslims and 
the official class, and, last but not least, restore 
Cromer's earlier hostile policy towards European
102.
91privileges.y
In drawing up his policy, Gorst appeared to be 
greatly influenced by local conditions rather than by 
wider British considerations, except that of avoiding 
the discussion of the Egyptian question in the Commons. 
Neither his private exchanges with the Foreign Secretary 
nor his correspondence with the Foreign Office showed 
at any point that the British Government attempted to 
force his hand or dictate his policies. Similar to 
Cromer, Gorst was left a free hand to manage Egyptian 
affairs. His understanding of the situation, however, 
suffered from some major weaknesses. Neither economi­
cally nor politically did he have the insight or foresight 
of his predecessor. His vision on his arrival in Egypt 
was definitely blurred by the existing turmoil of events. 
He wrote that at the time of the announcement of Cromer's 
resignation the excitement among the Nationalists was 
boiling. He recorded
"The hostility between H.H. /Khedive 
Abbas/ snd the "Lord" had grown to such 
a pitch that the condition of "armed 
neutrality" which existed between them 
could not have lasted much longer.
Lastly the local situation was compli­
cated by the outlook of a severe finan­
cial crisis coming at the end of two or 
three years of great speculative 
activity." 92
91 Gorstfs Papers, Autobiographical Note, pp. 111-121.
92* Ibid., p. 115.
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His pragmatic approach in dealing witb the situation
set him on a course of action which did not distinguish
between the transitional and the permanent symptoms of
the situation, between the natural ally of Britain and
its temporary friend. In slightly less than a year,
his policy alienated almost all the high-ranking British
officials in the Egyptian Administration. The Oriental
Secretary at the Agency wrote privately to his mother:
"Did I tell you old Mitchell /Adviser 
of Interior/ vanished at last on Monday 
last? I am sorry to lose the eld dear,
but there was no help for it. I
rather think_next June will see the end 
of Corbett ^Procureur General/ 2Iso, so 
you see the indomitable sportsman 
/.Gorst/ is bringing down the old birds 
right and left." 93
By that time, April 3 908, the Financial Adviser had
already resigned and Boyle himself was to leave Egypt
at the end of the year.
On the other hand, the early effects of the economic
depression were beginning to be felt towards the end of
February 1907* Both Egyptian landowners and foreign 
residents urged the Government to take effective measures 
to check the decline in the financial situation.
Gorst, despite the recommendation of his Financial Advisers 
refused to move on the matter,, and the negative effects
93* Boyle's Papers. Box E, H. Boyle to Mother, 12 April 
1908.
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of the crisis remained with Egynt until the outbreak
of the First World War. In reviewing the situation
in 1908, Gorst recognised that his local policy did not
appeal to the Egyptians or the Europeans, but he was
determined to adhere to it in spite of provocations from 
94all sides”. Boyle again amusingly commented;
”The other day he /Gorst/* asked me:
1Frankly, do you think there is any 
section, or sub-section of society 
here, British, foreign, or Egyptian, 
which has a good word for me and my 
policy?1 and I frankly answered 'Not 
one', at which he grinned cheerfully ♦ ^
rnv'he final rapprochement between the Khedive and 
Gorst towards, the end of 1907, Pu'k ps-id to the earlier 
plan of Kamil and the Khedive to form a political party. 
The scheme, however, had been revived in mid-May 1907 
by the members of al-Jaridah company. The departure of 
Cromer was in effect a serious setback to the interests 
and aspirations of al-Jarideh group, for he had already 
gone half way in appointing members of this group to a 
number of higher posts in the Egyptian Administration.
In his annual report for 1906, Cromer recommended the 
extension of the powers of the Provincial Councils and
94. Gorst!s Papers. Autobiographical Note, p. 124-125# 
95# Boyle's Papers, op.cit.
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the increase of their membership to include a larger
96number of provincial notables. With the appoint­
ment of Gorst, however, the scheme was delayed for two 
years before it was put into effect. At the same time, 
the departure of Cromer aroused a feeling of insecurity
among ohe official class and created some apprehension
camong the leading members of Abduh's group. The 
Prime Minister, on receiving the news of Cromerfs resig­
nation, himself decided to leave office, while the 
Zaghlul brothers, QSsim Amin, ci£tif Barakat and others
who net at Sacd ’s house on the night of 12 April were
97very depressed. (
In the first instance the reaction of al-Jaridah 
to the economic depression was one of studied modera­
tion. While attributing the cause of the crisis to 
the indulgence in land speculation by a number of 
companiesj and while admitting the rise in the cost
of living, it counselled the acceptance of the existing 
98situation. And though recognising the failure of
the measures taken in June 1906 by the Government to 
control the formation of new companies, al-Jaridah
96. Efiypt no. 1 (1907) Cd. 3394.
97. Zaghlul's Memoirs, notebook no. 6, 12 April 1907-
98. Al-Jaridah. 10 March 1907.
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referred in complimentary terns to Cromer1 s warning 
at the end of the y e s r of the dangers of the increasing
QQ
activities in land speculation. y On 26 March 1907> 
al-Jaridah called upon the Egyptian Government to inter­
vene and put a stop to the mismanagement and irregu­
larities exercised by financial and mortgage companies 
Iwo weeks later al-Jarldah supported the proposal of 
Amin Chamsi', a member of al-Jaridah Company, made in 
the General Assembly on March 2nd to set up a Ministry 
of Agriculture.^^ However, with the announcement of 
Cromer1s resignation, the newspaper, apart from advo­
cating Government intervention in the crisis, tended . . 
to evoke the national and personal sentiments of the
rich Egyptians to establish a national bank or at least
102to take part in foreign enterprises. A similar
call was also made upon them to invest their money in 
light industries and to abandon their over-cautious 
attitude towards trade for a more enterprising spirit.
99. Al-Jaridah. 21 March 1907> 8nd ^gynt no. 1 (1907) 
Cd. 3394-*
100. Al-Jaridah, 26 March 1907.
101* Ibid., 10 April 1907.
102. Ibid., 24 April 1907.
The emphasis of al—Jaridah, in relotion to tho oconomic 
crisis, seemed, at the time of the departure of Cromer, 
to shift from a complete confidence in the ability of 
the Government and Cromer to solve the problem, to an 
increasing tendency of reliance on Government inter­
vention. Clearly, this reflected not only the feeling 
of anxiety which increased as the crisis unfolded, but 
also, basically, the reaction was dictated by a con­
scious impulse for the preservation and promotion of 
self-interest.
The reaction of al-Jaridah group to the economic 
crisis was not the only indication of the growing con­
cern of the large landowners over their fortunes.
They simultaneously reacted in the direction of 
political self-assertion. During the first month of 
the publication of al-Jaridah the demand for the exten­
sion of the functions of the existing representative 
institutions did not exceed that which was already 
embodied in Cromer1s report for 1906. Even the 
criticisms of al-Jartdah of the actual wordings of these 
institutions during the twenty-four years of their 
existence did not materially differ from Cromer's own 
views. Al-Jaridah. clearly opposed to a radical change 
in the political and economic system of the country,
advocated tlie gradual attainment of political inde­
pendence, an aspiration which Cromer publicly supported, 
but the feasibility of which he privately doubted. 
Therefore, when the Egyptian Government rejected the 
resolution passed by the General Assembly for the 
establishment of a parliament, and promised only to 
extend the powers of the Provincial Councils, al-Jaridah. 
disregarding its earlier demands which included the 
Legislative Council and the General Assembly, praised 
the Government for its decision. Al-Jaridah stated 
that this was a step towards the participation of the 
nation with its Government in legislating for the 
people and invited every citizen to "leave the spirit
of obstinacy and respect the rulers as long as they
103performed their functions". ^ Evaluating the work 
of Cromer in Egypt, al-Jaridah recognised his great 
contribution to the economy of the country and paid 
tribute to his efforts for the protection of the press 
and personal f r e e d o m . B u t  as soon as Cromer had 
left Egypt, al-Jaridah reverted to its earlier demands 
for the extension of the powers of the Provincial
105Councils, Legislative Council and General Assembly, ^
103. Ibid., 1 April 1907.
104 Ibid., 13 April 1907.
105. Ibid., 20 and 21 May 1907.
109
end also demanded the revival of the functions of the 
State Advisory Council to co-ordinate the process of 
legislation among different Government Departments.^^ 
Almost all the members of the representative insti­
tutions were drawn from the provincial class of notables.
According so Cromer, the candidates to these institutions
c cwere either umdas or those who aspired to be umdas.
They were always landed proprietors representing the
107interests of a single class. ( In strongly empnasising 
the necessity of granting these institutions'wider 
legislative powers, al-Jaridah was in fact seeking to 
ensure, especially after Cromer's departure, the enhance­
ment of the political influence of the large landowners.
Considering the anxieties and. motivations of 
al-Jaridah group, on 18 May 1907, the editorial of the 
newspaper asserted that while recognising the presence 
in Egypc of an enlightened class of notables, Govern­
ment officials, and members of the liberal professions
who were all interested in asserting the nation1s inde-
108pendence, they did not yet form a political party.
On 21 September 1907, al-Jaridah group held a meeting
106. Ibid., ±9 May 1907.
107. Egypt no. 1 (1907), Cd. 3394-.
108. -Al-Ja rids h . 18 May 1907.
and declared the formation of the 1Ummah Party.
Reporting the event, the Adviser for the Interior
wrote that the Party was composed wholly of members of
the Legislative Council, General Assembly, some leading
Culama1, and large provincial landowners. He added
that, since the announcement of its moderate programme
■fche 1Ummah Party "has received the adhesion of numerous
groups, mainly Delonging to the landed and legal
classes, both from the capital and the provinces".
Once al-Jaridah set the pace, the other political
movements followed its example. The Khedive, after
his return from Constantinople, had already urged his
followers to abstain from taking part in nationalist
a g i t a t i o n , w h i l e  a 1-Mu*ayyad lost no time in attacking
111the 1Ummah Party on the first day of its inception.
Upon arrival from Europe in October 1907, Mustafa 
IQ^mil realised the possibility of his political iso­
lation and set to work to form the Patriotic Party.
On the 27 December the National Council and the 
Administrative Committee of the Patriotic Party were 
organised. In the meantime, cAli Yusuf had already
109. P.O. 371/249, E, Graham to Grey, A October 1907.
110. P.O. 800/46, Gorst to Grey, 13 October 1907.
111. Al-Mu'ayyad, 22 September 1907-
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published the political platform of the Constitutional 
Heform Party in a 1-Ku*ayyad on 9 December. While the 
programme of the Patriotic Party demanded the complete 
independence of Egypt and the Sudan, el-Mu1ayyad 
advocated administrative independence to increase the 
powers of the Khedive. vihile al-hiwa expressed the 
idealistic sentiment of the youth and the urban-centred 
section of the intelligentsia, a1-Ku 1 ayyad reflected 
the change of heart of the Khedive towards the occupation 
and asserted the political rights of the sovereign.
The emergence of Egyptian political parties during 
the second half of 1907 was a significant stage in the 
evolution of political consciousness among the different 
sections of the political movement in Egypt. Though 
these sections, namely: the Panislamists, cnbduh's and
Kamil*s followers had existed long before 1907, they 
owed their transformation into political parties to 
the immediate changes in the economic and political 
situation which developed during 1906-1907•
Under the Consul-Generalship of Gorst, the Khedive 
proceeded to consolidate his position, and to regain 
some of the powers which he and his father had lost to 
the British occupation. Early in 1908, the Prime 
Minister admitted to his son-in-law that due to the
1 1 2 .
interference of tlie sovereign, liis position hod become
quite untenable, and that he had therefore inforued
112Gorst of his desire to resign. 8acd Zaghlul, on
the other hand, in the hope of retaining his minis­
terial post, expressed on several occasions his
allegiance to the Khedive and categorically denied any
11*5connection with the 'Ummah Party. ^ He even severed 
his relations with some of the members of the Party 
and suggested to Lutfi al-Sayyid that they ought not 
to visit each other so often. In November 1908,
Mustafa Pahmi resigned and Gorst, as a result of his 
consultations with the Khedive, agreed.to the. appoint- . . 
ment of Butros Ghali, a prominent Copt, as Prime Minister. 
The Khedive's view in the matter was decisive, because 
when Gorst expressed his apprehension about the appoint­
ment of a Christian, the Khedive denied that it would 
arouse Muslim i l l - f e e l i n g . S i m i l a r l y ,  after Ghali's 
assassination in 1910, Gorst accepted the Khedive's
112. Zaghlul's Memoirs. Notebook no. 10, 8 January 1908.
113. Zaghlulfs memoirs during 1907-H revealed persistent 
attempts on his part and that of other Ministers to 
gain the Khedive's favour in order to maintain their 
positions.
114. Zaghlul's Memoirs. Notebook no. 14, November 1909*
115. P.O. 371/452 9 Gorst to Grey, 10 November 1908.
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proposal to appoint Kuhammad SeCfd to the Premiership,^^ 
Furthermore, the withdrawal of British Inspectors from 
the provinces enabled the Khedive to exercise more 
influence over the appointment of mudlrs and the provin­
cial -administration. Zaghlul, while still a Minister 
in the Egyptian Government;, noted that to a large 
extent the Khedive, through the members of his household 
and entourage, manipulated the 1907-08 elections for 
the General Assembly Legislative Council.
In addition, the Khedive moved to assert his predominant 
position in the Azhar. He forced Sheikh HasstEnah 
al-ITawawi, a disciple of cAbduh and Rector of the Azhar, 
to resign his post early in 1909* At the same time 
the scheme initiated under Cromer for the reform of the
r*
Sharr a Courts was shelved.
The Khedive's efforts were also directed against 
his previous allies, the Patriotic Party, and his old 
enemies, members of the 1Ummah Party. He succeeded in 
creating some difficulties for the Jar.idsh Company when 
in 1909, he indirectly caused some twenty-five of its 
members to demand its liquidation, but the remaining 
majority of the members of the Company continued their
116. F.O. 371/891, Gorst to Grey, 21 February 1910.
117. Zaghlul's Memoirs, Notebook no. 12, February 1908.
support for al-Sayyid. Similarly lie intimidated a 
number of its followers in Government service, either 
by means of indirect pressure or by simple adminis­
trative measures. Those who acquiesced to his wishes, 
such as the Zaghlul brothers, managed to survive in 
office, but those who could not adapt themselves to the
*1 1 o
new situation either resigned or were subjected to
liq
disagreeable administrative measures. y However, by 
virtue of its entrenched social influence in the country­
side, and its political predominance in the national 
and local representative institutions, the 1Ummah Party 
managed to withstand the bitter hostility of the Khedive. 
On the other hand, the position of the Patriotic Party 
was greatly undermined by the repressive measures intro­
duced during 1908-1911. In addition to the loss of its 
leader in 1908 and the disenchantment of the Coptic 
elements with the increasingly anti-Christian policy of 
cAbdel ^ ziz ShswTsh, the party faced the joint deter­
mination of the Khedive and Gorst to liquidate it.
118. At; the instigation of the Khedive, Mustafa* cAbdel 
Raziq, the son of Hassan cAbdel P§ziq*#Deputy-Chair- 
man of the 1Ummah Party, was forced to resign from 
the School of Qadis. Z a ghlul1s memoirs, notebook 
no. 14, 15 March 1909*
119. Muhammad Mahmud, the son of the leader of the 'Ummah 
Party, Cromer's protege, was constantly incon­
venienced by a frequent change of his post from
one province to the other.
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Gorst suggested that the only remedy to checl-: nationalist
propaganda was to establish Government control over the
vernacular press. He informed the Foreign Secretary,
"I believe that all classes in this 
country, from the Khedive downwards, 
would welcome the adoption of measures 
for controlling the press, ... The 
difficulties which I see in the way 
are, of course, Parliamentary, and you 
know better than I do whether, if we 
can make out a sufficiently strong case, 
they can be removed. An effective 
press law already exists, having been
passed in 1881. The question of its
application to Europeans presents 
difficulties." 120
The Khedive was certainly behind Gorst*s move.
In 1909* the British Government secured the agreement 
of some European Powers to the revival of the lav/, but 
in view of the widespread opposition which it provoked 
locally, the Egyptian Cabinet rejected the scheme.
The Khedive immediately approached his Ministers and 
demanded its acceptance. He sent a member of his 
household, 1 Ahmad Shafiq, to inform Muhammad 8 a cId and
C-
SaG Zaghlul that as he was the one who initlouod the
projecc, he did not expect his Ministers to out him in
an embarrassing situation vis-a-vis Gorst and the British 
Government. The Ministers had no alternative but to
120. P.O. 800/4-7, Gorst to Grey, 28 March 1908.
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endorse the Khedivefs desire, end the lev.7 uss reacti- 
121vstcch It was the abuse of this lav/ which enabled
the British occupation and the Khedive to exercise a
greater measure of control over the press in Bgypt.
It was applied more often to the disadvantage of the
Patriotic press, and provided the legal pretext for
the harassment of the leaders of the Patriotic Party.
Furthermore a decree, passed in 1909, placed criminals
under police supervision. The Foreign Secretary noted
'•hat it opened the door for "favouritismu or "private 
122malice". Despite the assurances of the Consul-
125
Genera 1 to the contrary, there v/as no indication 
that the new decree would not be used for political 
intimidation.
Pressure was also exercised on students to limit 
their involvement m  political agitation, and Zaghlul, 
in his effort to please the sovereign, carried out the 
task faithfully. The Patriotic Party, under the 
progressiva measures of the authorities, gradually Inst
121. Zaghlul1s Memoirs. Notebook no. 14, 26 Parch 1909. 
According to Shafiq, the Khedive informed him that 
Zaghlul was very unhappy at the decision to xevive 
the press law. Sh8fiq, vol. 2, p. 167.
122. F.O. 800/47, Grey to Gorst, 13 August 1909.
123. Ibid. Gorst to Grey, 19 August, 1909.
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mucli of the support which it previously enjoyed in the 
towns and among the students. Its inability to 
represent the interests of a particular social class, 
and its failure to maintain a permanent alliance withj.
the Khedive, left it in a very precarious 'position and 
finally led to its decline.
By 1911, the Khedive had regained a great deal 
of influence over the appointment of his Ministers and 
the administration of Government Departments, consoli­
dated his position in the religious institutions, and 
managed to weaken the popular and official support cf 
his adversaries. Gorst on the other hand, while 
succeeding in his policy of damping down nationalist 
agitation, was at the same time unable to repair the 
economic condition. The crisis checked the growth of 
items of revenue, such as import duties and fees on 
transfer of land, which together represented some 
IuK. 2,500,000. Revenues from the badaliyyah (exemp­
tion from military service) and proceeds of the sale of
124Government lands disappeared from the 1900 budget.
Gorst:s opening note on the financial situation for 
1908, was couched in pessimistic terms, he wrote:
124. F.O. 371/448, Note on the budget of Fgypt for 
1908, December 1907*
"The recovery from the effects of the 
financial crisis of 190? has been much 
slower than was anticipated and the 
stagnation of business in the chief -jpc: 
centres of activity still continues."
In 1909, the cotton crop was lower than expected 
due to the spread of the cotton-worm. At its seventh 
Congress at Brussels in 1910, the International Feder­
ation of Master Cotton Spinners1 and Manufacturers1 
Association adopted a resolution urging the Egyptian 
Government to form a well-equipped Agricultural Depart­
ment to check the decline in quality and production of 
Egyptian cotton. Gorst later pointed out that the 
Egyptian Government was taking steps.to implement a . .
scheme for tne institution of an Agricultural Depart- 
126ment. Finally, in November 1910, such a Depart­
ment was organised under the direction of a British 
official. During the years 1907-1911* the rate of 
increase of capital invested in joint-stock companies 
compared to the rate of increase before the crisis 
shaved a sharp decline. During the same period, mort­
gage companies showed slow signs of recovery, but by no 
means did this rise to the pre-crisis level of financial 
activity.
125. Egypt no. 1 (1909), Od. 4580.
126, F.O. 308/z'-00, Gorst to Chairman of I.FJ4.C.S.M.A., 
24 June 1910.
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The total effects of the crisis and its aftermath 
greatly harmed the economic interests cf the cotton 
growers as v/e^ l as the European financiers, Hie 
Consul-General, in an effort to prevent further abuse 
of the company law in Egypt; supported the unpopular 
decision of the Mixed Courts of Appeal in 1908 which 
declared the Company City and Agricultural Land of 
Egypt (Limited), null and void, chiefly on the ground 
that it was Egyptian in nature but not registered in 
Egypt, Consequently many companies registered them­
selves as Egyptian, but those which were unable to do 
so went into liquidation. Between 1007 end 1 9 H  some
AS companies, with a total paid up capital of £E.8,222,000,
127went out of business. { When idle British Chamber of 
Commerce and the Britisn Consular Court contested in 
1911, a similar decision by the Mixed Courts, the 
matter was referred to the Foreign Office and Board of 
Trade, but ultimately the views of the Consul-General
I pQ
prevailed* The British business community was
further disturbed when the Egyptian Government gave the 
contract for the construction of the Boulaq Bridge to 
a French firm. At the same time the Government refused
127. Owen, Cotton *.., p. 284.
128 . F.O, J68/526, Cheetham to Gray, 26 August 1911; 
and F.O, 141/447/file 14594,
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to respond to the proposal made by the business com­
munity to put forward £E. 2 million at the disposal of
some of the financial houses to relieve the tightness
129of the money market,
The Egyptian landowners likewise suffered from
the eifects of the crisis. Mortgage banks often
resorted to foreclosures as the proprietors failed to
meet their debt payments. Those who managed to acquire
fresh loans to pay the old ones did so at the risk of
further undermining whatever collateral security they
still retained, and at best increased in the long run
their indebtedness, Muhammad QA1T cAlluba recalled
that his father, a notable of Assiut, could not meet
his financial burdens after the crisis and soon in
150May 1907 died. ^ The consequences of the crisis spread
to all classes of landowners. The small peasants
became more than ever the victims of the moneylender.
Gorst in 1910, reported:
?,As a result of the crisis of 1907? 
there has no doubt been a recrudescence 
of usury. It is very difficult to see 
how this can be prevented, ... V/e have 
set our faces during the last few years 
against any increase in the output of
129. E.O. 800/4-7, Gorst to Grey, 28 March 1908.
130 • M .A . GAlluba , Dhikrayat Siyasiya wa Icjtimaciya , 
unpublished, p. 24-.
the Agricultural Bank. The suggestion 
of State ownership with tenant culti­
vators would be counter to the strong 
desire of the people to own land, and 
the Mohammedan custom of sub-division 
of property ... The only sound remedy 
for the present state of things is 
that the fellah should learn not to 
borrow beyond his means, and I gather 
that painful experience is teaching 
him this lesson.M 131
However, despite Gorst's wishful reflections, and 
the lack of capital in the hands of the Egyptian pro­
prietors, the process of accumulation of debt was 
inevitable. By 1914- the total mortgage debts amounted 
to BE. 66 m i l l i o n , w h i l e  the debt of those who owned 
5 feddans or less amounted to almost £E. 16 million in
1912.155
Despite some of the economically sound measures 
Gorst took, he seemed to alienate the European residents 
and the native cotton growers. His decision to co­
operate with the Khedive was taken purely on political 
grounds. His aim was first and foremost to eradicate 
the influence of Kgmil and his Party. In doing so, 
however, he lost the confidence of the provincial 
notables. On the other hand, pressed by financial
131. P.O. 371/891, Gorst to Grey, 24- March 1910.
132. Crouchley, Investment of Foreign Capital ... . p. 74*. 
153 Egypt no. 1 (1914), Cd. 7358.
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considerations, he failed to respond to the demands of 
the European business community. The Government was 
unable during the years 1907-1911 to perform to any 
appreciable extent its crucial task of accelerating 
the process of agricultural growth. The near depletion 
of Government revenues greatly hindered the utili­
sation of funds for public works and irrigation schemes. 
Gorst was very much aware of his unpopularity among 
foreigners and Egyptians. He made a determined effort 
in 1909 to win their good-will, but was unsuccessful. 
Early in 1908, the Dinshwai prisoners were released, 
and during 1909 he made an attempt to win Egyptian 
sympathy for his policy. He wrote:
"Throughout the year the policy of 
endeavouring to win over to our side 
the more reasonable element amongst 
the Egyptians was pursued, by allowing 
the ministers more initiative and res­
ponsibility, allowing the legislative 
Council to use the consultative powers 
which they possessed, and giving the 
Provincial Councils some real powers 
over local Government."
He admitted, however, that the results he hoped from
these steps were neutralised by the hostility of the
nationalist press, and the opposition to his policies
from the Anglo-Egyptian officials and local European 
1*54residents. Already, in April 1903 al-Jaridah had
134. Gorstfs Papers. Autobiographical Note, p.132.
123.
described the Government scheme for the extension of
the functions of the Provincial Councils ss insigni-
135ficant and inadequate. ^ A few months later, influenced
by the political changes in Turkey, LutfT al-Sayyid
urged the Egyptian Government to grant the nation a
constitution. After two years of delay, Gorst caused
the amendment of the Organic Law to allow for the
extension of the powers of the Provincial Councils in
partial response to the mounting demand for a consti- 
136tution. The new law received the approval of the
Legislative Council end came into effect on 1st January
1910. The Acting Consul-General remarked:
"The fact that it has received the 
approval of the Legislative Council 
justifies the hope that the large 
landowners and notables in the provinces 
will cooperate with the Government in 
making these bodies a useful and 
successful part of the machinery of 
the Government." 137
But the timing of the introduction of the lav/ and the
keen interest in securing the sympathies of the large
landowners and notables coincided with an attempt made
to extend the Suez Canal Concession. Both the Khedive
135« Al-Jaridah. 8 April 1908.
136* Abbas1 Memoirs. al-Misri, 28 June 1951.
137• P.O. 371/862, R. Graham to Grey, 19 September 1909.
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and Gorst were interested in the realisation of the
project. The Khedive, according to Yusuf Sadalq, a
prominent member of his household, expected to receive
a commission from a Fiench financier for promoting 
138
the project. J The Financial Adviser and Gorst,
unable to waive the Sultan’s restrictions upon Egypt’s
130
oorrowmg powers, calculated that the money accruing
"to Egypt from the scheme would enable them to solve
some cf Egypt's economic difficulties and finance
railway projects in the Sudan.
It would seem that the introduction of the new
provincial law was a step in response to a widely
popular demand, m  the hope of winning the good-will
of the Egyptians for a very Uxipopular financial scheme.
Al-Jaridah and Al-cAlam condemned in the strongest terms
the project, while a number of Ministers opposed it, but
under pressure from the Khedive and Gorst they ultimately
proposed to refer it to the General Assembly for a final 
l-f'-Odecision. ' At this point Gorst!s political judgement
138. Farid's Memoirs. Notebook no. 6, pp. 165-187*
Gorst noted that the scheme was cordially approved 
by the Khedjve and Butors Ghali, Gorst *s Papers,
Autobiographical Note^ p. 133. Zaghlul pointed
out that the Khedive strongly urged him more than 
once to defend the project in the General Assembly, 
Zaghlul’s Memoirs, Notebook no. 18, 13-20 February, 1910.
139. F.O, 371/864-, Marling to Grey, 9 November 1909.
14-C. Zaghlul's Memoirs, Notebook No. 17*31 October 1909.
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again failed him. He accepted the Ministers’ sug­
gestion in the hope that by making such a concession 
to the General Assembly he would procure the agreement 
of its members to his scheme. But soon he realised 
his mistake, he wrote:
"No doubt I committed some blunders in 
my management of what was a very diffi­
cult (perhaps impossible) business, and 
perhaps the decision to submit the 
scheme to the General Assembly7, was one 
of the chief mistakes, but it is easy 
to be wise after the event." 14-1
Apart from Egyptian opposition to the scheme, the National
Bank of Egypt, a British controlled undertaking, also
opposed the project. Its Governor felt that the
financial reliance of the Egyptian Government on the
Sues Canal Company would necessarily undermine the
14-2lucrative business of the Bank m  Egypt,
The assassination of the Prime liinister early in
IS10, effectively buried all the hopes of the Consul-
General to win over to his side the members of the 
14-3Assembly.  ^ Prom that time on, he intensified his 
campaign against the nationalist press and the Patriotic 
Party7', and ultimately his disappointment with his earlier
14-1. Gprst’s Papers. Autobiographical Note, p.. 133.
14-2. Zaghlul’s Memoirs. Notebook no. 13, 24- November 1909. 
14-3 P.O. 800/4-7, Gorst to Grey, 26 February 1910.
policy led him tc report that ho was "gradually coming
to the conclusion that it has been a failure, .
To remedy the situation he proposed that, "the English 
should come out more into the open, and, though 1 see 
the objections to this course, it appears to me to be
the lesser of two evils" ,*^ 4-4 In the same strain,
the Foreign Secretary stated that the manner in which 
the Assembly rejected any discussion of the Suez project 
made him concur with Gorst1s view, "I too have been 
coming to the conclusion that we shall have to do some­
thing to assert authority in Egypt, In May 1910,
Gorst submitted to the British Cabinet a Memorandum on 
the situation in Egypt which categorically emphasised 
that the Egyptians were very far from the stage when 
they could govern themselves wiuhout British assistance, 
and that he therefore proposed bo terminate the gradual
extension of the powers of existing representative 
14-6institutions. This became official policy when
Grey announced it in the Commons,
Unable to solve the financial difficulties which 
experienced after the crisis, and eager to check
1^ 1-4, Ibid,, Gorst tc Grey, 10 April 1910,
• Ibid., Grey to Gorst, 24 April 1910.
146. F#0. 371/890, Gorst's Memorandum on the Situation 
in Egypt, 22 May 1910,
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the appeal of the Patriotic Party, the new Consul- 
General allied himself with the Khedive. When the 
dominant aspect of his policy was to eradicate the 
influence of the Patriotic Party, he resorted to the 
adoption of repressive measures tov/ards the press, the 
leaders of the Party, ana the students. But when 
the urgent necessity to remedy the economic situation 
became paramount, Gorst tended to concede to the 
provincial notables a wider influence in the Provincial 
Councils and the Assembly, in the hope of v/inning in 
return their accuiescence for the extension of the 
Suez concession. But when this policy proved to be 
a complete failure, he reverted to his earlier policy 
of repression.
As the mouthpiece of the 1Ummah Party, al-Jeridah 
defended the political and economic interests of the 
class of provincial notables. It defined their status 
in society, voiced their demands, and articulated their 
aspirations. In the process, al-Jaridah further elab­
orated the earlier tendencies which it inherited from 
^Aoduh, Path! Zaghlul, Amin and CUmar, The shift 
frcm the individual to the wealthy family as the unit 
of national regeneration became the basis for the definition
1P8.
of the Egyptian nation end the 1Ummah Party. Simi­
larly, the secular notion of solidarity continued to 
be applied to social relationships as opposed to the 
increasing religious fanaticism of cAbdelcAzIz ShawTsh. 
Furthermore, though the attitude towards the occupation 
suffered a radical change in certain respects, there 
was yet no demand for complete independence or 
evacuation.
Al-Jarldah claimed that the 1Ummah Party repre­
sented the interests of the whole nation. The Egyptian 
nation, however, al-Ssyyid was inclined to believe was 
not composed of individuals but of families. The 
general solidarity of the nation and its collective 
authority was based on the solidarity of these prominent 
and leading Egyptian families. In an interview with
the Egyptian Gazette. al-Sayyid revealed that, it was 
not the intention of the * Ummah Party to popularise its 
principles among the masses of commoners (al-°Amah)«
though he believed that every Egyptian ought to adopt
14-8these principles. Accused by a1-Mu1 ayyad and
al-^Alam of being the representative of the 1A cyan
(potables) and not the 1Ummah (nation), al-Jaridah
retorced by boldly admitting the charge as the following
14-7. Al-Jeridah, 14 November 1910.
148. Ibid.. 19 September 1911.
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extract shows:
"When al-Jaridah described its founding 
members as al-'A^yen, it was only 
stating a fact, similar to saying 
large farmers.
The British authorities have 
always accused the nationalist movement 
of being the creation of a few educated 
Egyptians. Consequently al-TA cyan, or 
largo farmers, or the heads of the 
provincial families or a great number 
of them - whom the British considered 
to be the real men of responsibility 
in Egypt ~ decided to take part in the 
political affairs of the country." 149
On the occasion of the formation of the 1Ummah Party, the
Deputy Chairman had pointed out that since the first
meeting of al-Jaridah group a political party was virtually
formed. He said:..........................................
"All members of the company had similar 
objectives and were united by their 
social positions and the common bond 
of blood and nationality ... The choice 
to adopt the term a I-1 Umnali Party co­
incided with the fact that the Party 
included among its members the majority 
of the heads of prominent families, 
who represented the interests of the 
whole nation, a claim which no other
party in Egypt could make." 150
The tendency to assign explicitly to the 1A cyan, 
or provincial notables, the leading role in the regener­
ation of the Egyptian society and to reduce and often 
even substitute its interests and aspirations for those 
of the class of large landowners clearly indicated the 
particular social outlook of al-Jaridah. A further
14-9* Ibid., 15 fiarch 1909* 150. Ibid., 21 September 1907*
affirmation of this conclusion was inherent in the
policy of the 1Ummah Party. The departure of Cromer,
as wes already mentioned, hardened the demand of the
Party for the extension of the functions of the national
and provincial representative institutions. This
movement gained impetus in 1908, when for the first
time Lutfl al-Sayyid, influenced by the political
changes in Turkey, urged the Egyptian Government to
1S1grant the nation a constitution. ' Consequently, 
early in October, two leading members of the Party 
prepared a draft constitution and submitted it to the 
Legislative C o u n c i l . H o w e v e r ,  the constitutional 
movement represented by the 'Ummah Party did not go 
beyond the demand for the Egyptians to legislate for 
themselves. At no stage of its development did this 
movement raise the question of complete independence 
or evacuation. These were the limits beyond which 
the Party was not prepared to go.
Despite the radical shift in the system of political 
alliances in favour of the Khedive, the 1Ummah Party 
remained basically faithful to the principle of 
preserving a division of labour between the native and
151. Ibid.. 25 and 31 August 1908, 1 September 1908.
152, Ibid.. 4 October 1908 and 1st November 1908.
foreign communities under the auspices of the British 
occupation. While asserting the constitutional 
rights of the Egyptians, the Party equally stressed 
the importance of the European residents to the develop­
ment of the political and economic life of Egypt.
Lutfl al-Sayyid in a meeting in Alexandria impressed 
upon his audience that,
"The interests of the European residents 
are identical with those of the Egyp­
tians. The constitution which we 
demand today does not infringe on the 
capitulary rights of the foreigners or 
the authority of their Consular Courts, 
and does not undermine the powers of 
the Mixed Courts." 153
And while strongly criticising the j>o'licies of the British
Consul-General, al-Jaridah displayed the utmost caution
in presenting its economic and political demands, and
refrained from joining hands with the Patriotic Party
in its anti-British campaign. The economic crisis
did draw the attention of al-Jaridah group to the
harmful effects of the absolute reliance of Egypt on
the European financial enterprises, and it demanded the
intervention of the Government to check the economic
depression and to afford protection for Egyptian industrial
projects. However, realising the fact that most of the
153. Ibid.. 25 August 1908
v;ealth of the country was in effect mortgaged to foreign 
band;; and companies, and aware of the importance of the 
Europeans to Egypt’s economy, the 1Ummah Party reconciled 
its aspirations for financial independence with the 
economic necessities of the existing situation* Al- 
Jaridah, thus, advocated the co-operation of the natives 
with the Europeans in commercial, industrial and finan­
cial activities, while still impressing upon the
Egyptians the necessity of economic independence as a
154preroouisite for real political independence•
Similarly, the political demands of al-Jarideh 
avoided arousing the apprehensions of the foreign com­
munities and, unlike the Patriotic Party, refrained 
from incurring the irreconcilable hostility of the 
British authorities. The political aspirations of 
the Party did not, in the final analysis, threaten 
Britain’s presence in Egypt, but were confined to the 
moderate demands for the extension of the powers and 
membership of the representative institutions* A 
close study of the different proposals which the Party 
made in this connection would reveal that its purpose 
was to achieve a wider base of political representation
15^ • Ibid., 18 May 1908, 21 December 1909 and
1 January 1910.
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in the country to accommodate the growing number and 
influence cf the large landowners, and to cope with 
the different levels of social differentiation existing 
among the members of this class. Thus while advo­
cating the extension oi the functions of the represen­
tative institutions, the Party did not recommend a 
change in the Electoral Law. Al-Jaridah pointed out 
that the £E. 50 tax payable as a qualification for 
membership in the Provincial Councils and Legislative 
Council was initially imposed in 1883 to confine the 
membership in these institutions to the class of 
1 A cyan. But in view of the economic progress which 
the country witnessed since then, this particular class
had greatly increased in number. There was, therefore,
155no need to change the law to include the lower classes. ^ 
However, on the question of the Provincial Councils, 
al-Jaridah recommended the reduction of the tax quali­
fication to £E. 20. Furthermore, the scheme o± the
Party for the reform of the Provincial Councils empha­
sised uhe desirability of separating the membership in
157the Councils from that of the Legislative Assembly.
155. Ibid., 18 May 1907.
155. Ibid.« 20 May 1907.
157' Ibid., 20 and 22 February 1908.
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Similarly sl-Jerideh indicated the necessity of increasing
the administrative powers of the unida to cope with the
deteriorating condition of public order in the country-
side, and demanded the election of umdas instead of
158their appointment by the Government. ^ Al-Jaridah
also urged the Government to increase the number of 
Provincial Councillors, and to double the number of the 
members of the Legislative Council as well as tc invest 
in that Council the right to legislate for the native 
Egyptians.
These proposals indicated the strong desire on the 
part of the 1Ummah Party to give the members of the 
Legislative Council a greater share in the adminis­
tration of the country, while at the same time the 
membership in the Council was to remain the exclusive 
privilege of the higher sections of the 1A Cyan class.
The proposed scheme for the Provincial Councils and 
the cnmda, on the other hand, would seem to allow for 
the introduction of a larger number of provincial 
notables of a lower social standing into the adminis­
tration of the provinces.
In 1908, the Young Turks did not lend the Patriotic 
Party in Lgypt much encouragement, indeed their feelings
i53 . Ibid.. 5 November 1907.
155.
towards the Egyptian nationalists was one of "con- 
159tempt". But as in time Anglo-Trulcish relations
gradually ran into some difficulties, a deputation of 
the Patriotic Party was received in Constantinople, in 
1909,^^ and pressure was exercised on the Egyptian 
Prime Minister to appoint Turkish nationals in the
- 1 161Egyptian administration, The Patriotic Party,
under the influence of Oheikh cAbdel cAziz Sliawlsh,
and encouraged by the Young Turks became increasingly
associated with the ideas of extreme Panislamism, and
eventually lost many of its leading Coptic supporters.
The change of heart of the British authorities towards . . 
162the Copts, the violent attacks of Shawish and the
163nationalist press against them,  ^ and finally the 
assassination of Butros Ghali, provoked a number of 
Coptic notables at Assiut to call for a Conference to
159. P.O. 371/44-9, G. Lowther to Grey, 28 August 1908.
160. P.O. 371/662, G. Lowther to Grey, 29 June 1909.
161. Ibid., R. Graham to Mallet, 11 September 1909.
162. Gorst believed that Cromer had attempted to counter­
balance the growing nationalist spirit by leaning
an the European residents and the Copts* Gorst, 
however, was determined to redress the balance.
Gorst*s Papers, Autiobiographical Note, p. 112.
163. B.M. Seikaly, The Copts Under British Rule, 1882- 
1914. Unioublished Ph.D. thesis, London University,
1967, pp*. 156-159.
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voice the grievances of their community. The Coptic 
move precipitated a Muslim counter reaction. No 
sooner had the deliberations of the Coptic Congress 
terminated, than the preparations for a Muslim 
Congress began.
The *Uirmah Party, despite its political dif­
ferences with the Agency and the Khedive's Government 
pledged itself to follow the advice of the Ministry of 
Interior in order to check the dangerous consequences 
of extreme Panislamism. Ibrahim Hilbawi, a prominent 
member of the Party and Secretary of the Congress was 
in constant consultation with the British Adviser for
Interior on all matters concerning the Congress, while
165Lutfi al-Sayyid served on its organising committee. ^ 
Owing to the co-operation of the Party with the 
British authorities and the Government, "political 
issues were avoided and religious ones treated without 
display of f a n a t i c i s m " C h e e t h a m  reported at the 
end of the deliberations of the Congress that,'"The 
Nationalists were present in large numbers, but they
164. Ibid., p. 290.
165. Ibid., pp. 292-293.
166. P.O. 571/1113, Cheetham to Grey, 29 April 1911*
137.
were precluded from the advocacy of 
their particular theories by the rules 
of the committee, and found themselves, 
moreover, confronted by an organised 
representation of the party of the 
people /TUmmah7« which, though acting 
in opposition tc the Khedive and the ■ 
Government in the Legislative Council, 
is chiefly composed of men of property, 
and is not violently anti-occupationist 
... The party of the people had gained 
almost entire control of the committee 
of the Congress, and Sheikh Shawish 
and one or two other Nationalists were 
only admitted as members at the last 
moment in order that their party might 
not be represented in the management 
of the proceedings and that all sections 
of the Moslem world might be seen 
united in their resistance of the pre­
tensions of the Copts." 167
The Egyptian Congress served as a popular platform 
for the 1Ummah Party to give its views a wider circu­
lation. Most of the Muslim press reported the pro­
ceedings and discussions of the Congress which chiefly 
focussed on social and economic issues. But the 
political significance of the moderating and restraining 
influence of the 1Ummah Party in the Congress, unquest­
ionably indicated that when an internal conflict - in 
this case Muslim-Coptic conflict - reached a magnitude 
which threatened the general framework of the social 
fabric of the Egyptian society, the 1Ummah Party promptly 
moved to resolve the conflict peacefully without exposing
167. Ibid., Cheetham to Grey, 6 May 1911.
the existing framework to a radical change.
These were the general political and economic 
conditions which prevailed during the period 1907 -
1911. The interaction of al-Jarfdah with the environ­
ment produced by these conditions and the ideas which 
it borrowed from °Abduh and his early disciples, formed 
the specific ideological and political outlook of 
the 1Ummah Party. The unity of the elements of this 
outlook derived not only from the hostility of the 
Jaridsh-1Ummah group towards the Khedive, but also from 
the relationships which this elite established with 
the class of provincial notables and the British 
occupation.
The works of al-Sayyid and his associates covered 
0 wide range of literary and political subjects.
These were, generally speaking, either purely theore­
tical in the sense that they did not refer to any 
specific situation, or were practical1 directly 
related to the Egyptian situation. The views expressed 
in al-Jaridah on the concept of nationalism, the role 
of the state, political liberty and ethical values were 
largely drawn from the ideas of western liberal thinkers. 
On the other hand, the attempt to apply these notions 
to the existing political and social situation in Egypt
139.
appeared to have a logic of its own, which at many 
points seemed to reject the superimposition of these 
imported formulations. For instance, the basic prin­
ciples of laissez faire were abandoned for Government 
intervention in economic activity and protectionism. 
However, though some elements of this outlook were 
inspired by western liberalism, they nonetheless owed 
their integration into el-Sayyid's practical thought 
to the fact that they conformed to his general under­
standing of the Egj.^ptisn situation. The secular and 
rational tendencies were maintained to counter not only 
Muslim fanaticism but also Coptic reaction to it. 
Political independence, according to the 'Ummah Party, 
remained to be achieved through gradual means and not 
revolutionary methods which would disrupt society. 
Uhether these ideas originated in Europe or elsewhere 
seemed irrelevant. In the final analysis only the 
principle governing the political outlook of the 'Ummah 
Party determined the selection and integration of these 
ideas or their dismissal.
To conclude then, during the 1890s three major 
political tendencies, which owed their existence to the 
negative as well as the positive aspects of the develop­
ment of the process of agricultural production and the
installation of a British administration, appeared on 
the Egyptian political scene. The consolidation of 
the system of private ownership of land and the reform 
of the system of taxation confined the influence of 
the Khedive chiefly to the Waqfs, the Azhar, and other 
religious institutions. Simultaneously a new gener­
ation of young educated Egyptians, led by I-Iustsfg 
Kamil and inspired by the ideal of political indepen­
dence, began to challenge the British occupation and 
demand the evacuation of Egypt. The Khedive, eager 
to regain the lost political influence of his ancestors, 
lent his moral and.financial support to the-new Patriotic 
Movement, and exploited the political and strategic 
differences between Britain and the Foreign Powers.
In view of his reliance on Islamic Institutions in 
Egypt and his close relations with the Ottoman Sultan, 
the anti-British campaign of the Khedive was expressed 
in Panislsmic terms. However, once the policy of the 
British Consul-General towards the Khedive was reversed 
by his successor, the Khedive abandoned the demand for 
independence or even a parliament, turned against his 
Patriotic allies, and proceeded to take advantage of 
the new situation to enhance his own political position.
Panislamism end Egyptian Patriotism drew Cromer's 
attention to the crucial importance of rallying to his 
side a local political force which would check the 
influence of Kffmil and the Khedive. The class of 
Egyptians which benefited most from the economic -policy 
and administrative reforms of the occupation, and which 
occupied a position of social prominence in the provinces 
and political dominance in the national and provincial 
representative institutions, naturally formed the basis 
of Cromer's local political support.- The Consul-General 
recruited a great number of the members of this class 
to positions of influence in the administration and 
afforded its spokesmen, members of cAbduh1s school of 
thought, every possible encouragement to publish al- 
Jaridah. However, a combination of political and 
economic changes in 1906-07 provoked the members of 
al-Jaridah Company, after the departure of their Patron 
to form the ITJmmah Party in September 1907. Before 
the end of the same year the other political forces in 
the country followed suit and organised their own 
political parties.
Al-Jarldah, the mouthpiece of the 1Ummah Party, 
emphasised the decisive role of the class of provincial 
notables in the regeneration of the nation. It defined
the political and economic demands of this class, 
and articulated the ideological and political outlook 
of the Partya Despite the deterioration of the economic
and political position of the Egyptian large land­
owners, under the rule of the new Consul-General, the 
'Ummah Party continued to recognise that the interests 
of the class of provincial notables lay within the 
confines of the existing socio-economic structure of 
the country.
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CHAPTER III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS 
AND THE ’UMMAH PARTY
Despite the detrimental effects of Gorst1s 
policies on the political and economic situation in Egypt, 
the class of provincial notables, apart from maintaining 
its socio-economic position* seemed to achieve a greater 
measure of political independence and power. This was 
largely due to the development of local self-governing 
institutions and the extension of the functions of the 
existing representative institutions.
Before the British occupation, the umda was 
formally appointed by the Government, but the Khedival
decree of 10 March 1895 regulated the procedure fbr the
c 1selection of the umda and defined his functions.
Accordingly when a vacancy occurred, names of suitable 
candidates were submitted to a special commission 
(Shiakhate Commission) in the province concerned, con­
sisting of the mudir or his deputy as president, a 
representative of the Ministry of Interior (who was
1. See text of the cumda law of 1895 in al-WaqafiC a2- 
Misriyya, 18 March 1895*
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usually the British Inspector), the district attorney, 
and four notables or umdas of local standing selected 
by the mudir from among a number of delegates elected 
by the umdas of each district in the province- The 
Commission's choice was then subject to the confirmation 
of the Minister of Interior. This Commission was also 
responsible;, at the direction of the Ministry, for prose­
cuting the cumdas, with powers to impose upon them specific
Xi
penalties and fines, or even cause their dismissal.
0
In fact, however, the appointment of the umda
remained the prerogation of the Government, and, in many
cases, more specifically that of the British Inspector.
Yet by virtue of the wide powers which the Shiakhate
Commissions possessed, their individual members enjoyed
a privileged status in their provinces. It was, therefore,
not without significance that the provincial notables
attached great importance to their own membership in these
Commissions. Evidently the large land-owners were con-
0
cerned with the appointments made to the post of umdas 
in their provinces. But, while they were prepared, under
0
the occupation, to gradually forego the post of umda in 
favour of notables of lower standing, they were, neverthe­
less, keenly interested in becoming members of the 
Shiakhate Commissions. During the events of 1919? the 
British Inspectors of Interior were unable to retain their
control over the Commissions, or to secure the appointment 
of candidates who were amenable to British advice. Conse­
quently, under the influence of the new nationalist 
movement, members of the Commissions became considerably
p
involved in the political struggle. Thus, the large 
landowners not only participated in the administration of 
the provinces, but were able, as members of the Commissions, 
to manipulate these institutions to achieve their own 
political ends.
According to Baer, the socio-economic position 
and the political power of the umda declined under the 
British occupation. That official's earlier functions 
in the assessment and collection of taxes, leasing of 
state land, and recruitment of the peasants for the 
corvee and army service were either abolished or restricted 
in scope. Similarly, the movement of large landowners to 
the towns and the effects of Muslim inheritance law, 
undermined the cumda's position. In 1904, Cromer observed 
that though some of the cumdas were very wealthy men with 
incomes of as much as £E. 20,000 a year, yet in certain
2, Milner Mission, F.O. 848/19, Draft Memorandum on the 
administration of the Ministry of Interior.
3. Baer, 'The VillageShaykh in Modern Egypt, 1800-1950', 
(ed.). U. Heyd, Studies in Islamic History and 
Civilization, Jerusalem l9&l> PP- 121-155*
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districts it was difficult to find candidates who satisfied
IL
the property qualification of 10 feddans. Simultaneously, 
as the cumda hecame the object of local intrigue and 
official scrut.iny his local prestige would seem to have
T Csuffered. J-n 1903, some 900 umdas were accused of
committing various offences. All the charges were investi-
5
gated, but only in 96 cases were convictions obtained.
However, the decline in the cumda1s position was 
only relative. Although he was not a salaried official, 
he was responsible to the authorities for every branch of 
the administration in matters touching his village. He 
was called upon to implement, in his village, all the 
laws and regulations issued by the Government, and to 
render the central and provincial authorities every 
possible assistance. In fact, in some ways the authority 
of the cumda was even strengthened. Before, 1883, he had 
depended for the enforcement of the laws on his own 
personal influence and on the assistance of the Mudir 
and rural police, but the establishment in 1884 of a 
khaflr force strengthened his haxid, The khedival decree 
of 10 November 1884 provided for the attachment of this
1. Egypt No. 1 (1905) cd 2409*
2. Ibid.
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force t o the Village Council (Ma.ilis al-Balad). This
cCouncil consisted of the umda as president, the Sheikhs
of the village, the M a 1zun (religious sheikh), 4 to 8
c c —
umad al-Muzari in (local agricultural experts) and a
sheikh or more of the khafar depending on the size and
population of the village. As head of the Council and
with the khaflr force under his control, the cumda1s
decisions not only acquired the force of law but also the
means of implementing it. Most important among the
umda1s privileges, especially in the case of those who
owned medium-sized estates, were the exemption of the
Q
umda and his sons from military service, and from the
payment of a land-tax on 5 feddans of his property within
the circumscription of the village. On the other hand,
other factors contributed to the retention of the office
by some rich farmers. Cromer noted that,
"It frequently happens that a man of wealth 
or position, though he cares little for the 
advantages offered by the Government, is 
unwilling that a rival sho-g.lb occupy a position 
of greater administrative and to a certain 
extent, of greater social importance than 
himself".7
However, in spite of the advantages of the
6 . See Text of the Khafir Law in al-Waqa'i" al-Misriyya, 
27 November 1884.
7. Egypt No. 1 (1905) Cd 2409.
office, and in some respects the relative increase in the 
umdaTs political influence, the interest of the large 
landowners in the retention of the office for themselves 
declined. But as the minimum property qualification for 
the post was 10 feddans, the great majority of umdas 
were recruited from among the middle and large landholders. 
The creation of the Provincial Councils and the national 
representative institutions further tempted the upper 
sections of the class of provincial notables to exchange 
the umdaship for membership in these politically more 
influential bodies.
Lord Dufferin in 1883 bad recommended the 
creation of the Provincial Councils. Their main function 
was to assist the mudirs in the administration cf the 
provinces. Their role was purely consultative, but their 
advice touched on a wide range of matters of vital economic 
and political importance to the provinces. They were 
empowered to recommend extraordinary expenditure on 
projects ol public utility, and were invited to give 
their views on questions pertaining to irrigation, 
communications, public security, public health and 
education. Membership of the Councils was confined to 
the class of notables who paid a land tax of £E. 50 or 
more annually. Since, under the British occupation, 
the average tax per feddan in Egypt did not exceed the
14-9
sum of £E. 0.84, it could be safely assumed that almost 
all the members of the Provincial Councils were drawn from 
the class of large landowners.
During the Consul-Generalship of Lord Cromer, 
the functions of the Councils were greatly restricted by 
the infrequency of their meetings, which were only held 
at the invitation of the mudirs. But as the political 
alliance between the 1'Ummah Party and Cromer became 
stronger, the latter appeared to appreciate the necessity 
of granting more powers to the Councils. Before leaving 
^gypt he advised his successor to introduce changes in 
this particular direction. He wrote: "One of the last
proposals I made before leaving Egypt was thatthe Provin­
cial Councils should be re-organized, their powers some-
g
what increased .,..M
The new Consul, as las been pointed out earlier, 
awaited a politically more suitable moment to put the 
scheme into effect, though by that time the demands of 
the *Ummah Party has surpassed the concessions which 
Gorst was prepared to make. Nevertheless, the reform of 
the Provincial Councils greatly contributed to the growing 
political involvement and the widening of the influence 
of the class of provincial notables. In 1909, the Organic
8 . Cromer, Modern Egypt, Vol. 2, p. 277-
Law was amended so as to confer greater powers both in 
appearance and in reality on the Councils- Substantial 
changes in the functions, as well as in the structure, of 
these Councils were introduced. In addition to their 
previous consultative role, the new amendments authorised 
the Councils to vote municipal taxes and prepare an annual 
budget for the Province. The mudirs were bound to take 
their opinion in respect of the following: changes in the
boundaries of the provinces and the districts; the creation 
or suppression of local commissions in the provincial 
towns; the establishment or transfer of Government Schools; 
buildings or hospitals; the construction of agricultural 
railways and canals, and the granting of concessions to 
companies or individuals. The decisions of the Councils 
were, however, binding in matters relating to the appli­
cation of certain local regulations, the authorisation of 
religious fairs and markets, and in determining the number 
of kha.f irs required in the whole province. In addition to 
being che responsible authorities for elementary education, 
the Councils were now empowered to spend ?0°/o on secondary 
and higher education from the total funds devoted to 
public instruction.
The new reforms had a far-reaching impact in the 
provinces on the political situation and administrative 
conditions. Firstly, as a result of the relaxation of
mcentral Government control on the Councils, these bodies 
began to show more initiative in the provincial adminis­
tration. Consequently, influential rural families became 
more interested than ever in securing for themselves a 
predominant influence in the Councils. In Assiut, the 
two prominent families of Mahmud Pasha Suleiman, president 
of the rUmmah Party, and Mustafa Khalifa contested
for three consecutive years the seat of Abu Tlj district, 
and in each year the case was taken to court for a final 
decision.^ Secondly, a larger number of councillors were 
involved in the administration of the provinces. Each 
district (markaz) was invited to elect two representatives 
to the Council of the Province. Consequently, while 
before 1909 "the number of councillors ranged between 3 to 
8 for a single province, the introduction of the new 
reforms in 1909 raised the number to range between 6 to 
20 councillors. Furthermore, representation in the 
Councils tended to become more localised. Candidates 
were no longer elected upon a common list for the whole 
province, but on the basis of two representatives from 
each district, where frhey had for the last two years paid 
the necessary taxes. But perhaps the most important 
aspect of the reform was the opportunity it offered for
1C. F.O. 371/^658, R. Graham to Kitchener, 20 March 1913*
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an increasing number of the prominent members of the 
<*Ummah Party to take part in the administration of the 
provinces. Even for some one like Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, 
managing editor of al-Jaridah, the post of provincial 
councillor seemed to have a special attraction. In 1911, 
he represented the Simblawln district in the Daqahlia 
Council, bat soon resigned due to the pressure of his work 
in al-Jarldah.
Throughout the period of 1883 to 1913? membership 
in the Councils served as a stepping-stone to the entry 
into the legislative Council and General Assembly. Each 
Council elected from among its members one delegate to 
represent it on these bodies. In 1911? despite the 
opposition of the Khedive, at least ten of the sixteen 
elected members of the Legislative Council were either 
members of the Jarldah Company or leading members of the 
?Gmmah Party. Not less than fifteen of the founding 
members of the Party in 1907? were at the same time 
members of the Legislative Council.
The General Assembly created in 1883 consisted 
of eighty-two members. It comprised of all the thirty 
members of the Legislative Council, the Council of 
Ministers, and forty-six delegates chosen for six years 
by electors throughout Egypt. Candidates were requested 
to be 30 years of age or over, literate, and paying a
153
minimum annual direct tax of £E. 20. The duties of the 
Assembly were purely consultative, and it only met when 
summoned by decree, subject to a provision which was not 
always respected, that it must be held at least once every 
two years. It had a decisive voice only in one respect, 
that of approving ceruain forms of new taxation or the 
negotiation of fresh loans. But since it was one of 
Cromer's major policies to relieve the Egyptian landowner 
of the burden of heavy taxation, the Assembly tended to 
accept most of the measures proposed by the Consul-General. 
It endorsed the Government’s decision to suppress the 
corvee, and approved in 1899 the scheme for the general 
reassessment of the land tax. But apart from these two 
cases, this particular aspect of the functions of the 
Assembly was "particularly inoperative, inasmuch as up to 
the present time [1906]".^
However, during Gorst's term in Egypt, the 
attirude of the Assembly towards the occupation underwent 
considerable change. It assumed some political importance 
on the occassion of its rejection of the Government's 
recommendation to sanction the extension of the concession 
of the Suez Canal Company. But normally the Assembly
11. F.O. 371/68  ^ Cromer's Memorandum, 8 September 1906.
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was more concerned with the current national and local 
issues raised by the 1Ummah Party. These included 
proposals for the extension of the powers of most of 
the existing representative institutions, the promotion 
of secondary and higher education, the creation of a 
municipality in Cairo, and the sale of Government uncul­
tivated land. At the same time, the Assembly rejected 
the plans of the Government which were particularly 
unfavourable to the interests of the landowners. In 1907 
it defeated a proposal made by the Government to impose a 
new land tax for the aid of the kuttabs (village mosque 
schools), and opposed a scheme which aimed to restrict
the area planted with cotton to one third of the property
12of any landholder. In 1909, the Assembly passed a
resolution reiterating the demand advocated by the ,Ummad
Party calling upon the Government to grant the nation a
15constitution. However, following the reversal of the 
British policy towards the self-governing institutions in 
Egypt in 1910, the political influence of the Assembly 
declined.^
12. P.O. 371/245, Cromer to Grey, 8 March 1907, Inclosure
1 and 4 .
13. F.O. 371/060, Gorst to Grey, 6 February 1909*
14. Reference here is to Gorst's Memorandum respecting 
self-government in Egypt, in F.O. 371/890, 22 May 1910.
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A politically more important representative body 
which existed during the period 1883-1915 was the Legis­
lative Council, It consisted of 30 members, sixteen of 
whom were elected by the 14 Provincial Councils and the 
two Covernorates of Cairo and Alexandria, the remaining 
members being nominated by the Khedive and his Ministers, 
The Council met six times a year, or on further occasions 
when it was summoned by Khedival decree. All the laws 
and Khedival decrees as well as the annual budget were 
necessarily submitted to it for discussion, but its 
recommendations were not binding on the Government.
The relation between the British authorities 
and the class of large landowners practically governed 
the deliberations and behaviour of the Council. According 
to Cromer's annual report for 3905? the Council passed 
through three phases since its inception. While in the 
early years of its existence it attracted little political 
attention, in later years it became hostile to the Govern­
ment, but eventually Cromer recognised that its attitude 
towards the occupation was a good omen for the future.
Obviously these stages in the political develop­
ment of the Council corresponded to the general political 
and economic progress of Egypt. In the first dscadn of 
the occupation the country witnessed the achievement of 
political stability and financial solvency under a
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British administration which paid little attention to the 
wishes of the Legislative Council. In the early 1890ls 
the Khedive took the initiative in opposing the occupation 
and momentarily swayed the opinion of the Council against 
the British. At that point however, the benefits accruing 
to the large landowners from the economic policies of the 
Consul-General and the desire of the latter to check the
0
Khedive's activities by summoning the support of Abduh 
and his associates combined to consolidate the alliance 
between Cromer and the Council. Though the small number 
of the Khedive's supporters in the Council continued to 
be a source of nuisance for the Consul-General, the major­
ity of the members, however, showed a friendly disposition 
towards the occupation authorities..
The departure of Cromer ushered in a new phase 
in the development of the Council, which was characterised 
by the persistent demand of its members for a constitution 
and a parliament. On his return from Constantinople in 
the summer of 1908, the Khedive described the demand for 
a Constitution as "absurd", but at the same time he felt 
that such a demand would unite the opposition. "It was 
true" he said "that the extreme Nationalist party appeared 
to be moribund, but other and more dangerous parties 
[meaning the rUmmah] were growing in power". He advised 
Gorst to make some nominal concessions in the Legislative
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Council, which would make the Egyptians imagine that
15"they were in Paradise". Accordingly, the Prime Minister
promised the Council that the ministers would attend the
sessions and take part in the discussions.*^
However, this evasive method of meeting the
requests of the Council failed to satisfy the majority of
its members, who felt that the new privilege was nothing
17but a right which the Council already possessed. The 
Khedive and the Consul, consequently, resorted to more 
devious measures to eliminate from the Council the unde­
sirable elements who opposed their policies. Members of 
the Khedive's household frequently interfered in favour 
of the election of his supporters to the Council, while 
the British officials in the Ministry of Interior encouraged 
the mudirs to oppose the election of anti-British candi­
dates. In 1911, the Acting Consul-General reported that
c — _
'lama il Pasha, head of the 'Ahaza family, represented 
the Sharqia province in the Council, but his influence 
was persistently used for the purpose of intrigue against 
the occupation. The mudir of the province, under instruc­
tions from the Government, took steps to prove to the
15. P.O. 371/4-52, R. Graham to Grey, 18 September 1908.
16. Ibid., Gorst to Grey, 10 December 1908.
17. P.O. 371/064, Gorst to Grey, 25 November 1909-
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population of the province and members of its administration
that they would be safe from reprisals from 'Ismacil Pasha
if they resisted the 'Abazas. 'IsmacIl Abaza was thus
defeated, and the Government candidate won the seat
allocated for the Sharqia province in the Council. The
report of the Acting Consul concluded that "The influence
of the Abazas is thus broken and a number of men in the
province who aie not afraid to show British sympathies
IBhave come to the front".
Though such pressures exercised by Government 
officials tended to undermine in some cases the political 
influence of the fUmmah Party inside the Legislative 
Council basically the Party, by virtue of its control 
over the electorate in the provinces, managed to hold 
its ground. During the debates on the proposal of the 
Government to revive the Press law of 1881, the Party 
secured enough votes to defeat the motion, but at the 
instigation of the Khedive and the Agency, the Government 
disregarded the decision of the Council and passed the 
law. Towards the end of Gorst's term in Pgypt, the 
Adviser of Interior accurately described the position of 
the * Ummah Party in the Council and in the country at 
large in the following terms:
18. P.O. 371/1114, M. Cheetham to Grey, 29 July 1911
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"Founded some six years ago, with the tacit 
approval of Lord Cromer, to act as a moderating 
influence in Egyptian politics and as a counter­
poise to the Khedive, it is principally 
composed of large landed proprietors, such 
as Mahmoud Pasha Suliman, of Assiut, and 
Sharawi Pasha of Minieh. It is strongly 
represented on the Legislative Council, 
where Barakao Bey is its principal spokesman.
Its press organ is the "Garida" (about 4,200 
readers), edited by the intelligent and 
plausible Lutfi Bey Sayid- Within a year 
of its formation, this party turned against 
the Agency, though it has always depended 
upon us for protection from the Khedive. 
Latterly, since the policy of the "entente", 
[between Gorst and the Khedive] the party 
has been violently hostile to the Government 
and has opposed all measures in the Legislative 
Council, attacking the Government on every 
possible occasion. ... It is the best organised 
and most; powerful political party in Egypt 
at present, having considerable funds at
........ its disposal * At the, recent Provincial.........
Council and Legislative Elections it ran 
candidates with some success, and the 
Government was obliged to bring pressure 
to bear against it, in view of the open- 
hostile attitude it had adopted. ... Although 
useful to us at times, this party must not 
be allowed to become too powerful" .-*-9
* * *
The Legislative Council and the 1Gmmah Party 
regained much of their previous political influence under 
the Consul-Generalship of Lord Kitchener. This followed 
the gradual dissolution of the earlier understanding 
between the Khedive and the British authorities and the
19* F.R.O. 50/57, piece no. 56, from a report on "The 
Political Parties in Egypt" prepared by R. Graham, 
10 April 1911.
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growing political and personal antagonism between Kitchener 
and the Khedive, By the early months of 1912, the new 
Consul expressed his desire to grant the Egyptians a 
greater measure of self-government. The attitude of the 
'Ummah Party inside the Legislative Council seemed to 
reinforce Kitchener's intentions in that direction. He 
noted that the v»rork of the Council since his arrival in 
Egypt Mhas to be recorded with satisfaction". He, in 
addition, felt that previous experience showed that there 
were organic defects which militated against the success 
of the Council. He therefore proposed to abolish the 
General Assembly and legislative Council, and institute 
on different lines m  their place the legislative Assembly. 
The new arrangement he thought would "give the Egyptians 
a fresh chance of working out their own future represent­
ative institutions by proving that they are worthy of
20the confidence reposed in them".
However, this act of benevolence on the part of 
the Consul-General, in addition to the economic and 
administrative reforms which he introduced, was largely 
inspired by his appreciation of the existing political 
and financial situation in Egypt. Kitchener sought to 
undermine the position of the Khedive by resorting to a
20. Egypt no. 1 (1914) cd. 7358.
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greater measure of British control over the machinery
of the state and reverting to Cromer’s policy of personal
Government. Similarly he appeared to afford the *Ummah
Farty some encouragement to counter the activities of the
Khedive, but was at the same time, perhaps under the
influence of the views of his Adviser for Interior,
against the continued growth in the political power and
social influence of the Farty, which would eventually
pose a threat to the British interests in Egypt. He
accordingly introduced legislative reforms which were
specifically aimed at achieving "a fuller representation
21of the views of smaller land-owner class and others".
His concern for the small peasant was thus partly governed 
by a tendency to check the growing influence of the large 
landowners and preserve the political stability among the 
different classes in society, and partly to perpetuate the 
Cromerian maxim of preventing the displacement of Egyptian 
landowners by Europeans. Furthermore, he attempted to 
remedy the economic situation of the country by increasing 
Government expenditure on the construction of irrigation 
and drainage schemes and the extension of railways.
Many of the measures he introduced were inspired 
by his admiration for Cromer's earlier policy in Egypt,
21- F.O. 371/1-362, Kitchener to Grey, 14 April 1912.
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and in fact on several occasions he invited the latter's 
advice. On the other hand. Kitchener continued to apply 
the repressive measures which he inherited from Gorst to 
intimidate the members of the Patriotic Party and to 
suppress the nationalist press. Between 1911 and 1914, 
the harassment of the leaders of the Patriotic Party by 
the authorities brought about the departure of cAbdel 
cAziz Shawlsh and the flight of Muhammad Farid from Egypt.
The total effect of Kitchener’s policies in 
Egypt not only strengthened the political influence of 
the medium landowners, but unintentionally further 
consolidated the position of the large landowners.
Though at the beginning of his term in Egypt,
22Kitchener appeared to be satisfied with the Khedive, 
soon, however, the relation between them underwent a 
change. Kitchener's policy tended to check the growing 
political power of the Khedive and undermined some of his 
private financial schemes. The duties of the British
23Inspectors in the provincial administration were revived,"^ 
and Kitchener began to interfere with the administration 
of the Waqfs. At the request of the Prime Minister,
22. P.O. 800/48, Kitchener to Grey, 24 January 1912. 
Kitchener wrote: "The Khedive is working well,
and I have no difficulty with him".
23. G. Lloyd, Egypt since Cromer, Vol.'ll, London, 1934,
p. 157.
163
Q _
Muhammad Sa id Pasha, Kitchener had advised the Khedive 
to dismiss the trustee in charge of the properties of
2 4  m
Princess Saliha and her children. Though the Khedive
on that occasion had promptly responded to the Consul's,
request, the event, nevertheless, precipitated a minis-
terial crisis which endec in the resignation of Sa d
Zaghlul. Similarly during the summer of 1912, Kitchener
frustrated the efforts of the Khedive to sell the Mariout
railway to a German firm. By the end of the year, it was
evident that the differences between the soverign and the
Consul had become irreconcilable. The former, at this
point, resorted to his earlier policy of inciting anti-
British feeling among his subjects, and concluded an
agreement with the Patriotic Party and the nationalist
press. Furthermore greatly irritated by the interference
of the Prime Minister, supported by Kitchener, in matters
relating to the Waqfs, the Khedive attempted to provoke
a ministerial crisis to force the resignation of the
Prime Miuiisrer. Kitchener, however, reacted by threatening
to rely on the support of the 'Ummah Partv, and stated:
"I feel myself that we should suppoit 
Mohammed Said, who has done well, and 
generally acted pretty straightly. So 
I am inclined to let it be secretly known ; 
that, in case of a change, we might think
24. F.O. 800/48, Kitchener to Grey, 7 March 1912.
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of the Party of the People, which has some 
very respectable members. They are chiefly 
large landed proprietors •.. and not friends 
of the Khedive. If he understands that they 
may be given a chance of forming a Ministry,
I imagine I shall hear very little more about 
a new Cabinet".25
Kitchener's warring was effective, and the 
Khedive temporarily abandoned the idea of attempting a 
ministerial change. However, conflicting issues continued 
to contribute to the deterioration of the relation between 
the British authorities and the Khedive, and eventually 
caused the two parties to rally to their side their old  
respective allies. The Khedive reached an agreement with
the Administrative Committee of the Patriotic Party and
 c 26
paid a sum of £B. 1000 to al- Alam newspaper, an act
which, according to Muhammad Farid, rendered the organ of
27
the Party a mere instrument of the Khedive. Similarly, 
Kitchener, in the hope of winning the support of the 
'Ummah Party, pressed the Foreign Secretary to approve 
the introduction of a scheme for constitutional reform in 
Egypt• He explained that underlying the demand of the 
TTbetter classes" for reform was
"a general belief that the creation of a public
25- Ibid., Kitchener to Grey, 8 December 1912.
26. Farid's litemoirs, Notebook no. 3, pp. 76-77-
27. Ibid., p. 83-
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opinion which will effectively support 
Ministers, is the only mesns. of checking 
the undue demoralizing influence of the 
Khedive. It is realized that the Ministers 
unaided are quite unahle to control him, 
and that this Agency alone can do so. 
Respectively natives are satisfied that we 
shall not allow any overt act of tyranny, 
as long as we are here, hut they are froisses 
ar having to rely on the unreguralized inter­
ference of a foreign Power in their affairs, 
particularly as regards semi-religious matters 
and cognate subjects, in the direction of 
which the Khedive in supreme, and I fear 
systematically appropriates religious endowment 
funds bequeathed for public benefations".
Kitchener then pointed out that, since his arrival in
Egypt, he had attempted with some success to recover the
confidence of the Egyptians in Britain, but felt that this
confidence "will be rudely shaken if constitutional reform
is put on one side without an alternative policy".
Kitchener added, "those who now loyally support us will
28absolutely lose hope for the future". Early in 1913-.
the Consul-General foildd a second attempt made by the
Khed?ve to sell the Mariout railway to an Italian
Syndicate. The Secretary-General of the Italian foreign
Office admitted to the British Ambassador in Rome that,
"encouragement had been given to the syndicate 
because the Italian Government hoped thereby 
to obtain some hold over the Khedive and 
prevent him from intriguing in Cyrenaica 
by the hope of financial advantages".
28. P.O. 800/4*8, Kitchener to Grey, 2 March 1915*
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The Ambassador was also informed that if the Italians
"boro to sacrifice the influence thus secured 
and advocated the renunciation of the option 
by the Syndicate, we [British] ought, in 
recognition of their attitude, to endeavour 
to obtain through the Khedive the recall of 
Aziz Bey, [Aziz al-Masri, Commander of the
Turkish Army in Cyrenaica] and help them in 29
other matters to ihich they attached importance".
The direct rapprochment between the Khedive and
a foreign Power, however, provoked the strongest reaction
on the part of the Consul-General, He proposed to warn
the Khedive that similar attempts to sell the Mariout
line would lead the British Government "to take your
Highness's whole position into serious consideration",
but after consultation with the Foreign Office a slightly
milder reprimand was communicated to the Khedive, The
issue was finally settled in February 1914-, when the
Railway Department of the Egyptian Government agreed to
30buy the line from the Khedive. The transaction was 
concluded so %s to compensate him for his loss of his 
direct control over the Waqfs Administration.
Partly to regain the confidence of the 'Hmmah 
Party, and partly to reduce the Khedive's political 
influence, Kitchener, while in England during the summer
29. F.O. 371/1637, R. Rodd to Grey, 26 March 1913- 
30 F.O, 371/1966, Kitchener to Grey, 6 February 1914.
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of 1913? obtained the approval of the Foreign Secretary
to implement Cromer's recommendation of 1906, to place
the Waqfs under a responsible Minister assisted by a
Muslim Council* On his return to Egypt, he met the
Khedive and strongly condemned his support for the anti-
British campaign led by the Patriotic Party and al-
M u *ayyad. He then told him that despite the latter's
objections> the British Government had decided to create
a Waqfs Ministry, demanded from him a termination of the
scandals caused by the sale of grades and decorations,
and asked for the removal of some of his unsatisfactory 
31entourage* When the Khedive appeared to be reluctant
in complying witn the Consul's orders, Kitchener made it
known to him through some of the Ministers that, in case
of his continued refusal, "action will be taken for his
c —deposition". In an interview with Sa d Zaghlul, the
Khedive went so far as to c&aim that Kitchener on that
occasion threatened to send British troops to occupy the
52Qubba Palace. This was not a mere political bluff on 
the part of Kitchener, who had already informed the 
Foreign Office that there was no great difficulty in 
removing the Khedive, "as he is generally hated throughout
31- F.O. 371/164-0, Kitchener to Grey, 7 and 9 November 1913* 
32. Zaghlul's Memoirs, Notebook no. 23» 26 December 1913-
i1
i
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the country". Kitchener's hand was further strengthened
by a recent message which he received from the Ottoman
Grand Vezir, who stated that,
"His Highness's reception in Constantinople 
had not in any way changed Ottoman Government1s 
opinion of him, and that if it became necessary 
for the good of Egypt that even the highest 
personage should be removed Ottoman Government 
would willingly co-operate".33
The Khedive, realising the increasing weakness
of his position, acquiesced in Kitchener's scheme for the
34-reorganisation of the Waqfs, and offered his assurances
35that all grades and honours would be properly awarded.
Less than a week later, a decree was signed creating a 
Ministry and a Supreme Council of the Waqfs. The same 
decree instituted the Ministry of Agriculture* in response 
to the traditional demand of the 'Urnmah Party for the 
protection of the agricultural interests of the country.
The Khedive's political influence was further 
reduced when he was prevented from taking part in the 
appointment of the nominated members of the new legislative 
Assembly. He bitterly attacked the Government for the
33* P.O. 371/1640, Kitchener to Grey, 9 November 1913-
34. Ibid., Kitchener to Grey, 12 November 1913*
35* Ibid., Kitchener to Grey, 13 November 1913-
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selection of "incompetent candidates who failed to win
the elections". The Ministry thus became again a
subject of controversy between the British authorities
and the Khedive. Kitchener, despite the assurances of
the Khedive, suspected the latterfs intentions to provoke
a ministerial crisis which in its furn would lead to the
dismissal of the Prime Minister. He warned the Khedive
that there was no reason for a change of Ministers and
37demanded the immediate removal of his entourage. f 
However, by the end of March, 1914, the position of the 
Prime Minister became untenable and the Khedive, fore­
stalling Kitchener's possible objections to a change in
the Ministry, pioposed the appointment of Mustafa Pasha 
- 38Fahmi. The latter, influenced by the views of his son-
in-l^w, did not reach an understanding with the Consul-
General, and the post was eventually offered to Husain
39Rushdi Pasha. Nevertheless, the hostility of the British 
authorities towards the Khedive continued.
On his departure to Europe in 1914, the Khedive 
expressed his wish to visit England again, but Kitchener
36. Zaghlul1s Memoirs, Notebook no. 23, 26 December 1913*
37. F.O. 371/1967, Kitchener to Grey, 16 March 1014.
38. Ibid., Kitchener to Grey, 28 March 1914.
39- Ibid., Kitchener to Grey, 5 April 1914.
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advised the Foreign Office that, in view of the fact that
the Khedive
"has not yet dismissed the entourage I told 
him we objected to last November, and about 
which I have reminded him more than once, 
so I do not think it desirable to show him 
any favour, if you would agree this would 
be a suitable reason”.40
Subsequently, bhe First World War broke out in August and 
the Khedive was not allowed to return to Eg3*pt.
The political power and the personal prestige 
of the Khedive, during the period 1911 to 1914- sharply 
declined to a level which it had never reached before.
Lord Kitchener not only restricted the Khedive's inter­
ference in. the. working of Government departments and 
institutions, but also threatened the basis of his real 
power in the country by challenging his authority over
the religious institutions and particularly the Waqfs.
* * *
Though the Consul-General was keenly interested 
in the speedy recovery of the economic situation, he was 
at the same time equally concerned with the maintenance 
of political stability and the preservation of the existing 
division of labour between the Egyptian farmer and the 
European financier. lie realised, following the example
4-0. Ibid., Kitchener to Grey, 19 May 1914*.
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of Cromer, that an atmosphere conducive to economic growth
could be achieved by the increase of Government expenditure
on public works and by Government legislation for Egyptians
as well as European residents.
During the first year of his administration in
Kitchener became a^are of the necessity of increasing
Government spendings on railways, agriculture, public
41works and provincial services. Similarly, during that
year, his attention was drawn to the problem of the
financial indebtedness of the small peasants. He was
informed that,
"Unless some steps are taken, to counter­
balance the great facility given to Userers, 
since the establishment of the National Bank 
of Egypt - a very large portion of the small 
farms must in time pass from the hands of 
the Natives to those of Europeans of the very 
worst type. The Governor of the National 
Bank, although using an interest very con­
siderable sums of the Government money - 
says to a very large portion of those Natives 
who approached him:-
1 We are a Bankers bank" , in other words 
"We are a userers Bank" go you to the Userer 
pay him from 36 to 60 /o and he will supply 
you - next day the bank takes over the Bill 
or note of the Native with of course the 
signature of the userer or so called Banker 
on it, and gives him a very extensive credit 
of 5 1/2 to 6 1/2 /o and this is shown m  
the account as "Bankers accounts" ... twelve
41. Egypt no. 1 (1913) cd. 6682, see proposed Government 
expenditure for year 1913-
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of those local userers are the relations 
of one of the Directors of the National 
Bank".42
The dangerous dimensions of the problem prompted
the Consul-Genex"*al to enact the Five Feddan Law, which
aroused the opposition of the money-lending classes and
43the Europear business community, ^ Likewise, the London 
Committee of the Agricultural Bank of Egypt strongly 
objected to the new law and drew the attention of the 
Foreign Secretary to its damaging financial effects on 
the functions of the Bank.^
In the long run, the situation of the fallah
who continued to rely on the local money-lender as his
..............................  4 5
main source of credit, did not significantly change,
but the immediate impact of the new lav/ certainly reduced
the confidence of the European interests in the British
authorities *
Kitchener privately proposed the creation of a
Council to advise him before his seeking final approval of
the Foreign Office on legislation which would be binding
42. F.R.O. 30/57* no. 42, Enclosure on Five Feddan Lav/, 
note dated 4 March 1912.
43- F.O. 371/1364-, M. Cheetham to Grey, 29 July 1912.
44. Ibid., London Committee to Grey, 14 August 1912.
45* Baer, History of Landownership ..., p. 90.
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on Europeans. However, Cromer warned him that apart from 
the Five Feddan Law, which rudely shocked the confidence 
of the monied classes, the new scheme would further deal 
a serious biow go the interests of the European Communities 
in Egypt. Kitchener appeared to take Cromer's advice 
to heart and abandoned his plan for effecting a radical 
change in the system of capitulations.
air sfc >(e
During Kitchener's prescence in Egypt, the 
critical disposition of the 'Ummah Party towards the 
British occupation gave way to a more friendly attitude.
This change coincided with the gradual deterioration of 
the relation between the Consul-General and the Khedive, 
and the increasing willingness of the British authorities 
to grant some of the administrative and legislative demands 
of the Party.
During the early months of 1912, Kitchener on 
several occasions had expressed his satisfaction with the 
Khedive, and hoped that within a year he would be able to 
reduce all the political parties in Egypt to the sane 
dying state as that of the Patriotic Party. Consequently, 
al-Jaridah described the new regime as being autocratic.
46. P.R.O. 30/57* ho. 44, Cromer to Kitchener, 30 July, 1913*
47. F.O. 800/48, Kitchener to Grey, 24 January 1912.
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Lutfl al-Sayyid, unable to define the policy of the new
Consul-General towards the Khedive, claimed that his rule
4-8was, nevertheless, autocratic. And in contrast to the
political position of Abduh’s associates during the Tabs
Incident of 1906, al-Sayyid not only accused the Egyptian
authorities of preventing Egyptian volunteers from joining
the Ottoman forces in Libya, but also stated that it was
Egypt's duty to lend its support to Turkey in its war
against the Italians, or, at least, observe the Egyptian
nationality law and respond to the national feeling by
lacilitating the passage of Ottoman trcops through Egypt.
a legal right which according to al-Sayyid the Ottoman 
............................................4 . 9 .....................................
Government possessed m  Egypt. . Similarly, al-Sayyid
criticised the British authorities for allowing the
exploitation of the Egyptian peasantry in the interest
of British financial and commercial firms, while on the
other hand affording no such encouragement to the idea of
the creation of agricultural co-operatives or a national
Egyptian bank. Genuine reform, he claimed, was only
50achieved by granting the nation a constitution.
However, towards the end of March 1912, as the
48. Al-Jaridah, 9 January 1912.
49* Ibid., 1 October 1911.
50. Ibid., 4 February 1912.
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intention of the Government to improve the system of
representation in the country and to introduce legislative
measures for the protection of the small peasant and
effect the improvement of the state of public security
in the provinces became apparent, al-Jarldah adopted a less
critical attitude towards the occupation. In his opening
speech to the General Assembly in March 1912, the Khedive
announced that the Government was cardfully considering
changes in the Organic law of the country to allow for
the introduction of a better system of representative
SIinstitutions. On April the 11th, al-Jaridah reported
without comment that the Government was investigating
........................................................... 52
legal measures to protect the interests of the peasants.
Less than a month later, al-Jaridah published the proposed
law creating the Cantonal Courts, but again refrained
temporarily from expressing its views on the subject.
However, on the 20th May, al-Sayyid urged the nation to
accept and make use of this useful measure, and added that
it made no difference whether it was inspired by the Consul-
General or the Egyptian Government. J This marked a
turning point in the autitude of the 'Ummah Party towards
51. P.O. 571/1362, Kitchener to Grey, 14- April 1912.
52. Al-Jaridah, 11 April, 1912.
53. Ibid., 20 May 1912.
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the occupation, which provoked al-cAlam newspaper to
renew its personal attack on al-Sayyid and on his Party.
Similarly, al-Sayyid thanked the Government for the
promulgation of the Five Feddan Lav/, hut at the same time
explained that without the creation of agricultural
co-operatives or relieving the fallah from the burden of
his earlier debts, the new measure would be insufficient
5zl
for his protection from the money-lender. Al-Jaridah 
then praised Lord Kitchener for the distribution of 1000 
feddans in the Gharbia Province to 200 landless peasants. ^ 
On the occasion of the publication of Kitchener's report 
for 1912, al-Sayyid wrote that the financial section of 
the report was comprehensive and met the aspirations of 
all Egyptians. He also added that politically the report 
revealed the genuine desire of the Government to extend 
the powers of the Legislative Council during the summer 
of 1913* The implementation of such a scheme, al-Sayyid 
noted would not confine the services of Kitchener to 
Egypt to the economic sphere, but v/ould extend his con­
structive efforts to the social and political aspects of 
the life of the nation for which he would deserve the
54. Ibid., 30 June 1912.
55. Ibid. , 18 December 1912.
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56gratitude of all Egyptians, Al-Jaridah furthermore in
the face of the growing criticism of the European business
communitj1-, tended to defend the Government’s economic
measures. Al-Sayyid* while announcing in the best tradition
of western liberalism that the three functions of the
Government were the establishment of public order, the
administration of justice and the defence of the country
from aggression, admitted that in view of the existing
conditions in Egypt the Government should take upon
itself to perform other functions which would contribute
57to the remedy of the backwardness of the country. He 
wrote:
"It may not be in conformity with the doctrine 
of liberalism to advocate the interference of 
the Government in the economic sphere, But 
the country is in the first stage of its 
modern revival and the state should take upon 
itself to encourage the development of its 
economic potential. Undoubtedly, this could 
be achieved by the establishment of a national 
bank and agricultural co-operatives, which eg 
would form the basis of the economic system".
The aspiration of the prominent members of the
'Umin ah Party to win the election for the new Legislative
Assembly led tnem to seek a policy of reconciliation with
56. Ibid., S June, 1913*
57* Ibid., 28 September 1915* 
58 Ibid., 13 January 1914*
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the Government and the British authorities, A few months 
before the elections a raprrodbennnt was reached between
59the managing editor of al-Jaridah and the Prime Minister, y
whose position at that time wholly depended on the support
of Kitchener. Similarly, in the hope of winning the
blessings of the Consul-General and the British Adviser
for the Interior, al-Jaridah paid tribute to their efforts,
which, it maintained, were made to ensure the absolute
freedom of the elections.^ Al-Sayyid asserted in his
electoral manifesto that the enactment of the new Organic
Lav/ was a step in the direction of granting Egypt a
constitution. He also expressed his absolute satisfaction
with the progress of the scheme of the Government to
introduce self-government and lauded the initiative of
the administration in the protection of the freedom of
individuals and trie interests of the farmers. On reading
the document, Zaghlul commented with some contempt that
"not even Kitchener himself could have adopted a better 
01
programme". Other prominent members of the *Ummah 
Party, on the other hand, were in close contact with 
Kitchener personally. Muhammad Mahmud, the son of the
59. Zaghlul1s Memoirs„ Notebook no. 23, 18 October, 1913*
60 Al-Jaridah, 23 October 1913*
_  1VJL
61. Zaghlul* s Memoirs, Notebook no. 23, 3 December 1913*
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leader of the Party, acted as the intermediary between 
Zaghlul and Kitchener, when the latter sounded out Zaghlul 
whether he would co-operate with the occupation in his cap­
acity as the elected vice-President of the Chamber, in 
running the affairs of the newly-formed Assembly.
Even though the results of the elections were
on the whole favourable to the 'Ummah Party, al-Jaridah
reverted to its previous criticisms of the Government and
the occupation. Early in January 1914, al-Sayyid blamed
the Government for its infringement on the rights of the
nation. He deplored, rather belatedly, the methods it
adopted in the setting-up of the Ministries of Waqfs and
Agriculture, and the promulgation of the new Organic Law,
without reference to the existing Legislative Council or
0
General Assembly. He further stated that the Agricultural 
and National Banks of Egypt as well as the Pive Eeddan Law 
would continue to have detrimental effects on the whole 
economy of Egypt until a real Egyptian national bank and 
cooperative societies were created.64 Though the new 
Assembly, he claimed, had a larger membership than the 
Legislative Council., yet its voice remained purely
62. Ibid., 8 December 1913*
63. Al-Jaridah, 10 January 1914.
64. Ibid., 13 January 1914.
180
consultative and, with the exception of minor modifications,
65its functions were the same as those of the Council.
Undoubtedly, the results of the elections failed 
to satisfy the expectations of the fUmmah Party, and the 
conspicuous interference of the Government in favour of 
some of its own supporters was in some cases detrimental 
to the partyTs interests. The managing editor of al- 
Jarldah and some of the party members in Lower Egypt were 
not returned, while a prominent landowner, c^ ll Pasha 
ShaCrawi, was returned with some difficulty. Inside the 
Assembly, the 'Ummah-Jaridah group led by Sacd Zaghlul 
on many occasions joined hands with the Patriotic Farty 
in its opposition to the Government. At some point, at 
least, al-Sayyid appeared to entertain the idea of winning 
the Khedive's good-will. During the famous tour of the 
Khedive in the provinces in 1914, al-Sayyid invited his 
bwildered disciple Husain Haykal to join him in the
66reception of the Khedive whom he claimed had changed.
At the same time the decline in the prices of cotton 
during the year 1913-14, and the failure of the Government 
to meet the situation aroused the concern of al-Sayyid
65. Ibid., 17 January 1914.
66. M.H. Haykal, Mudhakkarati fi al-Siyasa al-Masriyya, 
Vol. 1, Cairo, 1951, pp• $8-59• #
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and his associates. Numerous articles appeared in al- 
Jaridah inviting the Government to intervene in favour 
of cotton growers, and al-Sayyid repeatedly made the plea 
for the creation of a national hank and cooperative 
societies•
The disenchantment of the fUmmah Party with 
the new Assembly and the economic policy of the Government 
was only a symptom of the growing rift between the Party 
and the British authorities. The years which followed the 
departure of Lord Crcmer had a far-reaching effect on the 
political behaviour and political demands of the Party.
The cooperation between the Khedive and Gorst and the slow 
economic recovery of the country not only contributed to 
the development of an independent political position but 
also produced a sense of political solidarity among the 
members of the ’Ummah-Jarldah group. On the other hand, 
Kitchener’s autocratic rule and his often declared inten­
tion to eliminate all the political parties hardly 
inspired any kind of confidence in his policy among the 
members of the 'Ummah Party. By the time of Kitchener’s 
appointment, the Party had already articulated its political 
demands and acquired a predominant social and political 
influence in the countryside. In any political alliance 
with the British authorities, the Party was no longer 
satisfied with the r^le of the junior partner. It was now
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seeking to secure its position against the unpredictable 
changes in the policies of the successive British Consuls. 
By insisting on the right of the nation to a constitution 
and to the extension of the legislative powers of the new 
Assembly, the Party was in fact emphasising its own 
determination to win an independent political influence 
in the country. Similarly, the Party encouraged, and often 
took a leading part in, the establishment of independent 
institutions to represent the interests of different 
professional groups in Egypt. On December 4, 1909,
Lutfi al-Sayyid had been elected Vice-President of the 
Press Union, which in November 1912, the newly-formed 
Union of Egyptian Lawyers elected Ibrahim al-Halbawi, its 
first President. Likewise, early in 1914, the decline in 
the prices of cotton instigated a group of large landowners 
and cotton growers (who included among them a number of 
the members of the fUmmah Party) to form a society whose
aims were the defence of the interests of the cotton
67 cgrowers. Moreover, at that time Hassan Abdel Raziq
and lalcat Harb were among the leading members of the
Egyptian Chamber of Commerce.
In spite of the growing dissatisfaction of the
67. See al-Jaridah, 18 March 1914 for the names of the 
members of the executive committee of the society.
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rUmmah Party with the political, and, to some extent, the 
economic system of the country, there was no tendency to 
advocate a radical change in the existing social order or 
to question the status of the British occupation. The 
Party maintained its friendly attitude towards the foreign 
communities and refrained from joining the Patriotic Party 
in its more extreme demands for evacuation or complete 
independence. On the whole, the Party benefited from the 
reforms which were introduced by Lord Kitchener.
Underlying the Consul's determination to establish
the new Assembly was his feeling, acquired soon after his
arrival in Bgypt, that the existing representative
institutions were "of very little, if indeed of any, value
68to the country". Re explicitly drew the attention of 
the Foreign Secretary, who was reluctant to reverse his 
earlier decision an 1910, to the extreme inadequacy of 
the existing system of Government, to meet the demands 
of the "better classes" of the community. He also warned 
that if the British Government did not show itself in 
favour of his moderate proposals, thun he would lose all 
the local support, and consequently would have to establish 
a protectorate over the country, a course which he felt 
was far from the Secretary's views and entirely out of
68. P.O. 371/13^2, Kitchener to Grey, 14 April 1912.
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the question. Evidently the Consul-General took special
personal interest in the creation of the new Assembly,
which led some of the British officials in Egypt to refer
70significantly to it as Kitchener’s "child".
The major purpose of the reform was to effect a
change in the electoral system and in the numerical
strength of the Assembly, in order to bring about the
representation of the smaller landowners and different
71interest and minority groups in the Egyptian society.'
There was, however, no intention to extend the powers of
the Assembly to exceed those which the earlier institutions
possessed. In agreement with Kitchener's views, Cromer
wrote "As you say ... it is quite essential that the last
72word should remain with the Government". Accordingly, 
though the Electoral Lew was modified to allow for an 
increase in the membership of the new Assembly, its powers 
remained practically the sane as those of the Legislative 
Council and General Assembly.
The new Organic and Electoral L$ws of 1915
69. P.O. 800/48, Kitchener to Grey, 2 March 1913*
70. Wingate’s Papers, Box 469/5 Clayton to Wingate, 29 
December 1913*
71. P.O. 371/1362, Kitchener to Grey, 14 April 1912.
72. P.R.O. 30/57> n° • 42 from "Enclosure and Reports 
1912", Cromer to Kitchener, 25 Laly 1912.
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abolished the Legislative Council and General Assembly and 
constituted instead the Legislative Assembly. The new 
Assembly was composed of 82 members, 17 of whom were 
nominated by the Government, while the remaining 65 were 
elected from the Governorates and the provinces. The 
British authorities made every possible effort to secure 
the nomination and election of candidates who were 
favourably disposed towards the occupation. Attempts were 
also made to curb the entry of hostile elements into the 
Chamber. Clayton noted that,
q
"The Government were anxious that he [Sa d 
Zaghlul] should not get in and Graham 
[Adviser of Interior] told me before the 
election that they were trying to find a 
candidate to successfully oppose him - 
however, they were not very successful as 
he got in for two divisions - Saide Zenab 
and Ezbekieh".
Clayton added with some disappointment,
"I think it is a pity they tried to oppose 
him without being certain of being successfu] 
as it has got out that they were anxious to 
prevent his getting in, and the result has^, 
been rather a triumph for his supporters'1. ^
The Adviser of Interior viewed the results of the elections
with great satisfaction. He reported that, with the
exception of the Khedive’s supporters and the candidates
73- Wingatef s P a p e r s Box 469/5> Clayton to Wingate, 
22 December 193-3•
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of the Patriotic and 'Umnah parties,
"The Government can count on a majority of 
the remaining 38 elected members of the 
Assembly and it is probable that most, if 
not all, the new members of indeterminate 
opinions will, if skilfully handled at the 
outset, come under its influence. Moreover ^  
it has nominated 17 members to the Chamber".
The majority of the members of the new Assembly 
were drawn from the Egyptian rich landowners. The exami­
nation of the list of its members showed that, at least,
71 of them were landowners, and with the exception of 
c — —
Ali Shamsi who owned some 20 feddans, they were all 
proprietors of 50 feddans or niore.^ The greatest 
concentration of their landholdings was in the range of 
200 feddans or more, which clearly indicated that the 
membership in the Assembly tended to favour the represen­
tation of the upper sections of the large landowning class. 
In terms of occupation, apart from 59 members who were 
exclusively classified as landowners, the rest included 
9 lawyers, 4 merchants, 4 culamaf and heads of religious 
sects, 3 engineers, 2 doctors and an ex-army officer. The
74. P.O. 371/1984 'Hote on the First Election for the
Egyptian Legislative Assembly' R. Graham, 29 December 
19139 P* 15.
75* Ibid., Most of the information in this section per­
taining to the size of the properties of the members 
of the Legislatjve Assembly is drawn from the report 
prepared by the Adviser of Interior, Graham estimated
P/note contd. on next page
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reserved estimate of the Adviser of Interior that the
1Ummah Party held 14 seats in the new Assembly led him
to conclude that.,
"Although a Government majority is practically 
assured the results of the elections ••. were 
on the whole favourable to the "Party of the 
People". ... This party represents all that 
is best in the cla,ss of large country land­
owners and, although its policy has been 
marked by a consistent hostility to the 
Khedive and the present Prime Minister and 
not seldom by a transparent selfishness 
where its own interests are concerned, it 
has never shown itself unreasonable towards 
the occupation or unamenable to the influence 
of the British Agency".
However, the deliberations in the Assembly soon 
proved that the assessment of the Government forces inside 
the Chamber made by the British Adviser was too optimistic. 
The names of JO members at least of the new Assembly 
either appeared on the list of the founders of al-Jaridah 
Company or were close associated with the 'Ummah Party 
since its formation. Among them was SaCd Pasha Zaghlu], 
who, following his resignation from the Government in 1912, 
re-established his political and personal links with the
Footnote 75 contd. from previous page
that the number of landowners in the Assembly was 
59* and thus overlooked the fact that some of those 
whom he classified as merchants or members of the 
liberal professions were also landowners.
76. Ibid., p . 14 -
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Party. The British Adviser referred to him, on the
occasion of his election to the Assembly, as being a
member of the ’Ummah Party who would possibly lead the
77opposition against the Government inside the Chamber*
L.J. Cantori pointed out that,
"An analysis of all the roll calls in which
the assembly divided along government and
opposition lines, reveals $ list of 34 names 
whg on a majority of occasions voted with 
Sa d against the government".78
E. Graham consequently realised that though the Chamber
"was by no means badly disposed towards the Government"
when it first met in January 1914-* towards the middle of
the session, however, the majority of the members were
7 0 .....................................................................
hostile. 1 J
c — cUnder uhe leadership of Sa d Zaghlul and Abdel
c — —
Aziz Pahmi, the ' Ummah Party formed the bulk of the 
opposition to the Government inside the Chamber. The 
division between Government supporters and the opposition 
centred around the issues which the 'Ummah Party raised 
to satisfy its aspiration for the extension of the powers
77- Ibid., p. 49-
78. L.J. Cantori, The Organizational Basis of an Blite
Party: The Egyptians Uafd, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis,
University of Chicago,19S6, pp. 31-32.
79- P-0. 371/1969 'Eeport on the First Session of the 
Egyptian Legislative Assembly', E. Graham, 26 June 
1914-.
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of the legislature. The Government endeavoured at the 
beginning of the session to confer upon the nominated 
President of the Assembly sufficient powers to control 
the proceedings, but the majority of the members foiled 
the Government's attempt. Similarly, Zaghlul on several 
occasions protested against the creation of the Ministries 
of TAaqfs and Agriculture without previous consultation 
with the Assembly. At the sane time, the Assembly 
resisted the attempts made to introduce new administrative 
measures designed to establish Government control over the 
agricultural cooperative societies. However, when pressure 
was brought to bear on the members of the Assembly, they 
endorsed by a small majority the amendments proposed by 
the Government on the new law of Agricultural cooperatives. 
Zaghlul, the elected Vice-President of the Assembly, 
declared that the vote "had stultified the Chamber, and 
had rendered his own position untenable" •. Consequently, 
in protest, he did not attend the subsequent meetings of 
the Assembly which adjourned till the autumn of 1914#^
But perhaps the most important issue which was the subject 
of heated discussions in the Assengly was the question of 
who would preside over the meetings in the eyent of the 
absence of the President. Naturally the 'Ummah Party
80. Ibid.
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supported the claim of the elected Vice-President against
that of the nominated Vice-President, hub eventually the
Government1s motion won by 44 to 32 votes, the majority
including the 8 Ministers.
The Government exercised some measure of influence
over the *Ummah Party through the intervention of the
Consul-General. Kitchener often demanded from Zaghlul
not to obstruct the legislative and administrative measures
proposed by the Government. He warned him that if the
Assembly voted illegal the action of the Government in
moving a group of Egyptian convicts to the Sudan, the
decision would settle once and for all the question of
81the Sudan . "being.in any way part of Egypt ..." Similarly, 
he informed Zaghlul that it was the desire of the British 
Government that the Chamber should pass the Criminal Bill
o p
submitted by the Egyptian Government.
However, despite the interference of the Consul- 
General in the proceedings of the Assembly, and the 
threatening tone which he frequently took to achieve his 
ends, the 1Ummah Party continued to utilize its strong 
position in the Chamber to express its views on the current
81. Wingate's Papers, Box 469/6, Clayton to Wingate, 
ll February 1914.
8> . Zaghlulfs Memoirs, Notebook no. 22, 26 December 1913*
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political issues and to assert the right of the new 
Assenbly to legislate for the native Egyptians. Though 
the existence of the Assenbly was shortlived, the changes 
brought about by tho promulgation of the Organic and 
Electoral Laws of 1913 had a far-reaching effect on the 
future political developments in Egypt.
Tho now law widened the basis of national repre­
sentation in the country, but still confined it to the 
upper sections of the large landowning class. At the sane 
tine, it tended to perpetuate on a political level, the 
process of social differentiation by the separation of the 
nenbership in the Assenbly from that of the Provincial 
Councils. Compared to the old Legislative Council, the 
number of the aembers of the now Assembly was alnost three 
times as large, while the proportion of the elected to tho 
nominated members was greater than that of the Legislative 
Council. The eligibility age was raised from 30 years to 
35, while the amount of tax payable as a qualification, 
except for a slight reduction in the case of those who 
paid a house tax or were holders of higher educational 
diplomas, was maintained at £E 50* On the other hand, the 
requisite amount of land tax for candidates bo the
83- See text of the Organic and Electoral Laws of Egypt, 
21 July 1913, in Egypt no. 3 (1913), Od. 6875*
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Provincial Councils was reduced from £E 50 to £E 35, and 
for candidates of higher educe,tion it was further reduced 
to £E 14. The new Electoral lav/ categorically emphasised 
the abolition of the earlier procedure of combining the 
post of provincial councillor with that of the nenbership 
in the Assembly and established the principle of the
separation of the two functions*
These measures resulted in the increase of the 
numerical strength of the Assembly, and, consequently, the 
introduction of a larger number of provincial notables 
into the political administration of the country. In the 
Old Council, each of the provinces was represented by only 
one member, but in the new Assembly the provinces returned 
a total of 59 representatives many of whom abandoned their 
seats in the Provincial Councils to become members of the 
Assembly. On the other hand, the reduction of the tax 
qualification for candidates to the Provincial Councils 
led, during the elections of 1913-1914, to the introduction 
of a large number of provincial councillors who were drawn 
from the class of middle landowners. From a British point 
of view this coincided with the initial desire of the 
Consul-General to break the virtual monopoly of the large 
landowners over the national and local self-governing 
institutions, and check their predominant political and 
social influence in the countryside, while simultaneously
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broadening the base of British support among the smaller 
landowners in the countryside*
Mainly motivated by this same principle, and 
partly influenced by administrative and judicial consider­
ations, Kitchener, towards the middle of 1912, set-up the 
Cantonal Courts in the provinces. These courst were 
empowered to settle claims in ordinary cases up to a limit 
of 5 to £E 10, and were entitled to decide on disputes 
involving the rectifications of field boundaries, and to 
administer justice in other small local matters according 
to tradition and custom. To each Cantonal Court were 
appointed five judges chosen from among the notables of 
the district by the Minister of Justice.^ The Government 
proposed that the candidates should own property in the 
districts where the courts to which they were attached 
were located, but significantly failed to specify the 
nature or size of this property. The members of vhe 
Legislative Council, however, perhaps aware of the danger 
to themselves of allowing the small peasants a certain 
measure of influence in these courts argued in favour of 
establishing a tax qualification. The Government reluc­
tantly gave way to the pressure of the Council and 
accepted the application of a tax qualification of 15*
84. Egypt no. 1 (1913)> Cd. 6682.
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The practical results of the aeasure naturally led to the
recruitment of judges for the Cantonal Courts from among
the class of provincial notables and the middle landowners.
* * *
To conclude then, the development of represen­
tative and semi-official institutions in Egypt during the 
period 1883 - 1914-, tended to favour the involvement of an 
increasing number of large landowners in the political 
system of the country. Heads of leading families in the 
provinces were keenly interested in securing for themselves 
a position of social and political prominence by becoming 
members of the General Assembly, the legislative Council, 
the Shiakhate Commissions and the Provincial Councils.
This process gained further impetus by the reform of the 
Provincial Councils in 1909* which resulted in the active 
participation of a still larger number of notables in the 
administration of the provinces. PurtherDore, the political 
and administrative reforms introduced by Lord Kitchener 
produced several important changes in the functions and 
structure of the existing representative institutions.
The new measures consolidated the political position of 
the large landowners and increased their numerical strength 
in the newly-formed Legislative Assembly. On the other 
hand, the creation of the Cantonal Courts and the pro­
mulgation of the new Electoral Law were advantageous to
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the political interests of the middle landholders and the 
lower sections of the class of provincial notables, who by 
the end of the 19th century had already acquired a sub­
stantial measure of control over the cunda institution in 
the villages.
The 1Ummah Party enjoyed a considerable political 
influence in these institutions, and was therefore strongly 
in favour of the extension of their functions. Consequently, 
as the Party gradually moved in the direction of asserting 
its relative political independence from the British 
authorities its demands increasingly focussed on the 
necessity of entrusting the new Assembly with wider powers 
of legislation. The constitutional movement which emerged 
after the Par was chiefly inspired by this same principle, 
which simultaneously formed the starting point for the 
more popular demand of the Wafd Party for complete 
independence.
The death of Gorst in 1911 and the appointment 
of Kitchener to the British Agency in Cairo reversed the 
political and financial fortunes of the Khedive. The 
power which he possessed over the administration of the 
religious institutions was greatly reduced, and his 
deposition at the beginning of the War was to a large 
extent a natural culmination of this process.
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CHAPTER IV
THE POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS OP EGIPT 
DURING THE WAR
Early in August 1914, the War broke out while
the Khedive was still on his summer visit to Instanbul.
The British Agency "had for long suspected his intrigues
at the Ottoman Porte, and did not wish for his return"
The Acting Consul first advised the Foreign Office to
2
delay his return, and at a later date further enphasised:
"It is quite certain that return of His Highness 
would be the greatest mistake and would 
prejudice, if not destroy,^present satis­
factory state of affairs".
Consequently, the Khedive was deposed in December 1914,
and his position was offered and accepted by Prince Husain
Kamil, with the title of Sultan. Furthermore, Egypt was
declared a Protectorate.
A number of measures were introduced to meet the
new military and economic situation created by the War.
Martial Law and military censorship on the press were
1. Vatikiotis, p. 244.
2. F.O. 371/1968, Cheetham to F.O., 6 August 1914.
3. 7.0. 371/1970, Cheetham to Grey, 31 August 1914.
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established, while a large number of the members of the
Patriotic Party and almost all the members of the Khedive's
household were arrested. Several princes and the Minister
of the Waqfs, who were suspected of Khedivist leanings
were asked to leave the country. On 9 November, a fetwa
was published signed by 27 loading Culamar urging the
Egyptian people to respect the new system of government
and refrain from all political activity.^
At the same time, steps were taken to ease the
strain of the financial situation caused by the failure,
at the beginning of the War, to sell Egypt's cotton crop
The Financial Adviser described tho immediate effects of
the crisis on the large landowners in the following terms:
"’Their recklessness in borrowing money is 
well-known, and a large proportion of them 
" have mortgaged their lands to a very large 
extent. They naturally will be unable to 
pay the instalments and are thus in a very 
precarious situation ... It is this class 
which is at the root of the present discontent 
which is being fomented by political ana 
foreign agitators".5
The Adviser of Interior explicitly warned that "if the
crop was not sold the blame would ... be 3 aid upon the
British authorities, and that public opinion would be
4. F.O. 371/2355, 'The General Situation in Egypt", 
R. Graham, 27 December 1914.
5. F.O. 371/1960, Note by the Financial Adviser, 26 
October 1914.
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6alienated from us". The Egyptian cotton growers and 
merchants quickly reacted to the new situation which 
posed a threat to their interests. On 8 August, the 
leading merchants and landowners of the Egyptian Chamber 
of Commerce appointed a standing Committee to consider the 
immediate measures necessary for the protection of these
7
interests. Subsequently, a delegation met the Prime 
Minister, who assured its members that their demands for 
the postponement of the payment of debts, and a government 
loan of £E 2 per kantar of cotton would be sympathetically
g
considered. The Egyptian Government thus took effective 
measures to remedy the deteriorating situation. Arrange­
ments were made for the large proprietors to borrow money 
from the National Bank, while half of the land-tax for 
the month of November was added in equal portions to the 
December and January instalments. In addition, the 
Government decided to assist the small proprietors by
9
the purchase of part of their cotton crop.
It was precisely during the period leading up 
to the declaration of the Protectorate, when the financial
6. Ibid., Graham to Cheetham, 25 October 1914.
7- Al-Jaridah, 9 August, 1914.
8. Ibid., 9 September, 1914.
9* F.O. 571/1909 9 Cheetham to Grey, 24 October, 1914.
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interests of the Egyptian landowners wholly depended on 
the goodwill of the British authorities that the Agency 
effected, without any serious opposition, a major change 
in Egyptfs political and international status. The 
previous determination of the class of provincial notables 
to win a certain measure of self-government and political 
independence gradually weakened as their reliance on the 
occupation authorities rapidly increased. The attempts of 
the 'Ummah Party in concert with the Egyptian Prime 
Minister, at the beginning of the War, to extract some 
political concessions from Britain in return for their 
cooperation in the War effort, soon gave way to a more 
conciliatory attitude on their part.^ The call of Lutfi 
al-Sayyid on the Egyptian Government to maintain "Egypt's 
tradition of absolute neutrality under any circumstances" 
was unhesitatingly superseded by his demand, less than a 
week later, for the declaration of a state of war in Egypt 
and the establishment of Martial Law. He stated that the 
participation of Britain in the Year rendered Egypt's 
neutrality meaningless, and, therefore, it was the duty 
of the nation to lend the Government all the support
10. Al-Sayyid, Q.issat Hay at i , pp. 162-164.
11. Al-Jaridah, 2 August, 1914.
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12needed for the defence of the country. Al-Sayyid 
explained to his disciple Husain Haykal that this change 
in policy was only temporary pending the results of the 
discussions between the Prime Minister, Husain Rushdl, 
and the British authorities. He added that the Prime 
Minister hoped to obtain an undertaking from Britain to 
recognise Egypt1s complete independence at the end of the 
War.13
On 30th October., Rushdl spoke officially to the 
Acting Consul and the British Adviser of Interior regarding
the
"necessity of accompanying a declaration of 
war. with Turkey by an announcement of a 
larger measure of self-government for Egypt.
He declared that his own attitude and probably 
that of his colleagues would be entirely 
influenced by paragraph in our proclamation 
relating to this subject, that, if it was 
satisfactory to him, he would gladly remain 
in office and render us his loyal support, 
but that otherwise he would relixiquish his 
post and retire into private life".!^
However, further discussions led the Prime Minister to
accept the proclamation of war with Turkey, and satisfy
himself with a British undertaking, which was never
respected, to the effect that the entire responsibility
12. Ibid., 8 August, 1914-.
13* Haykal, Mudakkarati ..*, Vol. I, pp. 63-66.
14. P.O. 371/1970, Cheethan to Grey, 30 October 1914.
|
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of the defence of Egypt would he carried out by the British 
15forces. ^ In the first military engagement with the Turks
at the Canal, an Egyptian Officer was among the first to
fall. Wingate remarked on the incident:
"It is a curious thing that the first one 
to fall in the war should be an Egyptian 
Officer, and yet Maxwell1s Proclamation 
st atecl that the Egyptians would not be 
called upon to fight".16
The new Sultan and the Prime Minister were very 
hesitant to accept the declaration of el protectorate 
without securing from the British authorities a promise 
to grant Egypt a measure of self-government. When
Cheetham sounded Prince Husain Kamil to see if he would
•   .............
accept the Sultanate, the latter explained:
"at the moment when Islamic feeling throughout 
Egypt will be stirred by fact of war against 
Caliph he could not accept Khediviate without 
grant or promise of autonomy to Egypt under 
British suzerainty".
The British Government, on the other hand, 
refused to make any such concessions and instructed the 
Agency
"to declare Annexation of Egypt thus getting 
rid of all difficulties about succession to 
Khedive and giving Egyptians at once the 
status of British subjects. November
15* Ibid. , Cheetham to Grey, 5 November 1914.
16. Wingatefs Papers, Box 157? Wingate to Herbert, 
25 November l9l4.
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nineteenth when troops arrive from India 
would bo a suitable occasion". 17
The decision of the British Cabinet, however, coincided
with the measures taken by the Financial Adviser to
relieve the anxiety of the Egyptian landowners. This
enabled Cheetham to report that the obstacles to the
establishment of a Protectorate "are now I hope largely
18overcone nere". He later added: "Prince Hussein's
views have somewhat progressed and that he wishes to
iq
accept [Khedivate]". J The new sovereign appeared to
be more interested in the throne and the honours attached
to it rather than in championing the demand for autonomy.
He expressed his desire to be awarded the title, of. Sultan,
a separate flag and a nev/ coinage to commemorate his
20accession to the throne. He told the Acting Consul
that he realised that Britain must govern Egypt but
"in his belief a Moslem Chief was necessary 
to Egypt from religious point of view and 
could be of eminent value to Empire through 
his influence in Arabia ... he felt now 
that he could accept a Protectorate and
17. F.O. 37i Cheetham to Grey, 1 November 1914.
18. Ibid., Cheetham to Grey, 20 November 1914.
19. Ibid., Cheetham to Grey, 23 November 1914.
20 F.O. 371/1970, Cheetham to Grey, 18 November 1914.
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21co-operate heartily with us under that regime”.
On 5 hecenter he handed Cheothan a note urging Britain to
A —
entrust the Muhammad ~Ali family with the hereditary
leadership of Egypt, and to deternine on a permanent basis
22the order of succession.
Consequently on December 18, Egypt was proclaimed
a British Protectorate. The next day the Acting Consul
while formally offering Prince Husain the Sultanate
informed him that with the elimination of Ottoman suzerainty,
the restriction upon the number and organisation of the
Egyptian Army and upon the Abe dive's prerogative to award
honorific distinctions would disappear. He further added
without making any specific commitments that it was
Britain's intention to '’accelerate progress towards self- 
23government”. ^
The political and administrative measures 
implemented after the breakout of the War did not only 
terminate for the time being the process of the development 
of self-governing institutions in Egypt, but also suppressed
21. F.O. 371/1971> Cheetham to Grey, 3 December 1914.
22. Ibid., Cheetham to Grey, 8 December 1914.
23. F.O. 371/3722, Cheetham to Prince Husain Kamil,
19 December 1914.
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earlier steps taken in that direction. Eager to avoid 
the complications and the embarrassment which night arise 
from the discussions in the Legislative Assembly, the Brit­
ish authorities and the Egyptian Ministers agreed in the 
first instance to suspend the November session of the 
Chamber. This was followed by successive suspensions 
which ended the existence of the Assembly. Similarly, 
the reversion of the functions of the Egyptian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs to the British Agency deprived Egypt 
of an important aspect of its nominal political independence.
However, despite these measures the Prime 
Minister and to a large extent the leading members of the 
now inactive Legislative Assembly and the !Ummah Party 
continued to entertain ideas of Egyptian Political 
autonomy. Their hopes were greatly encouraged by the now 
High Commissioner, Henry McMahen who, as the Turkish 
offensive on the Canal became imminent, felt that in order 
to allay the growing anti-British sentiment among the 
Egyptians a small concession must be made
Min the form of giving the Legislative 
Assembly a slightly larger voice in certain 
religious and charitable institutions, which 
badly need reform and in which our direct 
intervention is not desirable”.24
But with the defeat of the Turkish attack on Ismailia,
24. F.O* 800/48, McMahon to Grey, 4 Februaiy 1915*
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the interest of the Eigh Commissioner in the natter 
25declined, while the elected Vice-President of the
26Assembly regarded the new proposal with little favour.
A nore anbitious proposal however, was made by the Prime
Minister who, after consultation with Zaghlul, submitted
a memorandum regarding the future government of Egypt
27under the Protectorate. ( The main purpose of his project 
was to reconcile Britian's interests in Egypt with those 
of the European business community and the political 
aspirations of the Egyptian nation. He proposed to entrust 
Britain with the defence of the country, the supervision 
of Egypt's finances, the application of laws to foreigners, 
and the conclusion of political agreements with other 
countries. He favoured the introduction of such measures 
which would consolidate the position of the new Sultan and 
at the sane time moderately add to the existing powers of 
the Legislative Assembly, He stated that Egypt should
25* In an interview with Zaghlul on 8 April 19157 McMahon 
said that the Assembly should remain dormant until 
the end of the War. Zaghlul1s Memoirs, notebook 
no. 257 8 April 1915*
26. Ibid., 26 March 1915* Zaghlul advised the Sultan 
not to entrust the legislative Assembly, which was 
exposed to pressure from the British authorities, 
with the task of reforming the religious institutions.
27 See Ibid., 10 March 1915 for the Arabic text of the 
memorandum.
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"become a constitutional monarchy with a hereditary ruler 
who would possess all the royal honours and prerogatives 
attached to the post. The Prime Minister also recommended 
the modification of the Organic Law to allow the Assembly 
a decisive voice in matters pertaining to the nationality 
law, the Shari, a Courts, the Waqfs, the religious and 
civil institutions of education and the system of taxation.
Evidently the Prime Minister and Zaghlul acted 
with the tacit agreement of the Sultan who frequently 
expressed to the High Commissioner his desire to establish
the succession to the Sultanate on the basis of pre-
28nogoniture in the direct line. However, under the
pressure of the Lrar, the British authorities tended to
give little consideration for these demands, while the
attitude of the Sultan and his Prime Minister seemed to
fluctuate according to changes in the local and inter-
29national situation. '
The British occupation of Baghdad in 1917» -n<3- 
the success of the Sharif of Mecca aroused in the Sultan 
wider ambitions. He felt that with the disappearance of
28. P.O. 800/48, McMahon to Grey, 27 April 1915» £^d 
P.O. 371/2556, McMahon to Grey, 23 May 1915*
29. On 6 March 1915  ^ the Sultan categorically informed 
Zaghlul that he did not wish the_Assembly to convene 
nor to extend its powers. Zaghlul*s Memoirs, note­
book no. 25> 8 March 1915*
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the Ottoman Caliphate after the War and the establishment 
of Britain1s predominant influence over a large number of 
Muslin countries, Egypt could become the centre of that 
world. In his conversations with the High Commissioner, 
he pointed
"to Cairo as the great centre of Islamic 
teachings ... he hopes to see Cairo figure 
as one of the most, if not the most important 
of the world’s Islamic centres.
For this reason I [Wingate] can see 
that he is not altogether enamoured of the 
Sherif’s movement or of the large measure 
of support, financial and other, which wo 
are giving it ... There is perhaps a tinge 
of jealousy on the Sultan's part of the 
Shcrif's success, and perhaps he feels ... 
that if he were a younger man and in good 
health he night himself aspire to be Khalif".
In a note addressed to Graham in the Foreign Office, the
Sultan expressed his hope that Syria would become part of
the British sphere of influence. He warned that
"avec "Danas" a une Puissance etrangere, 
e’est le nonde Syrian Musulman separe des 
autre Musulnans et uni sous un autre drapeau, 
ce qui ne^nanquerait pas, de creer bien des 
difficultes dans l ’avenir et des frictions".
30. F.O. 371/3722, Wingate to Harding, 17 April 1917* 
Regarding the aspiration of Sultan Husain and at 
a later date Fu’ad to become the Caliph see S. 
Kedourie'Egypt and the Caliphate, 1915-1946', 
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1963»
pp. 208-248.
31. Wingate's Papers, Box 164, Sultan Husain to Graham, 
27 March 1917-
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The Sultan entertained the idea of acquiring under British
tutelage, a prominent position of moral influence among
the Arabs, while at the same tine curbing the Sharif1s
bid for Syria. In an interview with M. Sykes in 1915?
he explicitly "expressed his conviction that Syria should
B2form part of the Egyptian Government".
Towards the end of May 1917? both the Sultan
and his Ministers were
"seeking some modification of the settlement 
under the Protectorate as so far defined or, 
at any rate, an interpretation of it which 
will leave administration more in their
hands heretofore",53
Commissioner
The Prime Minister approached the / . with the view
that while the external functions of the Department of
Foreign Affairs should remain in the hands of the Residency,
the internal functions should revert to the Egyptian
personnel in the Department. The High Commissioner
replied that though
"This question might conceivably be examined 
at a later and more convenient date. For 
the moment it is not one which I can put 
before the Foreign Office when so many more 
important issues require consideration". 54-
Simiiarly, the demands of the Sultan were gradually
brushed aside. The Commissioner reported that he induced
52. Ibid., Box 158, M. Sykes to War Office, 14 July 1915*
: 33- ibid., Box 237v Wingate to Graham, 28 May 1917*
54. Ibid., Box 164, Wingate to Hardinge, 29 May 1917*
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the Sultan to agree with him that,
"during the war and when we are all so fully- 
occupied with war work, any drastic changes 
of organizations were out of the question 
and we must be content to go along as at 
present".
By that tine owing to the fact that the British forces 
were checked in Gaza, and following the Russian military 
failures, the Sultan1s mood had already changed* His 
ideas of "a great Arglo-Egyptian-Arab-Moslim combine" 
seemed to disappear, and his attitude tended to become
• . 35more pessimistic.
In the meantime, the precarious state of the
Sultan*s health confronted the British authorities with
the problem of succession* The debate which ensued
between the advocates of an annexationist policy and the
protectionists in Cairo and in London was resolved in
favour of the views of the latter. Lord Hardinge informed
the High Commissioner that the idea of annexing Egypt
would not only deprive Egypt of its role as a Muslim
centre, out would also be repellent to the 70 million
Indian Muslims. He wrote:
"It seems tc me that such a policy would be 
a serious error and should be avoided at all 
costs. At the end of the War it is probable 
that leading Egyptian Ministers and other 
notables will visit this country and there
35- Ibid., Wingate tc Hardinge, 1? June 1917*
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will then he an opportunity of finding out 
what their real feelings are in this kindred 
subject".56
The second problem which the British authorities had to
contend with was the choice of a successor to Sultan
Husain, in the event of his sudden death. Several # #
candidates were on different occasions considered, but
the discussion finally centred around two of then, namely
the Sultan’s son and Prince Ahnad Pu’ad, partly because
be
he had shown hinself for many years to/a convinced
Anglophile and partly because the Sultan’s son, who was
married to the ex-Khedive’s sister, declined the offer
when nade to him.
On the occasion of his accession to the throne
in October 1917? the now Sultan requested fron the High
Commissioner
”to convey to his Majesty’s Government his 
determination to follow the high example 
set by Sultan Hussein, and to labour, in 
close and loyal co-operation with His 
Majesty’s Government for the greatest good 
of Egypt”.37
But less than a month later, the Commissioner noted that 
in the course of a conversation between Sultan Pu'ad and 
the Secretary of State for India it was revealed that
36. P.O. 371/3722, Hardinge to Wingate, 7 May 1917*
37 P.O. 371/2928, Wingate to Balfour, 9 October 1917*
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"our Egyptian friends are all cut for as 
complete autonomy as they can get. It 
appears that the Sultan said to Montague 
that he hoped that Egypt would be granted 
full autonomy in due course, to v/hich the 
latter ... replied "Eut, Your Highness would 
appear tc- have already considerable autonomy 
in Egypt. Thereupon the Sultan turned to 
Rushdi ... and said: "Listen to this Bushdi,
Mr. Montague thinks we have autonomy in 
Egypt" and followed his remark with a hearty 
laugh".58
A few weeks later, the Sultan and Husain Rushdi proposed
the replacement of the Mirrihbers of Waqfs and Agriculture
by Sa d Zaghlul and Abdel 'Aziz Fahni respectively. J
This seemed to be part of an attempt to strengthen the
Government’s popularity and simultaneously reassert the
right of the sovereign in the appointment of his Ministers.
In an interview with the Acting Financial Adviser, the
Prime Minister elaborated a similar scheme to that which
he presented to ihe High Commissioner early in 1915* He
proposed that
"Great Britain’s rights to interfere ought 
to be clearly limited and rigidly defined, 
being restricted to finance, foreign relations, 
army and possibly justice. Intervention of 
His Majesty's Government in choice of Ministers 
was described as "abuse". British officials 
ought to be cut down in number, and ought 
to be chosen by Egyptian Government by 
reason of their technical qualifications, 
though ... His Majesty’s Government were
58' F.O. 571/5722, Wingate to Graham, 5 November, 1917. 
59* Ibid., Wingate tc Hardinge, 29 November 1917*
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to be allowed to advise as to value of those 
qualifications. Advisers ought tc be technical 
advisers subordinate tc their Ministers, who 
would take no part in politics. All these 
natters were to be regulated by a Convention 
after the war”.
Furthermore, the Sultan now joined his Prime Minister in
his effort to introduce a division of control of Egyptian
foreign affairs between the Residency and the existing
40Department staffed by Egyptians.
However, neither the Foreign Office nor the
High Commissioner were in any mood to concede part of
Britain's influence in Egypt to the new Sultan or his
Government. On receiving his instructions from London,
Wingate -informed- Husein Rushdi that the British Government
did not favour the appointment of Zaghlul and Fahmi, and
felt that the time had not cone tc discuss his political
programme. Bearing in mind Hardingefe message to Wingate
of May 7> ■fche latter wrote:
"In conclusion I suggested to the Prime 
Minister that it might be better to meet 
London half-way and withdraw the proposed 
changes. Later on I had little doubt, I 
said, he would visit England with the Sultan 
and their views would then carry greater 
weignt".
The Prime Minister for the time being accepted the 
decision of the British Government, but the High
40. F.O. 371/2928, Wingate to Balfour, 9 December 1917-
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Commissioner though satisfied with this result sounded a
note of warning* He wrote:
"for the moment at any rate - we shall have 
no more advanced political programmes, though 
we must expect a very frank expose of National 
aspirations when the war is over and the 
settlement has to he made of several pending 
questions".4-1
* * *
During the War, the political privileges of the 
class of provincial notables were systematically eroded. 
Their successful efforts in earlier years to introduce a 
change in the Organic Law and representative institutions 
soon were discontinued. The Legislative Assembly which 
ended its first session in June 1914, never met again, 
and its members were left to voice their discontent in 
private. The establishment of press censorship further 
limited the scope of political activity and reduced the 
press to a mere source for the dissemination of selected 
information on the progress of the War. Lutfl al-8ayyid 
soon after the outbreak of the War resigned his post as 
managing editor of al-Jaridah  ^ and temporarily left Cairo 
to reside in his village. Other leading members of the 
fUmmah Party also felt the strain of the new repressive 
measures taken by the British authorities. Hamad al-Basil,
41. P.O. 371/3722, Wingate to Hardinge, 24 December 1917*
214
head of the Bimah tribe of the Western Desert, was suspec­
ted of intriguing with the Sinus! and placed under police
surveillance. Muhammad Mahmud was accused of maladminis-
♦ *
tration and forced to resign his post as the Governor of
the Beheira province. At the sane tine the establishnent
of Martial Law greatly reduced the opportunities of work
42for the increasing number of Egyptian lawyers. Many of 
the nembers of the Assembly including Zaghlul and cAbdel 
cAziz Fahmi, who were left with little political influence 
were seeking employment in Government departments and 
public firms. Some of them who were associated with the 
Patriotic Party were interned. Zaghlul, in his capacity 
as the Vice-President of the Assembly frequently complained 
to the Prime Minister about the injustices committed 
against them by the Military authorities, and regularly 
appealed to the Sultan to effect the release of those 
interned. On many occasions the members of the *Unmah 
Party who met Zaghlul to discuss the political future of 
Egypt parted without reaching any practical conclusions. 
They obviously feared that any misinterpretation or 
suspicion of their motives would lead to their arfest.^
On many instances rumours of their imprisonment became
42. ZaghlulTs Memoirs, Notebook no. 29> 31 December 1916.
rr
43* Ibid., Notebook no. 28, 15 March 1918.
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widespread. Lutfi al-Sayyid recalled that when his father 
hoard the runour that Zaghlul had been arrested, he was 
greatly a lamed and urged his son to accept a Government 
post which the Sultan had offered, him earlier.^’
The loss of the freedom of the press and other 
means of political expression, and the suspension of the 
Assembly, greatly undermined the independent political 
position of the 1Unaah Party and the class of provincial 
notables. At this point the temporary interests of the 
newly-appointed Sultan Husain and that of the Party 
coincided. The Sultan, despite his weak character and 
largely unsuccessful efforts, made in cooperation with 
his Ministers some attempts to restore part of the 
political influence which his predecessor had been forced 
to surrender to the British under Kitchener*s pressure.
At the same time, the !Ummah Party, unable to put forward 
independently its programme for the future administration 
of the country, sought the assistance of the Sultan and 
the Ministers. However, in this relationship the initia­
tive remained in the hands of the sovereign, whose 
presence at the head of the Egyptian administration was 
an essential part of the new system of the Protectorate.
In mid 1917> a combination of personal and
44- Al-Sayyid, Qissat Hayati, pp. 166-167-
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political factors rendered the attitude of the Sultan very
pessimistic towards the progress cf the war and the future
of his country. At this stage his Prime Minister
suggested to him that instead of making futile complaints
of a personal nature he should propose a programme for
the future administration of Egypt. The Sultan took the
Prime Minister’s advice seriously and asked him to prepare
a note on the subject. Bearing in mind the relatively
conflicting aspiration of the British, the sovereign, and
the Legislative Assembly, Rushdi set to work on his scheme
with the intention of resolving these differences. He
proposed that Egypt should become a constitutional
hereditary monaichy with a Government responsible to the
King and not to parliament. Britain, he advised, should
be entitled to occupy any part of Egypt it deemed necessary
for the defence of its interests and the country, and
retain the Sirdarship (Commanding-Officer of the Egyptian
Army), and the overriding powers of the Einancial Adviser,
while limiting the functions of the other advisers to a
purely consultative one. Furthermore, the Prime Minister
recommended that the promulgation of laws should be
46subject to the agreement of the parliament.
45* Wingate's Papers, Box 257 > Wingate to Hardinge, 17 
June 1917•
46. Zaghlul1s Memoirs, Notebook no. 51> 25 July 1917*
21?
Before communicating the substance of his scheme 
to the Sultan, Rushdi invited Zaghlul, al-Sayyid, and 
other leading members of the !Umnah Party to express their 
views on the subject. Zaghlul strongly objected to the 
excessive powers which the project conferred upon the 
Sultan and the British occupation. Al-Sayyid drew a new 
scheme which embodied the traditional demands of the 
Party* He insisted that the Government should be respon­
sible to an elected parliament, while the monarch would 
exercise his authority through the Government and the 
parliament. He also proposed that onco the position of 
a British Adviser became vacant, an Egyptian official must 
repla ce him, and that the functions of the present 
Financial Adviser should be strictly consultative. In 
agreement with his colleagues, al-Sayyid further recom­
mended that Britain should retain the Sirdarship, but 
limit her occupation of Egypt to the Canal area when the 
country faced an external threat.
The deterioration of the Sultan's health 
prevented the Prime Minister from submitting the new 
scheme to the sovereign. The project thus remained 
dormant until the accession of Pu'ad to the throne.
Towards the end of the year both the new Sultan and his
4-7* Ibid., 9 August 1917*
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Prime Minister in their conversations with the High 
Commissioner and the Pinancial Adviser seemed eager to 
revive those parts of the programme which favoured the
} t Q
consolidation of the powers of the sovereign. However, 
their efforts in this direction failed, and a short 
interval of time had tc elapse before a new opportunity 
offered itself to make fresh proposals.
In the meantime the hopes of the members of
the ,Umnah Party for reaching a satisfactory agreement
with the occupation authorities faded. At a dinner party
to v/hich Muhammad Mahmud invited Zaghlul, cAli ShaCrawi,
cAbdel cAziz Pahni and al-Sayyid the discussions turned
to the subject of Egypt's future after the War. All those
present, with the exception of Pahni, v/ho was extremely
pessimistic, agreed that the prospects of achieving a
settlement in the near future were quite remote. Zaghlul
noted regrettably that the spirit of solidarity among
49then was very weak. y But though the element of fear and 
despair tended to dominate the attitude of these men, a 
grov/ing feeling of hostility and resentment towards the 
occupation at the same time emerged. In March 1918, this
48. See pp.
49* Zaghlul' s M e m o i r s Notebook no._28, 19 January 1918. 
Zaghlul appeared to regard Pahnl's pessimism to be 
relatively greater than that of the rest of his 
colleagues.
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feeling was aroused by the introduction Gf sone economic 
and military measures which directly threatened the 
interests of the Egyptian cotton growers.
In 1917 > the export of Egyptian cotton to the 
United States created a great deal of anxiety in London 
and Liverpool. Consequently, measures were taken tc 
prevent the British steamers from bringing direct shipments 
of cotton to the United States. At the same time addit­
ional arrangements were made to provide for the protection 
of British trade interests in Egyptian and Indian cotton. 
The Board of Trade early in February 1918, sent a Mission 
tc Egypt to organise the cotton trade. After consultations 
with the British Officials in the Egyptian administration 
and the representatives of the English export and banking 
houses in Alexandria, the head of the Mission, Sir H.L. 
Smith, discussed the natter in general and guarded terns 
with Rushdl Pasha. Then without reference to the Egyptian 
growers and merchants, the Mission proposed the creation 
of a Commission tc fix the prices and control the purchase 
of cotton from the producers. Smith urged that, in view 
of the fact that some Ministers knew in general terns the 
kind of action contemplated, it was, therefore, impossible 
to guarantee the continued secrecy of the scheme and was 
necessary to sanction its application as soon as
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possible.-^
Early in March, 1918, the Cotton Control Com­
mission was formed under the Chairmanship of R. Lindsay, 
the Undersecretary of the Egyptian Ministry of Finance, 
and the membership of B. Hornsby, the Deputy Chairman 
of the National Bank of Egypt, K.P. Birley of Peel's 
House, R. Carver., a leading British exporter, and K.
Lewis, the Director-General of the Egyptian Customs.
Soon afterwards, the Commission fixed the price of cotton 
at 42 dollars a kantar. This provoked the strongest 
reaction among the large landowners including the Sultan, 
who apart from being one of the largest proprietors in 
Egypt was deliberately left in the dark regarding the 
matter. Zaghlul, who only learned the news from the
press, blamed the Government for the betrayal of the
51interests of the whole nation. He told the Minister of
Q m m
Education, Adli Yeghen that by monopolising the purchase 
of the cotton crop the Government was in fact depriving 
the people from what was rightfully theirs. cAlI Sha°rawl 
and °AlawI Pasha Gazzar shared Zaghlul's views, and felt 
that the time had come to express their objections. At
50. F.O. 568/1899* H.L. Smith to A. Stanley (Board of 
Trade), 24 February 1918*
51. Zaghlul's Memoirs» Notebook no. 28, 14 March 1918.
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one point Zaghlul suggested that "We should raise our
voice in protest by calling a meeting of all those whose
interests are at stake". But realising that the country
was still under tho military rule he added: "However, any
52meeting at present would nave grave consequences". Bor 
a while the fear for their personal safety appeared to 
restrain their determination to protect their financial 
interests, and the initiative thus remained in the hands 
of Sultan Bu'ad.
The lack of tact with which the British authori­
ties and the Egyptian Ministers treated the Sultan aroused 
his suspicions. He felt that there was an attempt to 
isolate him from participation in major decisions, and, 
therefore, sought to enlist the support of those elements 
in the country who were similarly dissatisfied with the 
situation. He approached Ismacil Sidqi, the ex-Minister 
of Waqfs who resigned his post in 1915 following a private 
scandal, and asked him to convey to Zaghlul his views 
regarding the recent changes in the cotton policy. On 
19 March, Sidqi visited Zaghlul and informed him that the 
Sultan wo.s greatly disturbed at the irresponsible attitude 
of his Ministers who in concert with the occupation acted 
without his consent or permission. Sidqi added that the
52. Ibid., 15 March 1918.
Sultan would appreciate receiving his loyal subjects, and
would welcome an opportunity to listen to the views of
the distinguished non among them* Zaghlul readily agreed
to visit Sultan Eu’ad and induced Shacrawi Pasha to act 
53similarly* ^ Two days later, Zaghlul had an audience with 
the Sultan who complained that his Ministers now only 
referred to hLm only after decisions, as in the case of 
the cotton question, were already taken. Zaghlul,
encouraged by the Sultan’s attitude, decided to meet the
. 54High Commissioner.
Cn meeting T7ingate, Zaghlul remarked that had 
it not been for the importance of the issue, he would not 
have ventured to waste the Commissioner’s precious time.
Ho then proceeded to express his great concern at the 
rumour that the Government was intending to fix the price 
of wheat at a value which would hardly meet the cost oi 
its production. He also deprecated the failure of the 
Government and the British Trade Mission to invite the 
informed opinion of the Egyptians landowners before 
embarking on their new cotton po]icy. -lingate replied 
that these measures were dictated by the military require­
ments and the interests of the Egyptian farmers, and,
53. Ibid., 20 March 1918.
54. Ibid., 21 March 1918.
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therefore, could not hecone the subject of public
discussion. However, Zaghlul pointed out that the
peasant was only too well aware of the fact that while
he was forced to sell his cotton at a fixed price in
Egypt, prices in Liverpool were rapidly rising. He added
that the monopoly of purchasing cotton which the Control
Commission exercised had placed the peasant under the
mercy of a selected number of merchants. ^ Following his
interview with Zaghlul, Wingate reported:
"There is no doubt that locally the general 
trend of events is being viewed with some 
alarm and my last interview with the Sultan 
indicated not a little nervousness on his 
part. There are also certain stormy elements, 
like Saad. Zaghloul and others, who would 
like to exploit the new cotton arrangement 
in a somewhat, hostile spirit - I had an 
interview with the latter yesterday and his 
main complaint was that the present arrangements 
had been made without proper consultation 
with Egyptians independent of the Government, 
e.g. himself and others who knew the conditions
of the Fellaheen".56
In the course of his interview with Zaghlul, the 
High Commissioner suggested to him that he should submit 
in a written form his observations on the political and 
economic situation, and advised him to see the Acting 
Financial Adviser. W. Brunyate for further discussions
55- Ibid., 23 March 1918.
56. Wingatefs Papers, Box 168, Wingate to Graham, 24 
Marcii 1915". ---
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57on the s u b j e c t C o n se q ue n tl y , Zaghlul reiterated his 
complaints tc the Adviser, and expressed his deep resent­
ment at the deliberate exclusion of the members of the 
Legislative Assembly from takingpart in the functions of
the Cotton Control Commission, the Capitulations Commission,
58and the Supplies Control Board* Simultaneously, Sultan
Pu'ad was busily urging his supporters to join hands
against the occupation. At his request Zaghlul .and the
ex-Prime Minister, Muhammad SacId agreed to forget their
earlier differences and work together in the service of
59the country and the sovereign. '
Towards the end of March, 1918, Pufad formally 
awarded Zaghlul the insignia of Sultan Husain Kamil for 
his distinguished services to the nation. At the some­
time Zaghlul learnt that the Sul can hod in the last few
days expressed to a large number of Egyptian notables the
60same views which he earlier revealed tc him. The Sultan 
continued tc mount the pressure against his Ministers in 
the hope of achieving a greater measure of control over 
their decisions. Similarly he turned his attention to
57. Zaghlul1s Memoirs, Notebook no. 28, 25 March 1918.
58. Ibid., 26 March 1918.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., 29 March 1918.
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the discontented and long neglected elements of the 
Legislative Assembly, the former ministers and the members 
of the fUnnah Party to win their support. In July, he 
offered Znghlul the post of Director-General of the Bed 
Crescent Organisation, which the latter after consultation 
with some of his close associates from the 1Ummah Party 
declined to accept.^ The High Commissioner noted that 
though
"The Sultan is going fairly well, ... he 
listens to busybodies who have their own 
axes to grind, and does not seen to care 
much for his Ministers or consult then as 
freely as they would like - his officine 
nocturne, as it is called, consists of Enin 
Yehia, I snail Sidki, Saad Zaglul, the lawyer 
Abdul Aziz Fehni and one or - two others o.pd- 
naturally the Ministers do not like it".°2
The rift between Fu'ad and his Ministers further
increased when the Prime Minister gave in to the pressure
of the military authorities and tioned a scheme for the
recruitment of a large number of Egyptians for the service
in the labour and Camel Corps in preparation for Allenby's
campaign in Syria.. The Naval Connander-in-Chief reported
that the Sultan
"described that 'volunteers1 were 'collected*
61. Ibid*, Notebook no. 31, 31 July 1918*
62. Wingate's Papersv Box 169, Wingate to Graham, 9
June 1918.
226
by the local authorities, and once obtained 
were drafted off 011 a system which appeared 
to me to leave little to the wishes of the 
people concerned, and I renarked that this 
looked rather like the application of the 
old system of the Corvee. His Highness 
replied that it was more severe than the 
old Corvee, and that the Ministers received 
innumerable letters on the subject which 
they were obliged to destroy unread".63
Zaghlul noted that the corrupt methods applied by the
64
Government provoked the hostility of the whole population.
He wrote;
"Egypt has never witnessed a more trying 
tine than today. The enmity of the Govern­
ment towards the people is more intense 
than ever. It robbed the population from 
some £E 3*5 millions and offered it as a 
free gift to the British Government. It 
fixed the price of cotton at the lowest ; 
possible value and hampered agricultural 
production by requisitioning the peasant's 
livestock and crops".^5
However, despite the growing dissatisfaction of
the *Unaah Party and the Sultan with the Government and
the occupation, there was no determined effort to change
c c — —the situation. Abdel Aziz Fahmi recalled that at a
meeting which ho attended with Muhammad Mahmud, All
ShaCrawi, lutfi al-Sayyid, and Zaghlul in September 1918,
63. P.O. 371/3202, Notes of an interview with the Sultan, 
26 May 1918.
64. Zaghlul's Memoirs, Notebook no. 31* 27 May 1918.
65. Ibid., Notebook no. 28, 24 May 1918.
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to discuss EgyptTs political future, the last said that
in view of the presence of a largo force of British troops
in Egypt, the tine was not suitable for raising the 
66question. Furthermore, from May to October, the efforts 
of the country were wholly concentrated on the preparation 
for Allenby's final push into Syria. This undoubtedly 
was an inopportune moment for the Sultan or any of his 
supporters to draw the attention of the British authorities 
tc their demands. Moreover, it would seem that the 
Ministers hoped that by employing Egypt’s resources in 
the service of Brito.in*s war effort in the area, they 
would be afforded a better understanding in London after 
the War to reach a satisfactory settlement. Under the 
pressure of these circumstances, the Sultan moved to 
effect a reconciliation with his Ministers. The Commis­
sioner cautiously remarked:
1 The situation as regards the Sultan and 
his Ministers is more peaceful than I have 
known it for sometime and I hope it may not 
be the prelude to a storm ... I expect they 
will open their mouths wide when the war
is over".
Wingate's misgivings regarding the change in 
the attitude of the Sultan towards his Ministers were
66. Fahni, p. 73-
67. Tingate’s Papers, Box 169, Uingate to Graham, 25 
August 1918.
228
justified, lie sooner hod the signs of the victory of the 
Allies became imminent than a movement emerged in Egypt 
advocating the complete independence of the country. By 
the tine Allenby's army occupied Syria in 1918, Sultan 
Eu'ad once again discreetly took the initiative through 
his Ministers and Zaghlul to put forward Egypt’s demand 
for autonomy. Towards the middle of that month the Prime 
Minister after consultation with cAdli Yeghen, Zaghlul, 
and Lutfi al-Sayyid appealed to the American Consul in 
Cairo to champion Egypt's cause. The latter, however, 
advised Rushdi Pasha that Egypt should either await a 
declaration from Turkey relinquishing its rights in the 
country to the Egyptians or reach a bilateral agreement 
with Britain. The reply of the Consul disappointed 
Zaghlul and his colleagues. Consequently, after two days 
of discussions with Muhammad Mahmud and al-Sayyid at his 
countryside residence, Zaghlul felt that in view of their 
inability to arrive at a satisfactory plan for achieving 
Egypt's independence they "ought to dismiss the whole 
idea".69
Sultan Eu'ad, on the other hand, was less 
pessimistic. According to Wingate he appeared during
68. Zaghlul's Memoirs, notebook no. 32, 25 October 1918.
69. Ibid. , notebook No. 31v 14- October 1918.
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that tine to entertain "somewhat large aspirations and is
all out for 'Homo Rule'". The High Corrissicner rightly
anticipated "a somewhat troublous winter1 ahead* He
further added:
"I also heared a rurour (but cannot vouch 
its accuracy) that on the conclusion of 
peace a delegation of Egyptians Deans to 
apply to President Wilson for his support 
in obtaining 'Here Rule* for Egypt".70
The Sultan was determined to give his Ministers sufficient
encouragement to revive the programme which they had
shortly after his accession to the throne in 1918 sub-
nittod to the British authorities.^ Consequently Rushdl
and cAdli in concert with Zaghlul and his associates from
among the members of the 'Ummah Party decided tc press for
Egypt's claim for independence. The Sultan, on the one
hand, appeared eager to relieve hinself from the growing
influence of the British Advisers "whose interference in
the details of the Government is irksome to him. This
refers more especially to financial control cf his Civil
List1'. On the other hand, Zaghlul was more concerned with
the fate of the Legislative Assembly. He impressed upon
the High Commissioner
"the importance of allowing the Legislative
70. P.O. 371/3722, Lingate to Hardinge, 19 October 1918.
71. A.M. Al-cAqqad, Sacd Zaghlul, Cairo, 1936, p. 193.
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Assembly tc sit new that the war with 
Turkey was practically over - The burden 
of my reply to him was in the terms of the 
Koranic dictum - "Allah ma os Sabarin, izza 
Sabiru" - and I laid special emphasis on the
last two words’1.72
This, however, did not discourage Zaghlul and
his associates, who undoubtedly continued to enjoy the
Sultan's support and that of his Ministers, from forming
a delegation (the Wafd) to meet the High Commissioner.
In the meantime a movement sponsored by Prince wUnn.r
Tussun which included among its members some elements
from the Patriotic Party and some former senior Government
officials, appeared in Alexandria professing its aim to
be the. achievement, of. Egypt' s independence. On several
occasions Prince Tussun contacted Zaghlul to co-ordinate
73their efforts.  ^ But the Sultan "was furious with Omar
Tcusson at his interference in political questions and he
regarded the Prince ... almost as a hated rival to his 
74t h r o n e " T h e  latter thus withdrew from the scene, 
while by the middle of November 1918, some of his
72. Wingate' s Papers, Box 170, Wingate to Graham, 6 
November 1918.
73* Zaghlul's Memoirs, notebook nc. 32, 12 October 191S, 
22 October 1918, and 11 November 1918.
74. Wingate's Papers, Box 170, Wingate to Hardinge,
24 November 1916•
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75followers joined the Wafd.
The co-operation of the 1Unnah Party with the 
Sultan and his Ministers did not nark a shift in the 
traditional policy of the Party towards the sovereign*
On his accession to the throne, Fu'ad. attenpted, without 
previous consultation with Zaghlul or his associates, to 
pronote his own political position. This he sought bo 
achieve by first relieving his Ministers frcn the restric­
tions iDposed upon then by the British Advisors; and 
secondly by making the Egyptian Government responsible 
directly to him and not to parliament. The Ministers 
realising that such a scheme v/oulG necessarily, increase 
their control over the administration supported the Sultan. 
However, on their own, Fu'ad and his Ministers failed to 
obtain the agreement of the British authorities for their 
proposals. Consequently, the Sultan sought to enlist the 
support of the 'Ummah Party and Zaghlul, and utilise, for 
his own purposes, their growing dissatisfaction with the 
Protectorate.
Other than a strong desire to change the 
existing system of Government, the 1Ummah Party had little 
in common with the Sultan. However, owing to the intro­
duction of a number of repressive measures during the 7/ar,
I —— — —  ■ ■  r----------,-----i— ~t~ — T - - - -- - - - -  ~ ----------------------------1 
75. Zaghlulfs Memoirs» notebook no. 3^? 15 November 1918.
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the Party became increasingly aware cf the advisability
of aligning itself with the sovereign and his Ministers.
Thus, the emergence of the Wafd, at the end of the War,
was the outcome of the temporary coincidence of the
political interests cf the Sultan, the Ministers and the
761Ummah Party. A number of immediate political factors,
at the same time, further strengthened the alliance
between them. Wingate noted:
"There can be no possible doubt that the 
ideas of self-determination, which are now 
so freely discussed as an out come of the
war, are affecting him CFu'ad] and the
Egyptian Nationalist Party".77
It was, therefore, quite natural for the Wafd to appeal
to President Wilson and the American Consul in Egypt for
support. Similarly the hostile reaction of the senior
78British officials to the Sultan1s personal ambitions, 
and the preparation by the Acting Financial Adviser,
W. Brunyate, a programme of constitutional reform which
76. For an analysis cf the political relationship between 
Zaghlul, Fu'ad and the Ministers see, Kedourie,
'Sa d Zaghlul and the British', St. Antony's Papers, 
No. XI, (Middle Eastern Affairs, No. 2) ed. A. 
Hourani, London, 1961, pp. 139-160.
77* Wingate1s Papers, Box 170, Wingate to Graham, 6 
November 1918.
78. Ibid.
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79ignored the noderate demands of Egypt for self-government''
created a considerable suspicion among the Egyptians in
Britain*s intentions towards their country after the War.
The Prine Minister on receiving the text of the proposed
reforms rapidly submitted a counter-programme in which he
described Brunyatefs proposals in the following terms:
nProtectorat ne veut point dire annexion et 
le projet de reformes constitutionnelles 
de Sir William Brunyate transforme le pro- 
tectorat en une annexion pure et simple11.80
Furthermore, the Anglo-French declaration cf 7 November,
1918 regarding Syria, Mesopotamia, and other Arab countries
had a profound effect on Egypt. The High Commissioner
accurately predicted that the Egyptians would argue .that,.
"as self-government is to be allowed to all 
territories liberated during the war, why 
should the same principle not be followed 
as regards Egypt, which was also liberated 
but placed under British protection after 
the war began?"81
Evidently, the Sultan, the Ministers, and the 
1Ummah Party, while influenced by all these considerations 
recalled Wingate’s assurance to the Prime Minister, in
79* For the text cf the programme see Wingate’s Papers, 
Box 162.
80. For the text of Sushdi's programme see 7/ingate1 s 
Papers, Box 171; also the Arabic translation in 
Al-lihran, 11 March 1969.
81. Wingate1s Papers, Box 170, Wingate to Graham, 6 
November 1$18.
December 1917 that once the War was over the latter "would 
visit England with the Sultan and their views would then 
carry greater weight". Consequently, Zaghlul, Shacrawi, 
and cAbdel cAziz Fahmm in their capacity as members of 
the Legislative Assembly net the High Commissioner on 13 
November 1918.
From the point of view of Zaghlul and his 
associates, the major object of the interview was to 
prepare the ground for an Egyptian delegation to proceed 
to London, as soon as possible, in order to negotiate a 
political settlement with Britain. It would appear that 
at this stage the Wafd had not elaborated a specific 
programme. But as the Commissioner pressed his visitors 
for their precise views on the subject they seemed, to 
favour the conclusion of a treaty of alliance with Britain. 
They expressed their devotion to England "by whose strong 
right arm we have been set free", and pledged "to sacri­
fice our men and money should she require them in future 
wars". In return for their loyalty to Britain, they 
stated:
"we should expect to be given complete 
autonomy, though we should probably accept 
a measure of financial supervision on the 
part of His Majesty’s Government, such as 
existed - in regard to the Public Debt - 
prior to 1882. We should also guarantee 
special facilities for British ships
op
traversing the Suez Canal".
However, despite the relatively advanced vie?/s which 
Zaghlul and his friends expressed before the Coianissioner, 
and their public clear that they had been delegated by 
the Chanbcr to achieve the conplete independence of Egypt, 
the Wafdv at least at its inception, seemed to be nore 
inclined to accept a less ambitious programme. Lutfi 
al-Sa3^ yid revealed to Husain Haykal that the initial plan 
of the Wafd was tc send a delegation tc the Peace Con­
ference in Paris tc demand the right of Egypc for self- 
determination. In the event cf their failure, the Prime 
Minister and chGli Yeghen would then proceed tc London 
and negotiate an agreement based on the system of the 
Protectorate. This agreement, according to al-Sayyid, 
would establish a constitutional Government in Egypt which 
would guarantee the legitimate rights of the people vis- 
a-vis the authority ox the Sultan and the British occu- 
pat ion.  ^ Muhammad Farid did not for a moment doubt that 
the policy of the now movement was the sane as that of the 
1Ummah Party. He wrote:
"Despite the fact that the 1Ummah Party is 
now advocating independence, I, however, 
still believe that this Party would readily
82- Ibid., oingate to Hardinge, 14 November 1918. 
83. Haykal, Mudhakkarati ♦.., Vol. I, p. 82.
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a”b and on the idea at the first sign indi­
cating Britain1s willingness to reach a 
compromise cn the question"
The intentions of the Wafd, at that pointy did
net differ substantially from the traditional views of
the 1 Than ah Party regarding the future administration of
Egypt. Though the members of the delegation, encouraged
by the change of the international situation after the
War, entertained wider ambitions than ever before,
however, they remained basically attached to the idea of
increasing their own political influence, under British
tutelage-, through the extension of the powers of self-
governing institutions . Their alliance with the Sultan
was therefore only viewed as a practical necessity to
exert maximum pressure on the British occupation to modify,
or better still, to abolish the Protectorate, and revert
to a system of Government similar to that which existed
before the War.
In a coordinated move with the Sultan and the
Wafd, the Prime Minister visited the High Commissioner a
few hours after the departure of Zaghlul ond his colleagues
from the Residency. Rushdi Pasha showed Wingate a letter
which he had submitted to the Sultan,
"proposing that he and Adly Pasha should 
proceed at once to London to take part in 
the Peace discussion ... he remarked that,
84. Parld1 s M e m o i r s Notebook no. 11, p. 304.
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in his opinion, it would be vary advisable 
for [Zaghlul and his friends] to proceed 
to London and put up their case "as, in 
the event of their request being refused, 
the charge of inadequate representation of 
the Egyptian question could not be brought 
against us responsible Egyptian Ministers, 
as night be the case if we alone were dele­
gated to proceed to London"".85
Though the High Commissioner categorically adhered to the
opinion that "the presence in England cf the Ministers
and the unofficial delegates would be a help rather than
a hinderance", the Foreign Secretary, on the other
hand, decided that "Ho useful purpose would be served
by allowing Nationalist leaders to cone to London and
advance immoderate demands which cannot be entertained".
He further added that "the proposed visit of the two
Minusters would not be opportune at the present moment".^
To conclude then, despite the fact that the 
progress of the War during the years 1914 to 1918, 
dominated the political and economic situation in Eg 
the idea of effecting a change in the political status 
of the country remained alive in the minds of the
85* Wingate fs Papers, Box 170, Wingate to Hardinge, 
"14 November 19l8.
86. Ibid., Wingate tc Hardinge, 19 November 1918.
87. Ibid., Box 107* Balfour to Wingate, 27 November
T5I5.
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successive sovereigns and the members of the 'Ummah 
Party. Several attempts were made throughout the period 
of the War, at the instigation of Sultan Husain and later 
Fu'ad to achieve such a change, but were thwarted by the 
unfavourable reaction of the British authorities. However, 
towards the er.d of rhe 'far a number of immediate political 
and economic factors contributed tc the emergence of a 
new political movement led by Zaghlul and his close 
associates among the prominent members of the 'Ummah 
Party. In the initial stages of its development, the 
aims of this movement did not differ greatly from the 
traditional demands of the 'Ummah Party for self-govern­
ment. But as Britain refused to move in the direction of 
making such a concession, new political forces entered 
the struggle and the nature of the methods and objectives 
of the movement underwent a change.
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CHAPTER V 
THE 1919 UPRISING AND IPS APTERMATH
The political outlook of the T7af& as it emerged 
after the 'bar owed its origins to the social and political 
changes which Egypt witnessed since 1907*
During the decade which followed Cromer’s 
departure from Egypt, the fortunes of the Egyptian rural 
middle class and the lower sections of the class of large 
landowners appeared to survive the effects of the con­
tinuous process of land fragmentation. While the total 
area of nediun-size estates rapidly declined from 39*4°/o 
in 1898 to 34- * 2°/c in 190?, the decrease was relatively 
smaller a decade later. In 1918, the holdings of the 
middle landowners formed 33-8°/o of the total cultivated 
land owned by the native population* The average holding 
of the middle peasant remained almost constant.
During the sane period, the rural middle class 
acquired a greater measure of political influence.
Already by the end of.the 19th century, the great majority 
cf cumdas were recruited from among the members of this 
class. Similarly, Kitchener’s reform of the Electoral 
Lai in 1913> introduced an increasing number of middle
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1landowners into the Provincial Councils. Their political 
influence was further strengthened when during and after 
the War no new elections were held. .Is a result, the 
members of the Councils who were elected in 1913 and 1914 
retained thoir position despite the expiration of their 
tern of office.
In short, by the end of the VJar, the class of 
middle landowners exercised considerable political power 
in the countryside, and enjoyed a relatively stable 
economic position. However, the rise in the prices of 
the principal connedities during the 77ar greatly influenced 
its attitude towards the existing systen of government. 
Being unable to adapt themselves in the majority of cases 
tc modest habits of consumption, the middle peasants 
could not make ends meet, without resorting to the banks 
for loans. The same situation applied tc the lower 
sections of the class of large landowners. Zaghlul, who 
owned some 170 feddans in the Beheira Province on several 
occasions approached the National Bank for further loans
2
to finance tho cost of the production of his cotton crop.
He complained that the increase in the price of cotton
1. See Chapter III.
2. _,aghlul* s Memoirs, notebook no. 28, 19 January and 
26 February 19l8.
sincG the beginning cf the bar die! not natch the rapid 
rise in the cost of the daily necessities. In June 1917* 
he estimated that his revenue for the year from the sale 
of his cotton crop and the rent of his land would amount 
to £E 2850, while his debts and spendings would reach the 
sum of £3300.^ His nephews cAtif and Fathallah Barakat, 
who owned sone 200 feddans were in similar financial
5
difficulties.
In the sane period, a noticeable growth in the 
numerical strength and functions of the urban middle 
classes took place* The class of Government officials 
increased from 29,000 in 1907 to 43,000 in 1917, 
increase of almost 50°/o. Likewise members of the liberal 
profession grew in number and influence. Magistrates, 
lawyers and clerks in the Mixed and Native Courts increased 
from 2800 to 10,000. Those engaged in the medical pro­
fession rose from 3000 to 7000, while the teachers in 
Government and private schools rapidly increased from 
5600 to 15,600. Furthermore, the heavy expenditure cf 
the British forces and the rise in Egypt's exports 
resulted in the expansion of the services sector of the
3. Ibid., Notebook no. 26, 6 October 1916.
4. Ibid., Notebook no. 31, June 1917*
5- Ibid., Notebook no. 28, 26 February 1918.
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economy and the local industries. The total number of 
people employed in commerce, thus increased from 161,000 
to 281,000.
As long as the country was in a state of T7ar, 
the urban middle classes did not pose a serious threat 
to the occupation or tc the existing structure of society. 
But as the Aar drew to an end, the magnitude of the 
challenge became more obvious. The roots of the crisis 
lay in the fact that the existing regime was unable to 
accommodate the rapid rate of growth of the emerging 
social and economic forces, while at the same time the 
expansion of the administration failed to absorb the 
increasing number of professionals and graduates of 
schools and European universities. This state of affairs 
was exacerbated when at the end of the War, Egypt realised 
that in the higher posts of the administration, the 
number of Egyptians declined from 27«7°/o in 1905 9 to 
23-l°/o in 1920, "while in the same category the British 
share of posts, has increased from 42.2°/o to 59*3 /o".
The number of the British officials in the Egyptian 
administration in 1906 was 662, in 1918 they ranged between 
1600 to 1700. According to G* Young,
6. ‘ eport of the Special Mission to Egypt, 1921, Cd. 
1131, p. 30.
m"The m i d d l o ~ c 3 E g y p t i a n  had received 
an education that fitted him solely for 
subordinate official employment. He now
saw hinself deprived of all possible pro­
motion and„of many posts that had hitherto 
been his".'
The opportunities which at one time were available to the 
Egyptian lawyers in the Ministry of Justice were now 
greatly reduced following the establishment of Martial Law. 
Graduates of primary and secondary schools who formed the 
bulk of the middle and lower echelons of the provincial 
and central administration were similarly disappointed. 
During the events of 1919, the High Commissioner received
a letter signed by a "friendly adviser" describing the
situation in the following terms:........................
"No doubt that every fanner used to 
send his sons to the school hoping they 
will some day be appointed in the Government. 
"Then the farmers perceived that the Primary 
Education Certificate was cancelled and the 
salary of the bearers of the Secondary 
Education Certificate was reduced to six 
pounds instead of eight pounds while in 
the meantime thousands of English persons 
were appointed in the government circles 
with high salaries they took to these 
ravages you observe now".°
The withdrawal of the British troops from Egypt 
checked the growth of the services sector, and the
7. G. Young. Egypt, London, 1927, p. 219*
8. P.O. 14-1/Box 810/file 8013, friendly adviser to 
Alleriby, undated [6/4/19?3•
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resunption of large scale imports from abroad underained 
the expansion of the local industries. Consequently 
retail merchants, shopkeepers, dressmakers, barbers and 
industrial workers were considerably affected by the new 
situation arising froa the termination of the War. In 
addition to this, the rise of the wholesale price index
froa 100 in 1914 to 211 in 1918, and 312 in 1920 naturally
caused considerable hardships among the native Government
Q
employees and the workers.
* * *
Following Cromer's departure from Egypt, a new
form of political activity, which was purely an urban
phenomenon, emerged. The introduction of Gorst's
repressive measures against the press, the students, and
the Patriotic Party led to the formation of a number of
underground secret societies. These organisations were
brought tc the notice of the authorities late in 1910,
after the assassination of the Prime Minister, Butros#
-  -  10Ghali. The great majority of these societies ?/ere 
connected with some of the leaders of the Patriotic Party, 
and the bulk of their membership was drawn from among the 
student population. However, as the political position
9* Issawi, p. 33*
10. P.O. 371/1114^ 'Report Respecting Secret Societies*,
22 June 1911.
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of the Party weakened, its control over these societies 
declined. A number of them gradually broke up into small 
independent groups which carried out attempts against the
11lives of the Sultan, the Ministers and the British officials.
The G-eneral Secretary of the Wafd in 1919? CAbdel Rahman
Rahmi did not hesitate to coordinate the activities of
these groups for the purpose of intimidating his party*s
12political opponents.
* * *
The impact of the rise of the rural and urban
middle classes had a profound affect on the structure and
political outlook of the nationalist movement, Cantori
noted that since the founding of the Wafd in November
1918, there was
"early evidence of two competing structures 
within the party: a minority who would
accommodate themselves in a major fashion 
to Britain*s continued presence in Egypt, 
and a majority who opposed Britain in a more 
uncompromising fashion*'. 5
11. For an interesting and informative account on the 
development of secret societies in Egypt see_the com­
plete text of the confessions of Shafiq Mansur, who 
was an active member in a number of groups since 
1906 until his execution in 1925? following the 
assasination of the Sirdar. P.O. 371/10899? Henderson 
to Chamberlain, 6 July 1925*
12. A.A. RifaCI, Thawrat Misr Sanat 1919? Cairo, 1966, 
pp. 144-148.
13* Cantori, p. 18.
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The former tendency represented the familiar policy of 
the 1Ummah Party which advocated autonomy under British 
tutelage, while the latter led by Zaghlul favoured the 
withdrawal of Britain from Egypt.
The gradual change in ZaghlulTs position came 
about as a result of his earlier experience with the 
British authorities and the sovereign, and the growing 
support which the Egyptian middle and lower classes 
afforded the Wafd. After his resignation from the 
Government in 1912., Zaghlul became increasingly aware of 
the importance of his reliance on the electorate to 
restore some of his political prestige and influence.
He felt that the only course open to him for realising 
his hopes was in taking the side of the people (al-Nas), 
and not in submitting to the wishes of the Khedive or 
Kitchener. In 1913* despite the hostility of both these 
authorities, Zaghlul won the elections for the Legislative 
Assembly in two Cairo constituencies, and thus his 
confidence in the power of the electorate was further 
strengthened. Consequently, he made a personal vow, 
which was not intended for publication, not to allow 
himself, as the elected Vice-President of the Assembly, 
to be deceived by the friendly approaches of the Khedive
14-. Zaghlul1 s Memoirs» Notebook no. 23, 19 November 1913-
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or Kitchener, '’but to bend, only bo tiio interests of my 
countrymen to whom I owe my present honourable, posit.-i on" 
Though during the War Zaghlul did not strictly 
adhere to his vow, however, his early awareness of the 
growing political influence of the self-governing insti­
tution and the body of voters prepared him better than any 
of his colleagues to play a leading role in the develop­
ment of the nationalist movement after the War*
The enthusiastic and impressive support which 
the Egyptian middle and lower classes lent to the Wafd, 
at the end of the War, further confirmed Zaghlul*s 
confidence in the nation. He significantly observed that
"the majority of those who visited us from 
among the upper and educated classes of the 
society put forward questions which clearly 
indicated their bad faith and lack of con­
fidence in the Wafd. None of them offered 
any material or moral assistance .... On the 
other hand, many of the people belonging 
to the other classes volunteered their services 
without demanding a compensation or a salary.
They afforded us considerable sympathy and ^  
encouragement in their speeches and prayers''.
Undoubtedly the movement to secure a mandate
from the nation in the form of signed statements delegating
full powers to the Wafd for achieving Egypt*s absolute
independence was alien to the aristocratic tendencies of
I 15* Ibid., Notebook no. 22, 26 December 1913*
| 16. Ibid., Notebook 32, 15 November 1918.
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its founding members. In itself, this step was an
indication of the growing involvement of wider sections
of the Egyptian population in the movement for political
independence. By virtue of his personal experience in
the art of political survival and his responsiveness to
the aspirations of the nation, Zaghlul did not fail to
identify himself with the emerging middle and lower
classes. In a speech to the workers, he expressed his
enormous joy at the fact that the movement had spread to
include the poorer classes. He said that had it been
confined to the upper classes, the national aim of the
Wafd, would have never, been, achieved.. He addressed his.
audience in the following terms: ,rYour envious enemies
have called you 'the class of the mob1 I take pride in
17being a member of the mob". Zaghlul carefully observed
the mood of the nation before taking a decision of major
political importance. Before starting his negotiations
with Lord Milner in 1920, he instructed the Secretary of
the Central Committee of the Wafd to prepare public
18opinion in Egypt for such an eventuality. Though the 
majority of the Wafd1s negotiating team in London endorsed
17- Eahmi's Memoirs, file 27, p. 2819*
18. Ibid., file 10, Zaghlul tc Eahmi, 18 April 1920, 
p* 954*.
Milner's proposals, Zaghlul however, eager not to alienate
the hulk of his supporters in Egypt, insisted that the
nation should first be consulted before the final word
was pronounced. cldli Yeghen, on that occasion, informed
Milner's emissary in Paris that what prevented him from
concluding an agreement with Britain
"is only one jarring note and that is the 
attitude of Zaghlul Pasha, who is getting 
more difficult to manage every day. but 
who is not negligible unfortunately and 
who is going to be troublesome".^9
In his political campaign against the Liberal 
Constitutionalists in later years, Zaghlul refuted the 
old theme of the 'Ummah Party which envisaged the commer­
cial and financial independence of Egypt as a pre-requisite 
for genuine political freedom. On 7 October 1923* he 
informed a meeting of Egyptian merchants in Cairo that 
in the absence of political independence, Egypt would 
simply never achieve its economic liberty. He felt that 
the persistent emphasis of his opponents on the priority 
of economic and financial matters revealed a deliberate 
effort on their part to divert the attention of the nation 
from advocating the political independence of their 
country. He said,
19* P.O. 848/20, 0. Walrond to Milner, 9 October 1920.
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"It is necessary to economise and study the 
financial situation, hut our duty lies first 
and foremost in the achievement of political 
independence« Otherwise, what good is it 
to us to promote our economic interests 
without independence.
T.7hy did our experiment in the establishment 
of the ginning factories fail?
It failed because heavy taxes were imposed.
It failed because we were not in possession 
of our political freedom. Had it not been 
that we were under the rule of the foreigner 
we would have built a thousand and one industry.
It is, therefore, essential tiat if we 
exert in industry and commerce one carat of 
our effort, we should spend the remaining 
twenty three carats in the pursuit of our
political independence".20
Whether Egypt could have industralised if it 
had not been occupied by Britain is a matter for specu­
lation, however, the important thing for our purpose is 
to note that Zaghlul's emphasis on the principle of direct 
political involvement rather than the evolutionary approach 
to the achievement of independence represented a major 
aspect of the rupture between the selective movement of 
the 'Ummah Party and the more popular appeal of the YJafd.
It would appear that by the end of the War, the struggle 
for independence was no more confined to the activities 
of a limited number of Egyptian notables and large
20. Bahmi r s Memoirs , files 3-4-*
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landowners. fho Waf d embodied the hopes and aspirations 
of the rising middle classes, the lawyers, the doctors, 
the merchants and the class of Government officials.
As events unfolded during the period 1919 to 
1921, the coexistence of these two incompatible trends in 
the Wafd became increasingly intolerable. However, the 
movement passed through three interrelated phases before 
it finally lost its elements of cohesion and consequently 
the compromising faction broke away. March 1919 witnessed 
the outbreak of political disturbances in the provinces 
and the urban centres. In April, the Central Committee 
of the Wafd and a number of voluntary organisations 
affiliated to it were formed, which in effect consolidated 
the predominant position of the middle classes in the 
movement. Finally by making concessions to the moderate 
section of the Wafd, Britain managed to undermine the 
principle of national unity which the Wafd at the time of 
its formation represented*
During the War signs of discontent were brev/ing 
among the poorer classes in the countryside and the towns. 
Already the small landowning peasant was suffering from 
the effects of fragmentation of land. His average land- 
holding further declined from 1,17 feddans in 1907 to 
0.9 L feddan in 1918. A large number of those peasants 
who in 1907 cultivated land on lease, appeared by 1917
2 5 2
to have lost their land and "become more agricultural 
labourers. To make ends moot, the families of the 
landless and small peasants were employed on the large 
estates. Vhile in 1907* only 14,000 females were regis­
tered as agricultural workers and farm servants, by 1917
PIthey had increased to 1,530,000. The scarcity of land
and the rapid growth of the population in the countryside
caused the movement of a great number of poor peasants to
the towns seeking employment. Tho process of urbanisation
was given impetus by the presence of large bodies of
British troops in the towns. In Middle Egypt, whore the
percentage of landless poas.ants was the highest in the 
22country, there was a slower rate of increase in the 
population of the towns than a decade earlier. The small 
farmers and agricultural labourers of this part of Egypt 
appeared to drift in the direction of the Delta and the 
southern provinces in search for better opportunities 
of work. However, the population of the mercantile and 
provincial centres in lower and Upper Egypt showed a 
substantial rate of increase which exceeded that for the
21. Ministry of finance, The Census of Egypt Taken in 1917»
p. 580.
22. F.O. 848/19> Sir Thomas Owen, a member of the Milner 
Mission responsible for inquiring into the economic 
and agricultural situation in Egypt, estimated that
55 /o, 40 /o and 58 /o of the total number of families 
in Middle, Upper and Lower Egypt respectively did 
not possess land.
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whole population of the country* But at the end of the
War* the demobilisation of the army and the resumption
of large scale imports left tho majority of these uprooted
peasants without their means of subsistence. Consequently,
they supported the struggle for independence and joined
the newly formed labour unions during the industrial
unrest which broke out in 1919*
In the meantime, the condition of the mass of
small peasants who remained on the land continued to
deteriorate* This was accurately described in the report
on the "Agricultural and Economic Position of Egypt"
ox
prepared by the Milner Mission* ^ It stated that the 
demand for war material brought about the substitution of 
cotton for cereals with the obvious result of a sharp rise 
in the cost of foodstuffs, especially bread which formed 
82°/o of the total energy of the whole diet of the poorer 
classes. There was also a shortage in cattle on which 
the peasant relied to plough the land, and which he 
generally offered as a form of security against the plot 
of land he rented from the large proprietors, v/hile in 
1905, the ratio of persons per head of cattle was 7 : 1, 
in 1919 it increased to 12 : 1. One of the most potent 
sources of the small peasants' misery was the system under
23. Ibid.
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which they hired the land. The Mission "failed to obtain
copies of private leases or agreements between landlords
and tenants. It does rot seen to be the custom for
tenants to have copies of the agreements". The conditions
under which land was leased was not based on any established
law. Exorbitant rents were the rule in Egypt and not the
exception, whenever the crop failed the tenant suffered
the consequences. And when the peasant's financial
difficulties mounted, his creditor forced him to accept
the lowest value for his produce. On the other hand, the
Government made no effort to establish or support the
agricultural credit banks and left the matter in the
hands of the money-lender or the private enterprises.
The report of the Mission noted that,
"judging from the balance sheets of one of 
the Egyptian Agricultural Banks the profit 
made from its dealings with the fellaheen 
is beyond all reason. The policy of the 
Bank was the 'Pound of flesh' as in 1916 
when the fellah could not sell his cotton, 
the Bank pressed him to such an extent that 
the G-overnnent had to arrange a kind of 
'pawn shop' where the fellah could pledge 
his family's jewellery in order to meet 
the Bank's demands for instalments".
The report, with a view to satisfying the peasants'
hunger for land, recommended the compulsory acquisition
of land from the large landowners for the purpose of
distributing it among the landless.
To add to the peasant's plight and misfortune,
the military authorities, during tho War, pres sod tor the
recruitment of an increasing number of Egyptians in the
Labour and Camel Corps . It the request of C-eneral
Allenby all Governmental and private schemes requiring
24Unskilled labour were discontinued. Early in May 1918,
the British military and civil authorities decided that
"labour should be requisitioned from the 
villages on a sort of corvee system. This 
should be done through the Mudirs, Mamaours 
ana Cmdas".25
In compliance with this decision, the Prime Minister
instructed the Governors of the provinces to use all their
moral influence to ensure the success of the campaign.
He added that he had observed "that some Mamurs and Omdehs
are showing some neglect", and warned:
'In the future I will deal myself with those 
of whose neglect the Military authorities 
complain and will reward all those who will 
do their work in a satisfactory manner".26
The local authorities in the majority of cases
proceeded to implement the instructions of the Prime
24. P.O. 141/Bcx 797/file 2689? report on "The Limitation 
of Government and Private Works likely to interfere 
with Recruiting Egyptian Labour", prepared by a 
British committee with delegates from the army and 
the Egyptian Service, 24 December 1917*
25. Ibid. , report on a meeting of British officials 
attended by Allenby and Wingate, 5 May 1918.
26. Ibid. ; Enclosed in Haines to K. Boyd, 8 May 1918.
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Minister by the use oi force» Peasants were dragged
unwillingly away from their homes, families, and fields.
A recruiting officer vividly described the typical method
of obtaining men as it was acted by a group of recruits
in on^ - of the camps. He wrote:
"They procured an empty biscuit box and 
installed one of their numbers to represent 
my clerk. On either side of him were two 
gentlemen from Mit Anil representing the 
Mamoor Markaz and the Doctor and in front 
of the box strutting up and down was a par­
ticularly dirty ruffian representing my 
unworthy self ... One of the men xvould then 
be brought up with a great show of reluctance 
whereupon an official would shout out in a 
tremendous voice !Iktemf (sign), he would 
then be forced to sign and pushed over to 
the other, side, amidst howls. of delight from . 
the others".27
Though in themselves these mounting grievances 
did not endow the Egyptian peasant with a definite poli­
tical outlook, -they nonetheless shaped his attitude 
towards the state, the British and the landlords. As 
the news of the disturbances in the urban centres and more 
particularly Cairo reached him early in March 19197 and 
as the class of government officials in the provinces 
took an active part in support of the Wafd, thus causing 
a temporary breakdown in the system of public security 
throughout the country, the peasant identified his
27* Ibid., A.H- Curtis to Colonel Hazel, 1 June 1918.
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immediate oppressors and acted accordingly* Devoid of
any conscious political planning * the uprising -of the
peasants in Egypt took the form of spontaneous attacks
against the British occupation, the local authorities and
the wealthier classes*
Is early as 1916, signs of disobedience among
the men enlisted in the Labour and Camel Corps were
observed. On 29 January 1916, 400 recruits inarched to 
c— —Abdin Square to put before the Sultan their grienvances.
Lhey complained of the insufficient pay, the bad rations
they received, and ill treatment from British N.0.0*8.
Before they were marched back to their barracks by the
British troops, the mounted police had already wounded
28twenty of them. During a visit to one of the camps in 
Assiut, a British officer observed that the officer in 
charge
"found it necessary to surround the camp 
with barbed wire. In a recent case in which 
200 men were taken by somewhat irregular 
methods at Beni Suef the whole of the 200 
with one exception deserted before reaching 
Cairo".29
28. F.O. 800/48, McMahon to Grey, 2 February 1916; Wingate * s 
Papers, Box 159•, Assistant Adjutant General in Cairo 
to Adjutant General in Khartoum, 29 January 1916.
29* F-0. 141/Box 797/file 2689> Report on the progress 
of the recruitment campaign submitted to the High 
Commissioner, 27 May 1917*
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British officials who were in close contact
with native opinion in the countryside sounded notes of
warning. V/. YTillcocks of the Department of Irrigation
wrote: "Something should he done to get hack the goodwill
of the fellah, without which our rule here is founded on
30sand."^ During the second half of 1918 numerous reports
were received from the provinces describing attacks made
by the villagers against the local authorities and the
British troops. One such typical report from the governor
of the Qena province read as follows:
"The village Sheikh, [of] Armant, proceeded, 
with the Sheikh-Ghafar and a number of Ghafirs, 
to collect recruits, for the Military Author­
ities when one of the villagers offered 
resistance, firing a shot at the Sheikh 
Ghafar, who was also beaten with sticks, 
until ho expired; the village Sheikh was 
similarly assaulted, with blows, by sticks, 
so much so that he succumbed to his injuries.
Seeing this, the Ghafirs fired a number 
of shots, killing 3 villagers and wounding 
3 others ..."31
The deportation of Zaghlul and his colleagues, 
on 8 March, in the first instance provoked a large scale 
movement of student unrest and strikes among the lawyers, 
tramworkers, and government employees in Cairo and
30. 17ingat ef s Papers , Box 237 ? W. 1/illcocks, 1 Memorandum 
giving the opinion of a very friendly and reliable 
Egyptian1, 4- March 1919*
31 F.O. 14-1/Box 797/file 2689* Mudir of Qena to Ministry 
of Interior, 20 May 1918.
259
Alexandria. This was immediately followed by similar
demonstrations in the provincial towns. On 12 March, the
Acting Commissioner reported that troubles broke out in 
52Tanta, and a few days later he wrote, "All communications
55with Upper Egypt are interrupted for present" . J The
next day the disturbances spread to Zaqaziq, Mansura and
Beni Suef. The railway and telegraphic communications in
the Delta were cut and the "Military effort is confined
for the moment to restoring Alexandria - Cairo line which
54has again been cut". Cheetham, alarmed at the rapid
deterioration of the situation, advised the Foreign
Secretary to grant the Egyptian delegates permission to
•leave the country for the purpose of advocating their
national aspirations. He wrote:
"It should be realised that we are now in a 
totally different situation from that of 
moment when your original instructions were 
given not to relax restrictions in case of 
Nationalist Leaders,
No one in Egypt at that time could have 
believed that actual insurrectionary out­
burst was possible.
Its sudden appearance and rapid growth 
is astonishing to the oldest observers ...
British officials incline to the belief that
32. F.O. 371/3714, Cheetham to F.O. 12 March 1919-
33- Ibid., Cheetham to F.O. 15 March 1919.
34. Ibid., Cheetham to F.O. 16 March 1919.
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whatever Nationalist instigation there may 
have been in last few doaths the feeling now 
exhibited must have been growing during 
several years, and that an explosion at sone 
tine was inevitable".
On the sane day, he reported:
"Provinces of Behera, Gharbia, Menufia and 
Dakehlia are in a state of open revolt ... 
generally speaking Civil Government in the 
country districts of the Delta Provinces 
is non-existent except when practically 
maintained by Military ... Turkish flag 
is flown in some villages".55
On 18 March, the train from Luxor to Cairo was attacked
at Deirut. In the incident three British officers and
365 soldiers were killed. Reinforcements sent to the aid
of a small garrison of British troops in AssLut was twice
attacked on the way. In the event a senior British
officer, who took a prominent part in the recruitment
campaign during the T7ar was shot and died three days 
37later. ( By July 1919* the British military casualties
38numbered 29 killed and 114- wounded.
Simultaneously, the peasants attacked the 
provincial authorities, the police stations, and the 
government offices in the districts, which they naturally
55* Ibid., 19 March 2919*
36. Al-Rafici, Thawrat 1 9 1 9 ■> p. 171-
37. Ibid.
38. P.O. 371/5718, Allenby to P.O., 21 July 1919.
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associated with the repressive measures inflicted upon 
them during the Tar. In Assiut * Mini a al-Qamh and Menuf, 
the insurrectionists ransacked the police headquarters 
and took possession of the arms and ammunition. At 
Qalyub, the demonstrators burned the railway station 
and damaged the agricultural road. Attempting to interfere 
with the rebels, the governor of the Beheira province was 
beaten with sticks and later taken to the hospital. The 
government officials in the provinces "if not terrorised 
have no influence and we are not for moment in contact 
with them. Sultan is isolated in his palace and has no 
authority". J Cheetham reported that on March 14, the 
insurgents released the recruits in the Menuf Markaz and 
set the government house on fire. He added that "Zifta 
fell into hands of the mob, after demonstrations in which 
Europeans are said to have taken part* and in the course 
of which the ex-Khedive's photograph was hoisted in the 
Markaz. ... In the Fayoum began attacks by Bedouin bands 
upon communication and Government buildings" However,
in the majority of cases where government officials Y/ere 
unable to muster enough forces to repel the attacks, they
39. F.O. 371/3714, Cheetham to F.O., 20 March 1919*
14O. Al-Ahram * 21 March 1969, Cheetham to Curzon, 25
March 1919*
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either joined the rebels or idly stood by allowing events 
tc take their own course.
By the middle of March 1919* the troubles in 
the countryside acquired a new dimension. The large 
landowner, the foreign money-lenders, and in some cases 
the Coptic shopkeepers and jewellers became the targets 
of the deprived and exploited peasants. On receiving 
some information from the provinces after the partial 
repair of the telegraphic lines, the Acting Commissioner 
hopefully wrote MIn certain districts movement has 
character of a peasant rising against landlords, which 
is perhaps an indication that organised motive has spent 
its force".^ The British authorities appeared to 
encourage this new tendency which undermined the position 
of the upper classes and deflected the hostility of the 
peasants from themselves. According to a British Inspec­
tor, the reason for the change in the attitude of the 
peasants tov/ards the landlords was partly due to
"The British propaganda last year which was 
mainly directed at the Effendi class and 
the fellahin, Nearly all the pamphlets 
issued were in the line that the Effendi 
class had exploited the fellahin and had 
a l lo w e d them to suffer most".4-2
| 41. F.O. 371/3714-* Cheetham to F.O., 23 March 1919*
j
42. F.O. 141/Box 514, R.S. Stafford to the acting Adviser 
| of Interior, Monteith-Smith, 23 October 1920.
\
The investigations made by the hi In or Mission on the 
situation of the peasants further indicated that,
"The March riots revealed to the large 
owners how strong a feeling existed among 
the fellaheen against their rapacity and 
suggested that the threats of violence then 
made might very easily he translated into 
bloodshed and danger to themselves. It is 
reported that some estates were actually 
captured and divided during the riots, but 
on the retention of order were returned to 
the owners, but the attitude of the fellaheen 
during these riots indicated clearly reforms 
much overdue, if permanent content is to be 
established throughout the country" .4-2
The Acting Commissioner described the movement as being
not only anti-Sultanian and anti-foreign, but also "has
Bolshevist tendency, aims at destruction of property as
well as communications" A nationalist lawyer in
Assiut and an eyewitness observed that,
"The prominent families in Assiut locked their 
doors and installed their own guardsmen to 
protect them from the rebellious masses.
It was a revolution against the British, 
and a revolution against wealth. The former 
was the revolution cf the enlightened againsr 
Britain. The latter was the revolution of 
the evil poor against the rich".
In an attempt to prevent a group of peasants determined
to set on fire a building belonging to Mahmud Pasha
Suleiman, leader of the fUmnah Party, the young lawyer
43. P.O. 848/19> Report of the Milner Mission on the 
"Agricultural and Economic Position of Egypt".
44. P.O. 371/3714-, Cheetham to P.O. 19 March 1919*
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reninded tlie crowd that the Fashafs son. Muhammad Mahmud* #
was deported with Zaghlul. This hardly made any impres­
sion on the crowd, "One of the monsters retorted: Has
Mahmud Fasha Suluman ever distributed bread among the 
hungrv? It is food that we seek". In another part of 
the town, where the jewellery shops were looted, the Coptic 
merchants were the main victims of the deprived crowds.
The government employees left their posts and sought
refuge in the security of the private homes of the notables
45and foreign Consuls. ^ In Balbis the villagers burned 
part of the estate of Ibrahim Fasha Llurad, one of the 
founders of the Jaridah Company and a.leading member of . . 
the 'Hmmah Party.^
However, towards the end of March, the arrival 
of British reinforcements and the appointment of Lord 
Allenby as Special High Commissioner to Egypt with 
extraordinary powers enabled the military authorities 
gradually to gain control over the country. Firm and in 
many cases rather excessive measures were adopted to 
suppress the peasants. Although., for example, the 
inhabitants of the two villages of Azizia and Berdashin 
did not offer any resistance to the troops, the British 
officers in charge found it
45* F* Abaza, al Bahik a l - B a k l Cairo, 1933> PP* 58-73• 
46, Al-Ahram, 4 April 1969.
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"necessary to burn houses as a measure of 
coercion or punishment. This accordingly 
was done in each of the four hamlets com­
posing Azizia, and the native villages being 
very inflammable the fires once started 
spread rapidly, and a considerable number 
of houses were burnt".^7
In the meantime, the propertied classes in the
towns and the countryside, who in the first instance were
caught unprepared for the event, and who were extremely
alarmed at the growing threat which the movement posed
to private property and the machinery of the state
counselled calm and obedience to law and order. In some
districts, the notables, the lawyers and the native
Government officials who were sympathetic to the T7afd1s
aims took control over the movement and formed local
committees to protect the foreign residents and organise
ASthe administration. In Zifta a nationalist notable 
with the tacit agreement of the Ma'mur, presided over a 
revolutionary committee which took upon itself the 
administration of the affairs of the district, in the 
absence of the authority of the central Government
47* F.O. 571/3719v Allenby to Curzon, 25 August 1919*
4-8. Al-Ahram, 18 March 1969*
49- Al-Bafici, Thawrat 1919, p* 162. In recent years 
some Egyptian writers have asserted that during 
the uprising, Zifta was declared a republic, see 
for example; A. Abdel-Malek, Sgypte Societe Militaire,
F/note contd. on next page
2 c  6
Describing his own disappointment at the tarn of events
in Assiut, the young nationalist lawyer wrote:
"It was a shock for the young patriot. The 
revolution was a bewildering mixture between 
the advocates of independence and those who 
demanded food. It was indeed a strange mixture 
between national struggle and naive socialism".
Cheetham when first noting that the peasants foere beginning 
to attack private property remarked: "Fear of this is
driving decent Egyptians to try and arrive at some under­
standing with extremists sc as to modify their attitude
51and force them to approve of formation of a Ministry".
A few days later, he reported that a group of Egyptian
notables including a number of wealthy landowners
approached the Residency indirectly with the view to
obtain permission for the Egyptian delegation to proceed 
—I 52to England. Consequently, on 24 March, the members 
of the T7afd in Egypt, all the ex-Ministers, the leading 
Muslim and Coptic dignatories, the President and members
Footnote 49 contd. from previous page.
Paris, 1962, p. 28; also A.B. Al-Din, Ayyam Laha 
larlkh, Cairo, 1954. However, the evidence in al- 
Rafici , a contemporary of the 1919 events does not 
bear out this point.
50 Abaza, p. 63.
51 F.O. 371/3714* Cheetham to F.O., 16 March 1919*
52. Ibid., Cheetham to F.O., 22 March 1919*
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of the Legislative Assembly, and senior Government
officials addressed an appeal to the Egyptian nation.
The appeal significantly implored the nation to refrain
from the attacks on the life and property of the innocent.
It further stated that
T'such attacks ace prohibited by the rules 
of God and the laws of raan. The disruption 
of the communications has teen clearly 
detrimental to the interests of the people.
It interrupted the transport of their produce, 
and brought trade to a standstill. Further­
more., it exposed many villages to punishment 
and destruction ... and alienated those 
who might otherwise sympathise with Egypt.
We appeal to the Egyptian nation in the 
name of its most sacred national duty to 
keep within the bounds of law. And we 
appeal ro the notables and men of influence 
throughout the country to prevent the ^  
recurrence of these harmful incidents". ^
The uprising in the countryside thus gradually
came to an end by the suppressive measures of the military
authorities and the efforts of the moderate as well as
the radical sections of the Wafd. Though the large
majority of Egyptian professionals and Government employees 
strongly opposed the occupation, they were, however, 
equally averse to the destruction of the machinery of 
the State which they hoped to control. The small 
merchants in the towns and the rural middle classes were
53- Al-Fafici, Thawrat 1919* PP« 183-184.
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more inclined to accept the peaceful ant lawful means 
for achieving independence than suffer the consequences 
of a social upheaval. In the meantime, the confusing 
situation which prevailed in the ranks of the supporters 
of the 7afd0 during the uprising, soon gave way to a more 
organised and institutionalised form of resistance to the 
occupation.
The early events of the rising in the Tirban
centres appeared to lack coordination or organisation.
The spontoneous demonstrations of the students in Cairo
occured despite the objections of some members of the
Wafd. The Acting High Commissioner reported that
"There is some evidence that Nationalist leaders were
55opposed to this outbreak". ^ However, the movement 
continued to gain momentum and a measure of organised 
effort in certain cases slowly emerged. The Acting 
Commissioner wrote: "The most disquieting feature is
a strike of advocates, a concerted movement which has now 
prevented all the native courts of first instance in 
provinces from sitting". At the sane time, he noted that 
there was an effort to disrupt the work of the adminis-
54. Al~cAqqad, p. 229.
55* P.O. 371/5714, Cheetham to P.O., 10 March 1919*
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56tration. By mid-March, the strike of the Native Bar
became general, and the workers in the railway repair
57shops abandoned their work. ( Cheetham described the
movement in the following terms.
"I should make it clear that present movement 
in Egypt is national in the full sense of 
the word. It has now apparently the sympathy 
of all classes and creeds, including the 
Copts".58
Though the appeal of the Egyptian notables had a general 
calming effect o£l the population, sporadic disturbances 
continued. In April, the newly formed Strike Committee 
representing the Government employees called for a strike 
until Zaghlul and his colleagues were recognised as the
dq
official represencatives of Egypt in the Feace Conference. J
An Intelligence report revealed that until the beginning
of April, Cairo was quiet, but then demonstrations
recurred and the Egyptian
"Military and Police Cadets left Military 
School in a body and demonstrated before 
Sultanfs Palace. On April 3, 70 men of 
the Egyptian Army refused duty and left 
the barracks with their arms but returned 
later ... on 5th and 6th in Old Cairo 
trenches were dug and barricades erected
56. Ibid., Cheetham to P.O. 11 March 1919*
57* Ibid., Cheetham to P.O., 15 March 1919-
58. j oid. Cheetham to P.O., 17 March 1919*
59* Al-Rafici, Pi *Acqab al-Thawrah, Cairo, 194-6, p. 13*
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by natives".^
The radical elements in the Wafd, and notably
cAbdel Ifeitoan Pahml, the General Secretary of the Central
Committee which was formed on 12 April, did not fail to
appreciate the vital importance of the initiative of the
students, the lawyers, the doctors, and Government
officials in the struggle for independence, A number
of committees under the direct supervision of cAbdel
Hahman Pahmi, who at that time enjoyed Zaghlul's personal
confidence were organised to coordinate the activities
of the different sections of the movement. Together
with his nephew, Ahmad Maher and Mahmud al-Nuqrashl,
Pahml was able to exercise a predominant influence over
61the existing secret societies. Similarly by the end 
of 1919  ^ the Wafd had consolidated its position in the 
countryside by winning the allegiance of the majority of 
umdas, and the Provincial Councillors. In fact, this 
wide range of semi-official institutions and voluntary 
organisations, formed the basis of the Wafd1s social and 
political power in the rural and urban areas for years to J 
come. They were instrumental during the campaign which
60. P.O. 371/3715i General Headquarters, Egypt to War 
Office, 9 April 1919*
61. P.O. 371/10899, The Confessions of Shafiq Mansur,
18 June 1925* enclosed in Henderson to Chamberlain,
6 July 1925*
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"kk-e Wafd successfully launched against the Milner Mission, 
and prevented a number of Ministers from taking office 
under the Protectorate. Senior British officials giving 
evidence before the Mission admitted that the umdas, 
and the provincial councillors had fallen under the 
influence of the Wafd. The Adviser of Interior reported 
that
"Every Provincial Council has registered a 
protest in favour of boycotting the Milner 
Commission. As regards the cotton tax, 
only four have so far made a protest, but 
doubtless other protests will be made.
The irrigation projects ... have only been 
dealt with by those Councils which have 
hold their meetings since the middle of 
February., other Councils will probably 
........  follow the lead..."62
These protests were made in response to the policies of
Wafd. A circular distributed in the provinces and
signed by a secret society affiliated to the Wafd blamed
Britain for the fall in the prices of cotton. It
attacked the Minister of Public Works for his proposal
to build a barrage in the Sudan, which the circular
claimed would prevent the flow of the waters of the Nile
to Egypt. It incited the peasant to demand his rights
and the independence of his country,
"as Independence means your happiness and 
that of your children. Unite with your
62. F.O. 848/11, Clayton to Residency, 29 February 1920.
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brethren in the eternal struggle against 
Lord Milner’s Band. May God bless Union.
Down with Milner’s Band. Down with the 
Treacherous Ministry".^3
Investigations a i b o  ahowod that, until iK-^r.b, 1919, the 
British authorities had been able to secure the appoint­
ment of cuadas of their own choice,, but since then,
"This is ... no longer the case as the Nationalist Caucus 
has got hold of the members of the Cmdeh Commission, 7/ho
filL
are now considerably involved in the political movement".
* * *
The political aspect of Britain's reaction to
the events in Egypt widened the gulf between the compro­
mising and radical factions in the Uafd. The Sultan.......
under pressure from the High Commissioner and at the same 
time concerned about the growing popularity of Zaghlul,
withdrew the support which he had initially afforded the
movement. On the other hand, the refusal of the British 
Government to receive the nationalist deputation in 
London and the subsequent arrest and deportation of 
Zaghlul and his colleagues, in the first instance, did 
not only precipitate a ministerial crisis and a rebellion,
63. P.O. 848/12, Circular entitled "Life or Death",
9 January 1920.
64- P.O. 848/19> Draft Memorandum on the Ministry of
Interior, prepared for the use of the Milner Mission.
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but also preserved temporarily the unity o± the Wafd.
However, on his arrival in Egypt on 25 March 1919>
Allenby realised that the movement was not a passing
phase, but had come to stay, and, therefore, it was
necessary to reach a settlement regarding Egypt's status
under the Protectorate. He informed the Foreign Office 
he
that though/succeeded by the force of arms tc suppress
the most outward disorders in Egypt the 1 causes of unrest
and ill feeling are still strong as ever, and I can see
65no prospect of improvement under present conditions". ^
He repeatedly urged, after consultation with Rushdi and
cAdlI, for the removal of the restrictions imposed upon
the Egyptians to travel abroad, and explained:
"This concession without conferring any 
official recognition generally from me, 
would automatically restore tranquility 
and guarantee formation of a Ministry.
Fruitful discussions with His Majesty's 
Government would then be possible".^
Hhile promising him the "fullest support" for
his policy, the Foreign Office asked Allenby to consider
an alternative suggestion, that of sending a Commission,
65. F.O. 571/3714, Allenby to F.O., 4 April 1919*
66. Ibid., Allenby to F.O. 5-1 March 1919* On Allenby* s 
policy, in Egypt, see E. Kedourie, 'The Genesis of 
the Egyptian Constitution of 1925*, (ed.) Holt, 
Political and Social ..., pp. 547-301.
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headed by Lord Milner to report on the future form of
67the Protectorate* f He accepted the proposal hut added 
that "such a Commission will he desirable later hut would
he useless now" and decided to lift the embargo on travel
_ 68 
and ordered the release of Zaghlul and his colleagues.
Consequently, Husain Bushdi agreed to form a Government,
hut resigned less than two weeks later as a result of the
continued strike of the Government officials, and the
endorsement of the Protectorate by the United States,
Allenby thus resorted to the formation of a new Ministry
under the premiership of Muhammad SacId, who gave his
"assurances as to his recognition of British Protectorate 
69
over Egypt". y
Simultaneously, the Commissioner proceeded to
implement a number of measures designed to take the heat
out of the movement. He "put an end to Military Courts
set up to try offenders connected with recent disorders"*
and decided to release some of those who were interned on
70political grounds. The press censorship was removed, 
but the newspapers remained "subject to certain penalties
67- P.O. 371/3714, E-0. to Allenby, 5 April 1919*
68. Ibid., Allenby to P.O., 6 April 1919*
69. P.O. 371/3717, Allenby to P.O., 21 May 1919*
70. P.O. 371/3718, Allenby to P.O., 9 July 1919*
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71if license grossly abused”. In September 1919, the
Acting Commissioner decided to increase the salaries of
all grades of Government employees to meet the rising
72cost of living. Less than a year later, the Egyptian
Government with the concurrence of the British authorities
”taking into consideration the urgency of 
the co.se of many senior officials, for whom 
the previous increase has been found to provide 
quite inadequate relief, has decided to grant 
a provisional increase of 10°/o on Government 
salaries”.75
Similarly, the High Commissioner turned his
attention to the grievances of the small peasants who
were suffering from the exorbitant rents they paid to
the landlords and the continued fall in the prices of
cotton. Allenby felt that the consequence of such a
situation would ultimately lead to the renewal of agrarian 
74disturbances. An Agricultural Rents Commission was 
thus organised in each province for the purpose of fixing 
the rentals for the agricultural year 1920-1921. By the 
end of 1921, the majority of cases brought before these 
Commissions were d u ^  resolved. According to official
71. F.O. 571/5727, Allenby to F.O., 4 July 1919-
72. E.G. 571/5719, Cheetham to F.O., 16 September 1919.
75- F.O. 571/4-995* £)• Scott to Curzon, 7 July 1920.
74. F.O. 571/4992, Allenby to Curzon, 24 November 1920.
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reports, "The average reduction of rent granted has been 
fairly unifora in the different districts and has varied 
from 4-0°/o to 60°/o". The biggest reductions were ma.de
in the Minia Province where in some cases reductions
o 75 were *^s high as 75 / o .
On 18 August, 1919v 'the Labour Conciliation 
Board was formed tc deal with the problems arising from 
industrial disputes It dealt with matters concerning 
the conditions of work and mainly the demands of the 
workers for wage increases.^
Though these measures reduced to a considerable 
extent the existing level of political tension in the 
country, the basic issue of conflict between the occupation 
and even the moderates in the Wafd was not resolved.
Without a substantial modification in the form of the 
Protectorate, Allenby failed to achieve political stability. 
Between April 1919> 3.nd the end of 1921, five successive 
Governments were formed, but each, with the exception of 
Uessim's Government which enjoyed the Wafd1s temporary 
support and thus remained in office for nearly a period
75- P.O. 571/7763> R.V. Wild, Director General of Direct 
Taxes Department to the Egyptian Undersecretary of 
State for Pinance, 16 January 1922.
76. P.O. 371/5030, President of the Labour Conciliation 
Board to the Prime Minister, 22 March 1920.
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of 10 months, did not survive more than a few months and 
in certain cases only a few days. Ho?/ever, during the 
same time, the British authorities concentrated their 
efforts on weaning away the more moderate elements in 
the W.-afd from Zaghlul's influence. In this process, 
cAdli Yeghen, who advocated the modification of the 
Protectorate on lines similar to those of the 1Ummah 
Party, played an instrumental role in bringing about a 
final split in the \Jafd.
The recognition of the Protectorate by the 
United States and the Other Powers plunged the members 
of the Uafd in a state of depression. In their first 
letter to the central committee in Cairo they stated:
"since our arrival the doors have been closed to us and
M77our efforts have failed. Germany endorsed the Protectorate. 
On 24- July 1919, uhe v/afd expelled two of its members “for 
their disagreement to publish a report on the atrocities 
committed by the British troops against the inhabitants 
of a number of Egyptian villages. The two members 
appeared to favour a more conciliatory approach towards 
the occupation.^ By the end of the year, Zaghlul
77- Pahml' s Memoirs * file no. 4-, Wafd to Central Committee,
13 May 1919, p. 398.
78. Ibid., file no. p- 54-3-
2 7 8
realised that the Wafd1s reliance on the Powers to 
support Egypt's claim for independence had failed. He 
felt that the situation was further aggravated by the 
growing disunity among the members of the .7afd in Paris.
He wrote:
"Apart from our failure to win the support 
of the Powers, we are divided among ourselves 
... God has never created an organisation 
with so much disunity among its members as 
that of the T;afd".79
Following the arrival of the Milner Mission in Egypt on
7 December 19191 Lutfi al-Sayyid and cAbdel cAzIz Fahml
expressed their desire to return to Cairo for negotiations.
Zaghlul, however, strongly objected to the idea, and a
OQ • _
heated discussion ensued. Zaghlul was also subjected 
to pressure from cAdli Yeghen who was in close contact 
with Lord Milner in Cairo. However, cAdli's efforts and 
those of the Mission to lure Zaghlul into returning to 
Egypt were unsuccessful. He felt that his return would 
only solve the British dilemma created by the effective 
campaign in Egypt against the Mission cuid expose the 
disunity existing in the ranks of the Aafd. Furthermore, 
he believed that his insistence on his demands would
79- Zaghlul1s Memoirs, Notebook no. 35* 18 December 1919-
80. >bid., 12 January 1920.
decision was strengthened by the reports which he con-
c —______ _
tinuously received fron Abdel Rahman Fahmi, who assured
him of the determination of the nation to support the
O p
policy of complete independence.
The Mission left Egypt early in March 1920, and
cAdlI joined the Uafd in Faris a month later. Under
pressure fron his colleagues and cAdli, and in an attempt
to preserve the unity of the Tfafd, Zaghlul reluctantly
accepted a formal invitation from Milner to meet him in
London. Milnerfs emissary to Zaghlul, a member of the
Mission wrote:
"[Zaghlul] showed considerable obstinacy 
but it seemed to me that both Adly and 
Ahmed Lutfy el Said and Mohammad Mahmud, 
who _were both with him, were doing their 
hest to persuade him to come to London 
without making difficulties".^3
Before proceeding to London, Zaghlul sent three of his
colleagues to explore the bases on which an agreement
could be reached. And on receiving their favourable
impressions he decided to embark on the negotiations.
The British attitude during the discussions was
81. Ibid., H4 January 1920.
82. Fahmi1s Memoirs, file no. 9> p* 760.
83. F.O. 371/4-984-, C.J.B. Hurst to Milner, 20 May 1920.
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dominated by Milner's eo.rlier determination that,
"I do not for a aonont contemplate any 
Treaty, Convention or bargain with Egypt 
in substitution for the Protectorate. ’That 
I do think worth considering is, whether 
the definition of our several powers and 
duties in relation of Protecting and Protected 
Power might not take the form of an Agreement, 
tu which we should both be parties, rather 
than a Ukase of ours. Of course their 
agreement would be 1 camouflage1. They 
would only agree, because they could not 
help themselves. Still from the point of 
view of 1 saving face1, it would make a great 
difference to them if they could call their 
acceptance of our terms a Treaty of Alliance 
or something of the kind".®^
In the course of his conversations with the 
Egyptian delegation and in the memorandum he submitted 
tc cAdli in August 1920, which embodied the British 
proposals for a settlement, Lord Milner adhered to this 
policy.^ Moreover, he rejected the recommendations 
made by the Egyptian delegation which demanded the 
abolition of the Protectorate and the system of Capitu­
lations, the restriction of the powers of the British 
officials in the Egyptian service, and the withdrawal 
of the British troops to the Canal zone. Inevitably, a
84-. Milner1 s Papers, Box 162, Milner to Curzon, 10 
December 1919*
85* Eor the minutes of Zaghlul-Milner Conversations see 
P.O. 84-8/20, 22 and 26; also Zaghlulfs Memoirs, 
Notebooks nos. 36 > 37 and 39*
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deadlock was reached, hut, with the exception of Zaghlul
who decided to return tc Egypt, the other members of the
c —Jafd encouraged by Adli and Milner favoured the continu­
ation of the discussions on the basis of Milner’s project. 
Zaghlul then agreed to compromise with his colleagues.
He, however, insisted that before the resumption of the 
conversations, the views of the nation and especially the
members of the Legislative Assembly and the Provincial
86Councils on the proposed scheme should be heard. 
Furthermore, he plainly cautioned the Y/afdists in Cairo 
that the acceptance of Milner’s project would in effect 
be the endorsement of the Protectorate in the disguise
' o n
of a "Treaty of Alliance". Subsequently, the con­
sultations in Cairo which took place during September 
and October 1920, strengthened Zaghlul's hand. A con­
sensus of opinion emerged favouring the acceptance of 
Milner’s proposals provided that a number of substantial 
modifications were introduced. These included demands 
for the abolition of the Protectorate and Consular Courts, 
the restriction of the functions of the Financial and 
Judicial Advisers, and the modification of the Capitu-
86. Zaghlul’s Memoirs, Notebook no. 30, 15 August 1920.
87- Pahmi * s Memoirs, file no. 10, Zaghlul to Nahhas, 
cAfifi and wasif, 22 August, 1920, pp. 1016-1018.
lations with a view to enabling Egypt in the future to
88legislate for the foreign residents. Lord Milner 
refused to alter his programme, but agreed to recommend 
in his report to the British Government the negotiation 
of a ~reaty which would take into.consideration the 
reservations submitted by Zaghlul. At the same tine, 
he warned that this would considerably prejudice the
89chances of reaching an agreement acceptable tc Britain.
Following the failure of the discussions, the
c —founding members of the Wafd supported Adli?s suggestion 
for the formation of a Government which would negotiate
an agreement on the basis of Milner’s recommendations.
— c —Zaghlul rejected Adli's proposal and emphasised that
the Wafd was the only authoritative body to conduct such
90negotiations.
By then the disagreement in the leadership of
the Wafd was well 'under way. Zaghlul boycotted the
91meetings of the Wafd in Paris, and refused despite the 
appeals of the Central Committee to publish a denial of
88. Zaghlul1s Memojrs, Notebook no. 39* 19 October 1920.
89. F.O. 898/20, Minutes of Meeting with the Egyptian 
Delegation, 25 October 1920.
90. Zaghlul1s Memoirs, Notebook no. 39> 10 January 1921.
91. °Alluba, p. 130.
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92the reports reaching Cairo that a division had occured.
To counter °Adlifs efforts, he stated that in any future 
negotiations the V7afd should retain the effective leader­
ship and form the majority of the Egyptian negotiating 
qz
team. On 9 March 1921* Zaghlul decided to return to 
Egypt to nohili.se his supporters against cAdli’s newly- 
formed Government and the dissedent Wafdists. On his 
arrival in Alexandria on April 4* Zaghlul made public
Q —
his conditions for negotiations. Adli's contacts with 
him failed to produce any change in his position, and 
after several meetings of the Wafd, the moderate members
while declaring their full confidence in the Government
.................................. _ .................................................................................................95 ' -
b!i amed Zaghlul for the split in the Uafd. Zaghlul
retorted by expelling them from the movement and announced
that in view of the fact that the present Government was
the creation of the High Commissioner, its negotiations
with Britain would only be a case where "George V will
96be negotiating George V". Thus the unity of the Wafd 
ended.
92. Zaghlul1s Memoirs, Notebook no. 39* 1-4 February 1921.
93. Ibid., 18 March 1921.
94. Ibid.* 19 March 1921.
95. cAlluba, p. 153.
| 96. P.O. 371/6295> Allenby to P.O.* 27 April 1921.
ii
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'The majority of the dissenting members wore
Zaghlulfs old colleagues in the Legislative Assembly,
and former members of the 'Ummah Party, Their emergence
at the head of the nationalist movement at the end of
the -7^ r did not mark a change in their traditional
attitude towards the occupation. Their main concern
was to restore the position of social and political
prominence which they enjoyed before the establishment
of the Protectorate. Consequently, as the British
authorities proceeded to normalise the situation in Egypt
and offered to meet their demands, they readily abandoned
the radical variant of their movement led by Zaghlul
and joined hands with the occupation. Before embarking
on his negotiations with Earl Curzon, during the second
half of 1921, cAdli was afforded every possible support
to facilitate his mission and discredit Zaghlul. Allenby
urged his Government to accept Egypt1s claim for the
appointment of diplomatic representatives in foreign 
97capitals. On 22 February, the High Commissioner was 
authorised to inform the Sultan that the British Government 
"arrived at the conclusion that the status of protectorate 
is not a satisfactory relation in which Egypt should
97- F.O. 371/6292, Allenby to Curzon, 12 January 1921.
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continue to stand tc Great Britain". At the request 
c —
of AGli Yeghen, the Commissioner recommended the lifting
99of the press censorship. ' Furthermore, with a view to 
strengthening the position of cAdlIfs Government "who 
really wish for a settlement and give them some backing 
to control Zaghlul and extremists", Allenby demanded the 
despatch of British warships to Alexandria.100 Finally, 
in contrast to Milner1s uncompromising attitude towards 
Zaghlul, the new British proposals which included the 
abolition of the Protectorate and the establishment of 
Egyptian control over the Department of Foreign Affairs, 
were unquestionably more generous. They were made with 
the intention of facilitating CAdli's mission and at the 
same time undermining Zaghlul's position.101
C THowever, despite these concessions, Adli 
recognised the limitations of his support among Egyptians. 
He freely admitted during the conversations that the 
terms of the proposed treaty would not receive the
98. Ibid., Curzon to Allenby, 22 February 1921.
99. F.O. 371/6595, Allenby to Curzon, 10 May 1921.
100. F.O. 371/6294, Allenby to Curzon, 8 April 1921.
101. F.O. 371/6307, 'Memorandum of Clauses of a Suggested 
Convention between G. Britain and Egypt', November 
1921.
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1 0 2acceptance of Egypt's public opinion- He therefore
recommended that Britain should unilaterally put the
103draft treaty into operation. At the insistence of
Allenby and four of his senior advisers in the Egyptian
service, who threatened to resign, the British Cabinet
c —agreed to endorse Adli’j suggestion. In February 1922, 
Allenby made a declaration to this effect. The Protec­
torate was thus abolished and Egypt1s nominal independence 
recognised. Two years later, the first Egyptian Parlia­
ment after the Uar met. Unlike the position of the 
fUmmah Partjr in the Legislative Assembly ten years 
earlier, the representatives of the Liberal Constitution­
alists Party were in a minority in thenew Parliament.
By virtue of its entrenched position in the rural and 
urban areas, the v7afd had become a major political force 
in the country. Until such time as Britain were able to 
come to terms with its aspirations, a treaty with Egypt 
could not be concluded.
To conclude then, the nationalist rebellion of 
1919» reflected the growing dissatisfaction of the 
different classes in Egyptian Society with the British
c —102. For the minutes of the Adli-Curzcn Negotiations, 
see F.O. 371/6310.
103. F.O. 371/6307> Curzon to Allenby, 19 November 1921.
occupation and the existing system of Government. Occupied, 
by the pressing military requirements of the Aar, the 
British authorities in Egypt did not only overlook the 
economic and political interests of the class of provin­
cial retables, but implemented a number of measures which, 
intensified the grievances of the middle classes (the 
lower sections of the class of large landowners, the rural 
middle class, the majority of Government empDoyees, 
professionals, and retail merchants)., the workers, and 
the small peasants.
In the first instance, the hafd represented 
the movement of the 1Ummah Party seeking a return to the. 
pre-war situation, when a Legislative Assembly existed 
and the relative freedom of individuals and the press 
were guaranteed. But as the British Government refused, 
under the pressure of the -Jar, to listen to the moderate 
demands of Egypt, the Uafd increasingly became the 
rallying point for the expression of the demand for 
complete independence. This eventually resulted in the 
break away of the majority of the prominent members of 
‘tiie "Emmah Party from the Uafd, and the formation of the 
Liberal Constitutionalists Party with its organ the 
Siyasah newspaper.
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CONCLUSION
The British occupation of Egypt in 1882, gradually 
introduced profound changes in the political end social 
system of the country. Under the Consul-Generalship 
of Lord Cromer Egypt witnessed the decline in the 
powers of its traditional sovereign and the emergence 
of a new Egyptian political elite representing the 
political and economic interests of the class of 
provincial notables. The new system of Government 
not only consolidated the economic position of the 
large landowners, but enabled a group of local political 
notables, who were interested in securing an arrange­
ment with the Controlling Power to settle at the top 
of the indigenous political hierarchy* Consequently 
the majority of the members of this group acquired 
positions of influence in the administration and 
established their predominant control over the self- 
governing institutions which the occupation authorities 
devised to rule the country.
This process was given impetus by the increasing 
reliance of the British authorities on the support of 
the propertied classes, who since the occupation of 
Egypt were given "the impression that we intend to
e x e r t our influence through then rather then directly 
assums the government of the country ourselves"*
Therefore, ultimately the basis of the political 
power and ideological orientation of the emerging 
elite was twofold: an established economic and legal
position in tne country itself; and a relationship 
with a Great Power. However, partly governed by 
their relationship with Britain, and partly opposed to 
any fundamental structural changes in the existing 
social order and political system of the country, the 
new governing elite were neither able to transform 
themselves into a leadership elite nor even perceive 
of their role that way.
In fact whenever the development of events in 
Egypt threatened to undermine the basis of their 
political pre-eminence, they moved in concert with 
the British occupation to meet the challenge. In 
close alliance with Lord Cromer, the new elite of local 
political notables checked the Khedive1s attempts to 
restore part cf the political influence which he and 
his predecessors had lost to Britain. Similarly, 
in 1907> they reacted to the growing Panislamic and
1. Vangate1s Papers , Box 237, Wingate to R. Graham, 
28 Kay 1917.
Patriotic sentiment in tlie country following the Taba 
and Dinshwai Incidents by publishing the daily al-_ 
Ja.ri.dah to propound their views and by organising 
themselves in the 1Ummah Party.
it other times, however, their position under 
the pressure of circumstances appeared to suffer as 
a result of a temporary decline in their relationship 
with Britain* The conclusion of a friendly under­
standing between Cromer's successor and the Khedive, 
to the advantage of the latter, tended to jeopardize 
the political interests of the 1Ummah Party. The 
members of the new elite, in an effort to safeguard 
and promote their influence advocated the extension 
of the powers of the self-governing institutions which 
they controlled and demanded a constitution. However, 
these demands did not amount in any way to a change 
in the nature of the !Ummah-Ja ride h group, which^ 
remained loyally committed to the preservation of 
the existing system of Government and to their role 
as a ruling elite.
During the First World War a more serious set- 
baci: to their political influence occurred* The 
establishment of the new system of Protectorate not 
only violated the old maxim of Britain's policy towards
Egypt, namely that of governing the country indirectly, 
but also deprived Britain's local allies from the 
political privileges which they had enjoyed since the 
beginning of the British occupation. Consequently 
in co-operation with the Egyptian sovereign, the 
members of the 1Ummah Party sought to change the 
Protectorate and revert to a system of government 
similar to that which existed before the War, How­
ever, their efforts were largely unsuccessful.
In November 1918, at the instigation of Sultan 
Fu'acL and under the leadership of Sacd Zaghlul, a 
former Minister and the elected Vice-President of the ■ 
Legislative Assembly, the leading members of the 
1Ummah Party formed the Wafd movement to put before 
Britain Egypt's demand for self-government. However, 
by that time the emerging rural and middle classes 
which were keenly interested in achieving the political 
independence of the country, and which constituted the 
bull: of the organised and politically conscious sup­
porters of the movement, offered the founding members 
of the Wafd an opportunity to transform their role into 
that of an effective leadership elite. Instead the 
leadership of the new movement, with the exception of 
Zaghlul and some of his more radical supporters opted
for the restoration of its traditional relationship 
with Britain, welcomed the abolition of the Protec­
torate, and accepted the establishment of a consti­
tutional Government under British tutelage.
Eventually the compromising faction of the movement 
left the tfsfd. and formed the Liberal Constitutionalists 
Party*
'f ho ugh in the final analysis the Occupying Power 
chose to rely on the support of its old ally, name 
the governing elite of local political notables, 
Britain's dilemma in Egypt was not resolved. The 
Wafd which by the early 1920s embodied the growing 
social end political influence of the Egyptian middle 
classes had become a permanent political reality in 
the country. It formed the basis for the emergence 
of a more popular and independent political leader­
ship with which the Occupying Power had first to 
reach an understanding before it could finally legi­
timise its presence in Egypt.
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